


JPRS-UMA-95-007
21 February 1995



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-95-007

CONTENTS

21 February 1995

RUSSIAN MILITARY

CHECHNYA

Map Showing Chechen, Russian Positions [SEGODNYA 4 Feb]	1
Grachev TV Statement on Kovalev, Yushenkov [MOSCOW NEWS 27 Jan-2 Feb]	2
Appeal of Troops in Chechnya to RF Authorities [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 Jan]	3
Military Displeasure Over Conduct of Chechnya War [NOVOYE VREMYA Jan]	4
Supposed Military Report on Reasons for Failure in Chechnya [NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA 28 Jan]	6
Problems in Supplying Forces in Chechnya [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Feb]	9

MILITARY POLICY

Rodionov on Urgency of Army Reforms [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 9 Feb]	10
Col-Gen Samasonov on Steps for Army Reform [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 27 Jan]	16
Critique of Current Approach to Civilian Control Over Military [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 27 Jan]	19
'Catastrophe' Foreseen if Decline in Pay Continues [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Feb]	21
Text of Statement on WGF Bank Account in Zossen [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Feb]	23
Pay Supplements for Work With Secrets Explained [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb]	24
Amendments to Law on Status of Servicemen [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 2 Feb]	24
Russian Federal Law on Veterans [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Jan]	26

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

U.S. Views on Counterinsurgency Discussed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Feb]	40
---	----

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Underspensing on Helicopter Development, Production Deplored [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb]	41
--	----

NAVAL FORCES

Gromov: The Navy in the Last Year [MORSKOY SBORNIK Dec]	44
The Problem of Unidentified Submarines in the Waters of Sweden [MORSKOY SBORNIK Dec]	47
Results of Training Year Summed Up [MORSKOY SBORNIK Dec]	49

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

'Bureaucrats' Assailed Over Army Food Supplies [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Feb]	50
'Dual Book Keeping' in Main Trade Directorate [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 4 Feb]	51
List of Officer-Training Institutions [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Feb]	53

UKRAINE

GENERAL POLICY ISSUES

Shmarov Interviewed on Regional Conflicts, International Accords [NARODNA ARMIYA 10 Feb]	57
---	----

General Sobkov Addresses Territorial Defense Conference [NARODNA ARMIYA 26 Jan]	58
Observers Assess New York Nonproliferation Conference Prospects [NARODNA ARMIYA 15 Feb]	59
Officers Union Congress Considers Quality of Life Issues [NARODNA ARMIYA 25 Jan]	59
Armed Forces Union Head Interviewed on Defense Ministry Agreement [NARODNA ARMIYA 24 Jan]	60
Procedures for Confirmation of Labor, Military Service [NARODNA ARMIYA 3 Jan]	63
Territorial Defense Amendment to Law on Defense Signed [NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Nov]	64

ARMED FORCES' BRANCHES

Naval Air Chief Volovyn Remarks at First Press Conference [NARODNA ARMIYA 26 Jan]	64
Odesa Communications Brigade Accomplishments [NARODNA ARMIYA 2 Feb]	66
General Shkidchenko Praises Odesa Communications Brigade [NARODNA ARMIYA 27 Jan]	66

SERVICE SUPPORT ISSUES

Military Engineering Department To Become Separate Academy [NARODNA ARMIYA 18 Jan] .	66
Delay in Start-Up of New Department at Armed Forces Academy [NARODNA ARMIYA 31 Jan]	67
Conscription, Academic Accreditation Progress Discussed [NARODNA ARMIYA 18 Jan]	67
Hudym Discusses Problems Confronting Military Education [NARODNA ARMIYA 26 Jan]	68
Military Jurist on Service Computation [NARODNA ARMIYA 31 Jan]	68
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Sponsorship, Support [NARODNA ARMIYA 31 Jan]	69
First Lectures at Cultural Center, Kobzar Speaks [NARODNA ARMIYA 20 Jan]	69
Ministry Order Establishes Cultural Training Center [NARODNA ARMIYA 5 Jan]	69

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan's Kasymov on Military Union With Russia [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Feb]	70
--	----

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

Russian Export Controls on Dual-Use Chemicals, Technology	72
Presidential Directive [DELOVOY MIR SUPPLEMENT PRAVO I EKONOMIKA 28 Dec]	72
List of Items Needing Export Licenses [DELOVOY MIR SUPPLEMENT PRAVO I EKONOMIKA 28 Dec]	72

DEFENSE INDUSTRY & CONVERSION

Effects of Severodvinsk Nuclear Sub Plant Strike Viewed [NEVSKOYE VREMYA 27 Jan]	83
Proposed Ban on Weapons Advertising Decried [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Feb]	83
Problems, Success Stories in Defense Conversion [ROSSIYA 1-7 Feb]	84

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. Loss to China in War Game [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Feb]	86
--	----

SECURITY SERVICES


Border Troops Face Financial, Other Problems [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 1 Feb]	86
Continued Problems on Tajik Border [GRANITSA ROSSII Jan]	87
RF Border Troops News Briefs [GRANITSA ROSSII Jan]	88

CHECHNYA

Map Showing Chechen, Russian Positions

95UM0260A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 4 Feb 95 p 3

[FBIS Translated Text]



This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Grachev TV Statement on Kovalev, Yushenkov*95UM0270A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 4, 27 Jan-2 Feb 95 p 3*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's press conference of last week, given with two other "power ministers" (Yerin and Stepashin) and televised in part by Ostankino, produced such a stunning impression on public opinion that our editorial staff found it expedient to print the text.

Published below is the transcribed version of Grachev's press conference. It was held in Mozdok and took place right after Grachev's January 20 announcement congratulating officers upon completing "the first stage of the operation aimed at re-establishing constitutional order in Chechnya."

He congratulated some people on victory and declared war on others.

Grachev: ...Look how good the Chechens are, how they fight... Young officers—they have been here—say: "Comrade Minister, we will finish now and go to settle accounts with those who..." And they will go. They are not even those Afghan vets. Afghanistan in comparison with Chechnya is nonsense.

Pavel Sergeyevich, I would like to thank the commander-in-chief of the Air Force. He put us on the plane... they are good boys.

Grachev (vigorously gesticulating): Two weeks ago we were sitting around and holding a press conference. This is already a terrible cancer disease which has been accumulating not for three years but for at least seven. All the riff-raff, all the bandits who saved themselves from criminal prosecution, all the foreign scum who flourished on unaccounted oil, on unaccounted drugs, gathered here, and they were protected. They perpetrated whatever they liked. Not a kopeck into the budget of the state. And they are being defended! By the peacemakers, deputies, some of our valiant mass communication media. What is it, has the fifth column been formed in Russia? Whom are you against? Do you want this cancer to spread all over Russia? It hurts! Officers in trenches, soldiers, 18-year-old boys. Of course, it was not desirable to use them, but we have nobody else. Regrettably, those drafted in our country are 18-year-olds. Although I as the Defense Minister have said that we need to call up all those individuals who are healthy and at least 21 years of age, but so far I have not been listened to. And these 18-year-old boys (smiling) under the leadership of our gallant officers and generals, not having superiority in manpower but having good knowledge, have made short shrift of professionals, of tough men from the other side who are 30-35-years old; they have experience, they have passed through the army and through tough situations. You have seen for yourselves how many professional foreign mercenaries there are here. And these 18-year-old boys were dying, and dying with a smile, for Russia. There is a need to put up a

monument to them! And this peacemaker, Deputy Kovalev! But no place has been left where to put a stigma on him! He is an enemy of Russia, a traitor to Russia! But he is being met everywhere there. This Yushenkov, this skunk, for whom no other epithet can be found, reviles that army which has given an education and rank to him. Regrettably, in keeping with the resolution, he is still a colonel of the Russian army. And he, this skunk, is defending those scoundrels who want to ruin the country. I don't understand this. I don't want to say that I am the only patriot in Russia. You have seen today in the trenches: they are all patriots there—18-year-olds, 19-year-olds, 50-year-olds, and they all die, from private to general, but nobody is leaving their position.

I give a command: boys, the battalion which has been fighting from the first day has been worn out. Let us withdraw it, let them have a rest for a fortnight, and then we shall commit it to the protection of the airdrome or the Severny airport where everything is practically quiet now. They won't leave! The lightly wounded won't leave! The shell-shocked won't leave! And nobody shows this on TV, nobody speaks about this. How is this possible? Can you consider yourself to be a Russian if you are going all out to tear Russia apart? What for? For that green buck, for that stinking dollar?

Pavel Sergeyevich, what will now happen to the south of Chechnya?

Grachev: Today at 16:00 hours I reported to the president that the armed forces had completely accomplished the mission which was set to them. Tomorrow the Minister of Internal Affairs and I will fly to Moscow where there will be a meeting with the President, with the leadership, maybe also with the Security Council. The functions of the concluding stage will already be given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, now already with the assistance of the armed forces. The main aid will be rendered primarily by the Air Force, artillery and the now most powerful mobile groups which we have set up to complete the cleansing and disarm the unlawful formations. Therefore, having accomplished the mission, we will need to spend two-three days on thoroughly cleansing the main part of the city which has already been seized completely today, whereupon we shall move to the south.

Have large forces accumulated there?

Grachev: No such forces already exist. There will be no uphill battles, this is beyond all doubt, which is why we shall plan no very complicated operations. There will be ordinary militia-interior functions in cleansing the territory—task force-army operations. As far as the bases which the militants are planning to set up are concerned, we know not only their approximate but even precise coordinates both along the line of the Federal Counter-intelligence Service and the Main Intelligence Directorate, and also from local inhabitants. If anything like this happens, they will, of course, be destroyed in the mountains. We shall decide in what way this will occur.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

We will not stop. We can only stop when the President passes a decision on the basis of an ultimatum.

Yerin: We have constantly suggested that arms be surrendered, from the first day of our operations in the Chechen Republic we have been suggesting that people stop shooting, that arms be surrendered, and hostilities be voluntarily discontinued. We made such attempts up until yesterday, and even today. It's a different matter that we are offering an ultimatum, we do not suggest that talks be carried out on some terms, ceasefire or on some pauses.

Are all the soldiers against this?

Grachev: You have seen at the front lines, you have seen that all soldiers say that there can be no truce. Here there can be only an ultimatum, the white flag and the organized surrender of weapons and remaining equipment. Because no soldier and no officer who has smelled gunpowder and seen the blood of his comrades will accept anything else any longer. And I, the defense minister, do not have even a moral right to make them change their mind by telling them: that's all, you go, the whole thing ends by this because they have offered peace. First, there is nobody over there to offer peace. Second, reason must prevail even among those people who have been left. And reason must consist in the need to drive away the foreigners immediately and to find resolute junior-level field commanders who must come and say: that's all, sorry, wind up, take a decision, we surrender. Then there will be peace. Just imagine: one hears it said about us that we are bombing the city, other inhabited localities, and so on—but nothing of the kind! We are not bombing anything.

Appeal of Troops in Chechnya to RF Authorities

95UM0269A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jan 95 p 1

[Appeal by the soldiers of the Unified Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic: "While Insulting the Army, They Insult the People: Appeal of the Soldiers of the Unified Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *To the President of the Russian Federation*

To the Chairman of the Russian Federation Government

To the Chairman of the Federation Council

To the Chairman of the State Duma

To the Russian Federation Minister of Defense

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

The political and economic situation that has developed around federal troop units and subunits in the Chechen Republic compels us to personally appeal to you and to set forth our views on a number of fundamental issues.

A fierce, uncompromising war is occurring on the territory of the Chechen Republic, the consequences of which will determine the future of not only the North Caucasus Region but also of Russia as a whole.

Acting in accordance with the order of the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the government, the Russian Army is paying with its blood for the mistakes and miscalculations of the politicians of the past. Soldiers and officers are fighting not with the Chechen people and not with individual bandit formations, but with well-manned and trained armed forces that were created by Chechnya's Mafioso groups with well-trained professional mercenaries from the countries of the near and far abroad.

We want to call your attention to the fact that the Russian Army is essentially operating in an encirclement. Bands of professional murderers and mercenaries who have gathered from all over the world confront it from the front and enemies of the consolidation of Russian statehood who have been strewn in much of the mass media and among the country's separate pseudo-patriotic political movements and public organizations conduct attacks from the rear. While systematically insulting the Russian Army, its soldiers and officers, these people risk nothing. They are not shedding their blood and they are not being prosecuted according to the law for their criminal-disdainful attitude toward servicemen and toward the Army as a whole.

While shielding themselves with the support of unscrupulous politicians and while actively juggling the facts, extracting individual phrases and words from the statements of army command personnel, and openly falsifying events and facts, much of Russia's mass media is misinforming the population and intentionally exacerbating the political situation in the country and undermining Russia's prestige in the international arena.

It is easy to note that the continuous attacks against the minister of defense and the command staff of the Armed Forces are part of a well-planned and organized information-psychological war against Russia.

Undisguised subversive propaganda is affecting the morale of personnel and is promoting the stepping up of the activities of criminal circles not only of Chechnya but of other regions of Russia.

While thoroughly recognizing the danger for Russia that emanates from Dudayev's criminal regime and from other separatists, the soldiers of the federal group of forces, not sparing their lives or blood, are performing their military duty and are consistently accomplishing the missions to restore constitutional order in Chechnya under the most difficult conditions.

Servicemen have no doubt in the correctness of the operations to ensure Russia's territorial integrity and to protect the freedoms and rights of all citizens who reside on the territory of Chechnya—an integral part of the Russian Federation.

All state structures and public organizations are obliged to support the efforts of the servicemen who are conducting combat operations on behalf of preserving the unity of the Russian state.

We demand a cessation of discrediting the leadership of the RF Armed Forces and all commanders and superiors who are performing their military duty. Never before has the military profession in Russia been subjected to such degrading attacks. Servicemen—these are the defenders of the Fatherland and they are doing everything in the conditions that have developed to strengthen the Fatherland's state power. We are prepared to endure and overcome everything if they will cease spitting in our faces and shooting us in the back.

The time has come to decisively support the soldiers at the state level, at sessions of the Federal Assembly and in the mass media. That is why we have been compelled to call upon you—the supreme commander-in-chief, the chairman of the government, and the leaders of the State Duma and Federation Council.

In the difficult period that is being experienced by Russia, all honorable politicians must think not about their ambitious interests but about the state and state honor. Today it is especially important to disseminate to the country's public opinion the entire truth about this fierce and uncharacteristic war.

[Signed] The Soldiers of the Unified Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic

Military Displeasure Over Conduct of Chechnya War

954Q0122A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian No 2-3, Jan 95 [Signed to press 17 Jan 95] pp 14-15

[Article by Sergey Surozhnev under "Army" rubric: "Legendary Army in Grozny: the Opinion of a Military Expert on the Actions of the Russian Army in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to some information from competent bodies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Dudayev's detachments were armed with the following (data as of June 1994):

- 40-50 T-62 and T-72 tanks;
- 40-50 BMP-1 and BMP-2 (infantry fighting vehicles);
- 30-35 BTR-70 (armored personnel carriers) and BRDM-2 (scout vehicles);
- 90-100 antitank weapons;
- 620-630 grenade launchers of various types;
- 150-160 artillery pieces and mortars;
- more than 20-25 "Grad" rocket launchers;
- 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers;

- about 42,000 firearms;
- 678 tank machine guns;
- 319 large-caliber machine guns;
- about 40 antiaircraft complexes of various types;
- munitions: cartridges, artillery shells, bombs, mines, and grenades in sufficient quantity for an armed force of 40,000 to carry on intensive combat operations over a period of six to seven months.

Gen. Pavel Grachev, who until May 1992 was first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, was personally involved in turning the arms over to Chechnya and now it is a cruel irony of fate that hundreds of his subordinates are dying in Chechnya trying to correct a mistake that was once made, including by the current minister of defense.

It is now absolutely clear that long before the "official" decision of the Security Council on the introduction of forces into Chechnya the Russian forces and special services had taken the unequivocal course of using force to resolve the conflict with Grozny, although political methods were by no means exhausted.

The Kremlin had worked hard to "pump up" the "opposition" Nadterechny Rayon not only through artificial "people's leaders" and their detachments but also through Russian volunteers. At the same time, the special services were not stingy about providing all kinds of weapons—tanks, helicopters, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, machine guns, grenade launchers, automatic rifles, and mines.

The work was done crudely and soon both the Russian and the foreign press began to shed light on the "activity" of the bodies of the counterintelligence service and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, whose representatives naturally did everything that they could to avoid secret participation in the "establishment of constitutional order in Chechnya" and the sending of their specialists and arms. One of the representatives of the opposition, a certain Bagayev, once appeared on Russian television and openly demanded that Moscow cease delivery of old combat equipment and begin to send the most up-to-date equipment.

Political Expediency Instead of Military Science

In the fall of 1994, the armed detachments of the opposition undertook two absolutely inept attempts to seize power in Grozny. The plan for the second of these attempts (26 November) was developed under the leadership of General Kotenkov, a former chief of a directorate in Yeltsin's apparatus.

A meeting of the Security Council was held on 29 November 1994 and there they made the final decision on the introduction of forces into Chechnya. Here one should pay attention to several fundamental aspects that

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

will help us to understand better why the plan adopted by the Security Council was adventuristic from the start and led to enormous human casualties.

From a legal point of view, the plan approved by Yeltsin and the Security Council was absolutely vulgar and grossly violated legislative and constitutional norms. The use of troops for "restoration of constitutional order" was possible under the conditions of an emergency situation and even then only as an element in support of internal troops. The decision made by the Security Council would not pass an examination by the Constitutional Court.

Because of the existing "tradition," the president and Security Council and all of the departments of force found themselves utterly beyond parliamentary and public control, which deprived them of public responsibility for the decisions that they made (this is where the adaptation of the new constitution to the whims of the president works out badly for us).

The minister of defense gave his approval to a rapid military operation in Chechnya, being guided thereby by principles of political expediency rather than military science. The grouping of forces turned out to be unprepared, the reconnaissance data on the state of Dudayev's armed formations was erroneous, and the routes for the moving up of columns were unprepared and untreated by special propaganda agencies. Special subunits of force departments were not successful in carrying out timely and complete operational measures in Grozny and other strongholds of Dudayev's formation to neutralize their leaders and to weaken combat readiness.

The decision by the president and Security Council on the introduction of troops into Chechnya was quite unexpected by the public, government, and parliament. A vigorous controversy began in the country about the advisability of the use of troops and a powerful wave of protest rose up against the use of force to resolve the conflict with Grozny.

A Schism Among the Generals

As early as the first day of the military operation, many officers of the Russian General Staff spoke indignantly of the fact that on 26 November (the day of the second and most powerful storming of Grozny by "opposition forces") the possibility of achieving decisive success through the counteractions of troops and "opposition forces" was lost on account of the lack of a unified coordinating body for the departments of force in Chechnya. And the element of surprise was likewise lost because of the absence of the necessary conspiratorial methods.

To the extent that one can judge, the absolute majority of the generals and officers of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff had a quite negative attitude toward the decision by the Security Council. They felt that it was not the business of the army to "establish constitutional order" with the help of tanks and that for this there are

the internal troops and specially trained subunits that once again, just as in October 1993, found themselves relegated to a secondary position.

The first few kilometers of the advance of the federal troops in the territory of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia showed that because of the blocking of the routes for the moving up of convoys by the inhabitants of the population centers not a single one of the convoys was able to reach the assigned lines in the designated time. In response to an inquiry from the center for the military operation (Mozdok) as to why the troops from the Pskov Airborne Division had stopped, their commander, Gen. Ivan Babichev, radioed back that he did not want to "wind the intestines of women and children on the tracks of combat vehicles."

The minister of defense expressed his dissatisfaction with the gross miscalculations of the operational planners in laying out the routes for the moving up of troops. There were mistakes not only in the fact that the routes passed through densely populated centers whose inhabitants blocked their way but also in something else: one of the tank columns was sent to a swampy place and several combat vehicles along with the crews disappeared forever in the frigid slurry.

When Grachev suggested that Gen. Eduard Vorobyev, first deputy commander in chief of the ground troops, lead the military operation, he flatly refused, adding that "you do not change horses in the middle of the stream." In other words, Vorobyev did not consider it possible for himself to lead troop combat operations that were ineptly planned from the start and not provided with good executing entities.

There are also other explanations in higher military circles for such an audacious action by the general: he did not at all accept the method of force in Chechnya. Whatever the case there, with his refusal Vorobyev automatically went over to the category of retired officers, increasing the number of generals who "got burned" in the Chechen crisis. This account was opened for them by Gen. Boris Polyakov, commander of the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, who went into retirement after he learned of the participation of servicemen from his combined unit in combat operations in the territory of Chechnya. And a complete surprise for many generals and officers was the removal of one of General Grachev's favorites, his deputy Gen. Georgiy Kondratyev, from his post.

After this event, they began to speak openly in the corridors of the Ministry of Defense about the growing crisis within the ranks of the army's high command and about the formation of an anti-Grachev and anti-Yeltsin military opposition. Deputy Minister of Defense Gen. Boris Gromov, Commander of the Airborne Troops Gen. Yevgeniy Podkolzin, Commander of the 14th Army Gen. Aleksandr Lebev, and others had a very negative attitude toward the use of troops in Chechnya and toward the decision by the Security Council and the president. They enjoy rather stable authority and support in the troops, which does even

more to increase the morale problems and political schism at all levels of the military organism and may have very negative consequences for the controllability of the army and its loyalty to the regime.

The Reform Has Failed

The operation to gain control of Chechnya is now in its second month. The number of regiments brought in by Grachev has already exceeded 10 (almost eight times what the "enemy" has) but they still do not have complete control of Chechnya. The Russian Army has suffered huge losses of manpower and combat equipment. Some generals, accustomed to fooling their fellow citizens purely in the style of Grachev, are declaring that human losses are even "below what was calculated." But honest professionals from the Ministry of Defense admit that there cannot be any calculated norms in the situation at hand, for the field manuals do not even have a classification of such combat operations of the army against armed formations that do not by any means fight in accordance with the classic rules.

A rather complete idea of the effectiveness of the reform of the armed forces can be gained from how the military subunits of the Russian Federation demonstrated themselves in the Chechen conflict. Essentially there is not a single indicator of the quality of the organization and execution of combat operations that could even be called satisfactory. The officers of the General Staff participating in the command and control of the unfolding of the military operation almost unanimously make note of a very primitive level of tactical, weapon, technical, and special training as well as teamwork and coordination of personnel and organization of interaction.

All of this is a direct consequence of the catastrophic undermanning of subunits (about 50-60 percent in the ground troops and 60-70 percent in the airborne troops) and the curtailment of combat training of troops that has been going on for several years consecutively (tactical exercises with combat firing were reduced by 60-70 percent in the ground troops in 1994, there was not a single regimental tactical exercise with the assault troopers, and instead of 100-150 flight hours a year our combat pilots barely managed 20!). What kind of combat proficiency can we be talking about if the crew members of our combat vehicles and tanks did not even know each other until the first battle! Hence the continual misses when firing at the "enemy" with tank and artillery projectiles, his engagement with aircraft bombs and missiles, and the destruction of purely civilian facilities.

The contract soldiers scarcely differed from conscripts, which indicates the failure of this very important element of military reform.

One of the high-ranking officers of the Ministry of Defense let slip that the majority of the subunits and commanders participating in combat were not at all prepared for this kind of fighting in a city with a high building density.

It is interesting to note that during all the time of the conflict the Ministry of Defense did not hold a single press conference in Moscow and in general failed to independently inform the public of the actions of military forces. This was done for it by government and presidential information structures that gave reports with a large mixture of lies and distortions.

Judging by everything, quite soon the groupings of Russian troops will gain full control of Grozny after suffering huge losses. But what then? Even the best analysts in the ministry cannot give a clear answer to this question today. One thing is clear: the Russian units cannot avoid a guerrilla war.

Supposed Military Report on Reasons for Failure in Chechnya

95UM0248A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Untitled report introduced by Yelena Afanasyeva and Dmitriy Muratov: "Minister Grachev's Statement That He Would Take Grozny With a Single Regiment Had a Deleterious Effect on the Consciousness of Commanders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This Wednesday, Minister Grachev was congratulated by the Security Council on completing the military stage of the Chechnya operation. The command received high grades.

But also this Wednesday, a unique document found its way into our editor's office—a report written by a certain highest-placed military serviceman.

Compare the grade given by this professional with the grades given by the courtiers.

Report

In my capacity as working jointly with generals and officers of the General Staff and the North Caucasus Military District, please allow me to present my opinion regarding preparation of the leadership of the staffs and troops to organize and conduct combat activities.

I. Preparation of the Leadership

Leadership of combat activities by the joint grouping was assigned to Colonel-General A. Mityukhin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District.

The first phase of combat activities was planned by the General Staff under the direction of Lieutenant-General L. P. Shevtsov, and an operational group from the General Staff.

On the whole, the plan for the special operation was written competently, and it satisfied the established requirements, but a number of shortcomings that had not been accounted for were revealed in the course of detailed planning:

First, command and control bodies were unable to switch to wartime operating conditions. The window dressing, the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

stereotypy and the unfounded optimism did not escape commanders at the lowest level. RF Defense Minister General of the Army P. S. Grachev's statement "that he would take Grozny with a single airborne regiment" had a deleterious effect on the consciousness of the commanders of divisions and operational-tactical groups;

second, not a single briefing was held with the command, and no specific combat missions were posed.

The commander of the North Caucasus Military District didn't sign a single document regarding the organization and conduct of combat activities, and especially regarding rules of engagement and air strikes. All documents were signed by Lieutenant-General V. Ya. Potapov, chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District;

third, the staff of the North Caucasus Military District and the commander personally were unprepared to organize and plan the combat activities. The commander led his subordinates very weakly, he did not listen to their proposals, and all of his "directives" degenerated into unpublishable tirades against his subordinates.

A fire and nuclear planning group was not created;

fourth, coordination was not organized.

On 5 December 1994 the defense minister disregarded a report from the commander of the North Caucasus Military District stating that command and control bodies, the command posts, and the troops in general were unprepared for combat activities;

fifth, weather and time of year (fog, rain etc.) were not accounted for in organizing, planning and conducting the combat activities.

From my point of view, a 3 to 5 day command-and-staff exercise should have been carried out in order to provide combat teamwork training to command and control bodies in the use of communication resources, an additional 10-15 days should have been devoted to troop training, and combat activities should have begun somewhere around 20-25 December 1994.

II. Preparation of Staffs

1. Not a single command-and-staff exercise or command-and-staff training session was conducted with staffs of all levels during preparation for the operation.
2. Staffs found themselves unprepared for work in the conditions of combat activity, and the work of staffs was organized at a low level.
3. Planning and preparation of the operations was conducted superficially, which led to unjustified losses in armament, equipment and personnel.
4. The position, composition and possible nature of activities of the opponent were not analyzed.
5. The position, condition, support and possibilities of friendly troops were not accounted for in planning the combat activities, and the missions and the nature of the activities of neighbors were not brought to the awareness of commanders of subordinated forces.
6. The conclusions that were reached from the situation, the proposals and the necessary calculations were superficial, and as a rule the command did not take them into account.
7. Clear and constant coordination was not organized.
8. Combat experience was not generalized and brought to the awareness of the combined units and units.
9. Accounting of personnel, armament, and combat and other equipment was superficial, which made it difficult to identify deceased servicemen, account for POWs and MIAs, and account for armament captured by the enemy.
10. Staffs worked in a tense situation that was made even more stressful by the command, and personally by Colonel-General A. Mityukhin.

III. Preparation of the Troops

1. The personnel were poorly prepared morally and physically for combat activities in adverse weather.
2. The troops were not trained in performing a march and conducting offensive and defensive combat.
3. Weak knowledge of the materiel of armament and equipment made it impossible for the personnel to use it competently.
4. Servicemen were weak in their fighting skills as lone soldiers and members of subunits.
5. The skills of the personnel in using individual and crew-operated weapons were weak.
6. Driver-mechanics and drivers are poorly skilled in controlling combat equipment.
7. IFV machinegun operators and tank gunners do not know the rules of fire against targets of opportunity and moving targets, and they reveal a lack of confidence in using the armament (there were cases where gunners did not fire their tank and IFV armament).
8. The servicemen are not trained to render first aid on the battlefield, and they do not know how to use antishock drugs.
9. The subunits are not trained in concentrated fire or in transferring fire to a new target.
10. Poor use is made of smoke screens to conceal movements on the battlefield and to organize evacuation of casualties.
11. Sniper groups were not created to neutralize the crews of guns, antiaircraft guns, antitank grenade launchers, and grenade throwers, and nothing is being done against snipers.

12. The personnel do not know how to designate the forward edge and to designate targets with rockets (smoke) for aircraft.
13. The actions of flanking groups and ambushes are not employed.
14. Servicemen are not trained in means of movement over the battlefield.
15. Assault groups are not prepared for destruction of fire positions, permanent pillboxes and earth-and-timber emplacements, and weak use is made of flamethrowers and grenade launchers.
16. The personnel do not carry identification tags, making their identification in case of death difficult.
17. NCOs are not trained in battlefield command, and are unable to replace an officer in the event of his death.
18. Special subunits (the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs) are not trained to carry out their missions.
19. The subunits do not undergo combat teamwork training at their permanent stations; instead, such training is done within the zone of hostilities, where the equipment needed for combat teamwork training is practically absent.
20. The experience of the Afghan war was not applied to the combat activities.

IV. Types of Combat Support

a) Reconnaissance

1. Possible places where the columns could be blocked along their routes of advance were not revealed in time.
2. Reconnaissance subunits did not conduct preliminary reconnaissance of the routes.
3. Reconnaissance was passive, it was limited to observation, and the fire weapons of the opposing soldiers and their movements were not revealed in time.
4. During the time of combat activities, intelligence did not capture a single prisoner, which significantly reduced the possibility for verifying the acquired intelligence.
5. The command of the grouping basically utilized intelligence acquired by FSK [not further identified], the Main Reconnaissance Directorate, the General Staff, the Reconnaissance Directorate, the Internal Troops, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
6. Reconnaissance subunits demonstrated poor training in fulfillment of combat missions.

b) Camouflage, Concealment and Deception

1. Adequate attention was not devoted to camouflage, concealment and deception as forms of combat support.
2. The personnel were not trained in the means of camouflage, concealment and deception.
3. Fire positions and the positions of the subunits were not concealed, which led to the death of personnel.
4. Camouflage, concealment and deception resources were not employed.
5. Armament and equipment was not camouflaged to blend in with the surrounding terrain.
6. Personnel were not supplied with white camouflage overalls.

c) Engineer support

1. Servicemen were not trained in digging foxholes, trenches and covered trenches.
2. Sandbags were not used to prepare the positions.
3. Not all personnel were provided with entrenchment tools.
4. Personnel were not trained in laying and removing mines and minefields, and destroying landmines.
5. The traffic support and mine clearing detachments acted weakly.
6. Personnel were not trained in quickly and efficiently erecting bridges and creating passages.
7. Engineer reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy was not conducted.

V. Technical Support

1. Combat equipment does not arrive in the area of combat activities ready for combat.
2. There are no spare parts for some types of armament (IFVs, APCs, tanks, guns).
3. Some of the equipment is not filled with operating fluids, and storage batteries and the necessary fuel and lubricants are lacking.
4. Technical observation and evacuation of damaged equipment was organized very weakly.
5. Current repairs on damaged equipment and armament was practically nonexistent.

VI. Rear Support

1. Rear support by rear services was organized at a low level.
2. Not all personnel were supplied with thermal underwear, foot cloths and felt boot liners, which led to numerous cases of frostbite.
3. Messing of the personnel was organized unsatisfactorily (personnel were not provided food for periods of 6-8 days), and neither fruits nor vegetables were included in the ration.
4. Bath and laundry services were not organized for the personnel, which led to infestation by lice.
5. Personnel warming stations were not deployed.
6. Bulletproof vests were issued to the personnel unfit for use (they lacked protective plates).
7. The personnel were not supplied with helmet liners, insulated mittens and water bottles.

I feel it necessary to make the leadership aware of these shortcomings in order to avoid their repetition during preparation of units and subunits to be deployed in the Chechen Republic.

Problems in Supplying Forces in Chechnya

95UM0261A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Petr Altunin: "Dog Tags, Field Rations and Mini-Kitchens: Urgent Rear Services Measures While Taking Into Account Battle Experience. Won't Lapses in Troop Financing Disrupt Them?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No matter what you call the events in Chechnya, the fact is that this is a war, a bitter war and the enemy is—insidious, armed and dangerous. And today it is already not a question of miscalculations or errors—they occur in every war—but of practical conclusions which we need to make rapidly and without hesitating. Armed Forces Rear Services are also making conclusions.

Operational groups were not immediately created at the center and locally when the Rear Services staff created the unified task force in the Chechen conflict zone. The units that arrived in the assembly area were supported with both full-fledged messing and a rest area. Despite shortages, fuel was provided in such quantities that, in the majority of cases, vehicles had adequate fuel supplies. On the whole, there was also enough warm bedding, ponchos and flak jackets. Soldiers-truck drivers delivered ammunition, arms and food to fighting units under enemy fire.

All of that in so. And on the whole Rear Services handled the mission.

But protracted fighting also dictated its terms for rear services operations. Take water supply. It became a very serious problem during the battles in Grozny. The water supply line was put out of commission. New wells had to be drilled. Water carriers were put into operation but there weren't enough of them. Fuel trucks came to their assistance: oil was removed from new refueling trucks, the trucks underwent health and sanitation inspections and were put to use. The problem was resolved at the first opportunity but the matter has not ended. Right now, GVMU [Main Military Medical Directorate] is ordering "Rodvik" compact water purification devices and the rations suppliers are resolving the issue of rations with components that contain water. Admittedly, money is needed to do that...

They also had to make adjustments in the organization of messing. There are no problems for those personnel who are at Mozdok or for subunits that have been withdrawn for rest. Disruptions frequently occur in combat units, especially assault elements that are fighting independently or in an emergency situation. What causes these problems? According to theory and also according to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, a field kitchen must be as close as possible to the positions and camouflaged food delivery personnel serve food in thermoses right in the foxholes. But everything shifted very quickly in Grozny: the front and the rear and then there were snipers on the roofs of houses—try to approach... At that time the KP-20M compact kitchen was put into operation. It is reliable, not too heavy, with obsolete technical parameters. Of course, that was known even prior to Chechnya. And now a suitable modern "burner" [gorelka] has been developed and it is being produced. It weighs a total of five kilograms. It heats up a kettle with a capacity of from 10 to 50 liters. It doesn't operate on gasoline but on diesel fuel which is safer and more effective. The "burner" is already being delivered to combat formations and to block-posts and commanders are saying thank you. But once again inadequate numbers of these mini-kitchens are being produced due to a lack of financing. Right now we have to make up for lost time with everything.

Field rations are being improved on the run. Colonel Aleksey Shalin, chief of the TsPU [Central Food Directorate] Scientific Research Committee, recently visited Chechnya and demonstrated to me a new type of field rations that contain more calories and vitamins. It can be used in a dry form and it can also be prepared on a mini-kitchen as a hot meal.

Metamorphoses in the clothing of many Russian soldiers were already noted long ago in newspaper photographs and in television reporting: sports hats (helmet liners) instead of winter caps with earflaps and rubber boots instead of imitation leather boots.

"The mud is impassable and that's why we are using rubber boots," said Major-General Ruslan Zubov, TsVU

[possibly Main Clothing Directorate] deputy chief, who is intimately familiar with the problem. "But that's temporary. We have a development—felt boots: they are both light and don't let in water. But won't that really only remain in drawings and test models due to the lack of money? Sleeping bags must be of a lighter type, knapsacks must have a larger capacity, straps and be adjustable in size. And the current tents are obsolete—new model, heated tents are needed. We have developed mobile field laundries (MPP-5, MPP-6), two units are already in Chechnya and they have recommended themselves well. But once again, we need money for all of this."

Reports on alleged mass situations of pediculosis [lice infestation] of our soldiers have stirred up public opinion. Both the medical and clothing services have reported that this is not so. There are isolated cases. The main thing is a bath and that is weekly and there is an adequate supply of disinfecting equipment. But we need to bear in mind: soldiers sometimes cannot get out of their combat positions—ruins, basements, and bunkers where there are very unsanitary conditions—for two weeks at a time. And here one can accumulate everything. Even without a war, there's currently pediculosis in many villages and cities, even among Moscow's school children...

Are steps being taken? Certainly. First of all, regular bathing, and treatment of underwear and clothing. Doctors are sending an effective remedy to the troops—"Malkord" powder. Incidentally, there's a large detachment of medical epidemiologists in the Chechen region. Spring is coming and they are doing everything to prevent terrible illnesses like cholera, enteric fever and typhus, viral hepatitis, etc.

Yes, this is a war like any other war. The situation changes rapidly and problems arise, including supply problems. For example, there weren't any refueling helicopters (they were manufactured at one time in Ukraine) and it was quite difficult to supply fuel to combat formations without them.

Or this fact. A commissary was deployed to Chechnya and it did quite a bit to supply servicemen with food and necessities. Goods turnover totaled 270 million rubles. But a cadre problem soon arose. Right now a field commissary has been developed which will only consist of servicemen.

We also have to mention such, even isolated, cases when, unfortunately, it is impossible to identify dead soldiers. Today officers have dog tags but soldiers don't. Different armies deal with this in various ways: there are all types and shapes of dog tags, bracelets and sometimes even tattoos...

Right now steps are being taken: a type of dog tag is being developed for all categories from soldiers to generals. Incidentally, the total cost of their manufacture has also been calculated and that will be tens of billions of rubles.

For now, the following decision has been made: supply all personnel in Chechnya with officer dog tags—from the existing reserve.

When Colonel-General Vladimir Churanov, Deputy Minister of Defense—RF Armed Forces Rear Services chief, was asked at a recent press conference: are there delays in supplying servicemen, he responded: there are, this is war. But there would be far fewer of them if they were concerned about the army ahead of time and not when lightning strikes and they place us on alert and send us out to defend Russia's state interests. It is impossible to begrudge us the resources while we are carrying out the rear services troop support program.

MILITARY POLICY

Rodionov on Urgency of Army Reforms

95UM0266A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Colonel-General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov, chief of the RF Armed Forces Academy of the General Staff, under the rubric: "An Alternative": "After Chechnya: A New Turning Point in the Reform of the Armed Forces or a Repeat of Past Mistakes?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The beginning of 1995 was characterized by new efforts in the matter of reform of the Russian Federation Armed Forces command and control system. On January 11 at a meeting with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and with Vladimir Shumeyko and Ivan Rybkin, the chairmen of the houses of the Federal Assembly, the country's president announced his intention to withdraw the General Staff from the Ministry of Defense structure and to link it directly to himself during the course of a discussion of ways to resolve the Chechen crisis.

1.

The decision of the RF president—the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces—in and of itself was not something that was altogether unexpected for army society or even for Russian society as a whole. This was the next step on the path of reform of the armed forces that logically proceeds from the content of the adopted military doctrine that provides for the need to divide the administrative and operational functions of the highest organs of military command and control, the possibility to appoint a civilian to the post of minister of defense and therefore a change of the status of the MOD and General Staff. For the uninitiated, this decision appears to be a just reaction of the president to the failure of the armed forces and other troops during the course of the military actions being conducted in the Chechen Republic and the aspiration to effectively correct the matter. Perhaps for the first time in recent years, our political leadership has so closely touched upon military problems and has been compelled to be directly involved with their resolution. Of course, the bloody

armed conflict in Chechnya is not a large-scale war and therefore cannot serve as a reason to review the basic conceptual provisions of military structural development or the state's military policy. However, the Chechen events have forced us to pay attention to the true state of affairs in the armed forces and to the real readiness of the force ministries to carry out the missions assigned to them. They have exposed many imperfections of our military organization and have convincingly indicated that many reform experiments on the previous army and the country's defense command and control system did not, putting it mildly, strengthen its military security.

It has been suddenly discovered that the country has no single system of organs that are responsible for the entire defense of the state and for the comprehensive management of military structural development. There is neither a concept, actual programs nor special organs that are responsible for military reform. But really, we the military have long and persistently reported that. Did we really have to wait until military practice forces us to face the problem? It is this practice, thickly mixed with the blood, grief and tears of our fellow citizens and with the lives of soldiers and the local population. The fate of the state also frequently depends on it.

The difficulties of comprehensive planning of defense measures did not arise yesterday or today; the lack of coordination in the operations of the force ministries; weak information about enemy plans and concepts of operations, and his state of readiness for combat operations; the lack of preparedness of the infrastructure of areas for the conduct of war; and, the inability of the federal government to somehow affect the mass media and to disseminate its decisions through it. We arrived at this state long ago under the unfurled banners of pseudo-reform. As a result, the status of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff has fallen dramatically. They have found themselves removed from the solution of the general tasks of the organization of the country's defense and the military structural development of the state. They have sooner become the ministry of the army and navy and its command and control organ.

Right now it has become clear to many people that our armed forces do not totally meet their mission and are inadequately combat capable. They curse the generals and officers and complain about untrained soldiers. But they are not to blame that there is practically not a single formation in the army that is fully manned now and that the miserly budget does not permit us to conduct planned combat training, that field exercises and maneuvers are not being conducted, and that the main efforts of commanders of all levels and ranks are directed at how to survive under conditions of a limitless market. The impression is being formed that neither the president nor the government have so far understood their role and responsibility for the state of the country's defense and the conduct of military reform.

What is occurring right now with the MOD leadership, its command and control organs and highest level cadres is to a well-known extent written in the overall concept of reform of the armed forces. But this is what puts us on guard. The president made the announcement about his intentions to reorganize the Armed Forces command and control system so unexpectedly that, as the press reports, the minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff stated with one voice their noninvolvement in its development. The disagreement in the assessment of the planned reorganization by spokesmen of the military leadership attests to inadequate coordination in the activities of the presidential structures and the military department. Some unconditionally supported the decision being prepared (the commander-in-chief of the ground forces) and others—categorically did not agree.

The press, as always, made its prediction: the organizational rearrangements—are a method to punish the minister who was responsible for the reverses. And a legitimate question arose among society: who prepares decisions on defense issues for the president?

All of this and much else only confirms the need for a thorough and weighty approach of all state organs of legislative and executive power to the problems of military reform in the country and requires bringing the Constitution and military laws into accord with the requirements of our country's development. Let's attempt to calmly analyze the situation that has developed and the planned measures to reform the country's military command and control system.

There's no doubt whatsoever that this system requires a decisive change. The President as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who bears the primary responsibility for the state of the country's defense, is obliged to have the corresponding command and control organs, military information and monitoring system, and the required scientific structures that are capable of resolving not only current but also future problems of a defense nature. The president, the government, the force ministries, the ministries and departments that work toward the accomplishment of defense missions, the Federation Council and the State Duma with its special powers on defense issues, the regional authorities, the organs of local self-rule, etc., must be part of a unified system. The functions, rights and obligations of each of these structures must be more precisely defined, coordinated and reinforced in the law. We need to make the appropriate clarifications to the Law "On Defense". We must not permit cadre policy to be structured on the basis of personal devotion, sympathies, or antipathies of leaders. Then positions will not be created based upon personality to the detriment of the common cause.

For the time being, the legislative-legal base of the country's military organization, including the military command and control system, does not permit the implementation of a purposeful military policy. For

example, the Russian Federation Constitution (Article 87) states: "The Russian Federation President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces". But, according to the Law "On Defense", the armed forces are only the army and the navy and, according to this law, they "... are tasked to repel aggression and to inflict damage to the aggressor and also to accomplish missions in accordance with international obligations".

In this case, how do we treat the internal and border troops and the troops and forces of the other ministries and departments that are not only obliged, in accordance with their mission, to participate in the resolution of internal armed conflicts of the Chechen type but also to repel aggression from without?

Are they subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief? In this case, does the General Staff exercise leadership of these forces? If yes, we need to change the composition of the armed forces or in some other way bring the contradictions that have arisen into conformity.

According to the RF Constitution, the armed forces do not participate in internal-state armed conflicts but, according to the military doctrine that has been adopted, they can participate.

According to the Law "On Security", the forces that ensure security consist of the armed forces and other military formations in which military service has been prescribed by law but the danger for the country (society, the state and the individual) can be not only military but also economic, ideological, information, etc. What, do we employ military formations in all cases?

Now criminal cases are being filed against servicemen who refused to carry out orders on the conduct of military operations in Chechnya. But there were precedents in our very recent history when military leaders who refused to carry out orders not only were not punished but were allotted high posts. The provision on "criminal orders" has even found reflection in our military legislation.

2.

How many contradictions, disconnects, and alternative versions are there in legislative acts and how much effort do we need to expend to put in order the legal base of the military and not only military practice but certain legislators, politicians and military personnel are involved with clarifying personal relations and they are utilizing the complex military-political situation and Russia's very difficult economic situation to satisfy ambitious plans. Insults, rude remarks and unparliamentary expressions are being set in motion that are certainly intolerable among persons of that level and rank. Only they are not helping the actual situation.

Especially many accusations are being leveled at the minister of defense. A steady opinion on the need to remove him from his position is being formed among

society at large. Let's even concede that someone else will replace the military department's current leader. Will there be a guarantee of a decisive improvement of the matter? Obviously this will not be since the situation does not depend as much on them. The Armed Forces carry out the will of the politicians and, if the politicians do not know the state of affairs in the armed forces and cannot properly utilize them, and in the process they are not capable of protecting them from unjustified accusations, hardly anything will change for the better. I dare to presume that after the conclusion of the "Chechen epic", the RF Armed Forces will become the tragedy's main culprit under this approach. Much of the mass media, which has conducted the latest decisive attack against the army, will promote this in every possible way. They pour mud not only on the leadership of the armed forces but also on all of the general officers and the officer corps and they ridicule the most sacred—the patriotism of the soldier. The minister's coarseness with regard to the defender of rights instantaneously became the talk of the town and the highest "intellectual" Kovalev, who detected "1.5 bends among all of the generals together" and who did not find the best words besides "boors" with regard to his opponents, became a heroic figure. Double standards and juggling, dishonest shuffling and the lie became nearly the norm of a certain writing and speaking fraternity. The air waves, the television screen and the press cover events in Chechnya in a one-sided manner. This is dishonest with regard to the army.

Why not expend the energy of journalists on a search for the real individuals who are responsible for the Chechen bloodletting or other similar actions? Why not lift the curtain over the causes of the emergence of the Dudayev regime and the real mechanism of the adoption of the decision on its armed suppression? Why? A battle, an engagement, a war—these are the concluding acts of a political drama. Everyone has seen the operations of the troops, you can't conceal them, you can't hide them from society like you can hide the actions of the politicians from it.

Now about the specific intention to separate the General Staff from the composition of the Ministry of Defense and subordinate it to the president of Russia personally.

First. We must clarify why this reorganization is being carried out. They tell us that in this case the president will have his command and control organ that is capable of becoming effectively and skillfully involved in planning and organizing the country's defense, coordinating the efforts of all force structures that are involved in accomplishing defense missions. They assert that while tying the General Staff to himself, the president will be able to neutralize and, if necessary, suppress through force any external or internal threats to the security of the current political regime.

The decision that has been made would certainly to a certain extent bring the primary organ of operational

command and control of the *armed forces* closer to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief but this is not the main reason for the reorganization. For the General Staff to be able to carry out its new role, it must be substantially changed: in functions, in composition, and in structure to the general organization. The President needs the General Staff as a planning and command and control organ of *all of the state's defense forces* and not only the army and the navy.

Naturally, additional men and equipment and cadres of new specialists will be needed for the reorganization that is being conducted. Where do we get them in our time of troubles?

Any reorganization of the Armed Forces command and control organs is associated with the inevitable weakening of their command and control during the entire period of its conduct. How long will it last? Experience shows that rapid reforms do not happen in Russia. Can we resort to this in the difficult contemporary situation? Will this not lead to the final destruction of the military system of the state? Who developed the proposal for this restructuring of the military command and control system? Why do even the highest individuals of the military leadership, experts and scholars learn about the decision from the newspapers?

Second. How do we understand the main thesis of the reorganizers—the Ministry of Defense should be involved with supporting the activities of the RF Armed Forces? Which armed forces? The Army and the Navy? And the other troops and forces? With what kind of support? Does it follow from all of this that the other force ministries will separate from their composition any command and control structures whatsoever and resubordinate them to the General Staff?

The separation of the General Staff from the Ministry of Defense will immediately result in the creation in it of another command and control structure because experience has shown that no one ministry can get by without them.

Will the Ministry of Defense in its new form really correspond more to its name than it does now?

Third. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff will really have to divide powers and responsibility under new conditions. We will have to redo and tear down as soon as possible that which was accumulated, pressed home, received organizational and legal consolidation over decades and was embodied in concrete structures, staffs, men and equipment and crews. Why, for the sake of what? Will this resolve the problem under conditions of the financial and economic crisis in the country? The General Staff, broken off from the Ministry of Defense, will become weaker. Why are we once again moving based upon random, not well-thought out ideas and spontaneous, impulsive decisions? Why do we avoid our own experience like the plague and why do we want to use only foreign experience?

Of course, we should not idealize the experience of the Soviet period of our history and we don't need to repeat it in detail. But the structure of centralized leadership of the armed forces (which, in contrast to today's armed forces, consisted of civil defense troops, border, internal and railroad troops and a number of other formations besides the services of the Armed Forces, special troops and rear services) that existed in the past provided reliable command and control of a somewhat more powerful than now military complex of the state and coordination of the military policy of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. Special structures existed in the state that were responsible for the main directions of military structural development and preparation of the country for defense.

The USSR Defense Council under the leadership of the head of state—the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at its regular sessions examined exclusively military problems and, based upon the results of the Defense Council's work, prepared and made specific decisions at the highest state level. The ministries and departments, that were somehow or other connected to the accomplishment of defense missions, sensed and understood their roles and assumed direct responsibility for the execution of state decisions.

The General Staff was responsible for the development of proposals on the main issues of preparing the country for defense, planned the employment of the armed forces and the country's mobilization in the event of war, coordinated activity for the development of the defense infrastructure, etc.

Besides other missions, the issues of unified military-technical and cadre policy, construction and troop quartering, troop manning, and coordination with the civilian organs of power were within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR also coordinated the development and was responsible for coordinating plans for the employment of the armed forces of the state—Warsaw Pact participants.

On the whole, one could say that the USSR Ministry of Defense and its General Staff performed the main functions of the highest organ of planning, organization and command and control of all of the country's armed formations, participated in the development of military policy and were the direct executors of decisions made by the Defense Council and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the state's armed forces.

Can that experience now be utilized, of course, while taking into account the new conditions? In our opinion, this experience is entirely acceptable for employment and must be utilized.

First, because it permits us to resolve the main problem—the president will be able to directly rely on the needed command and control structure that unites

under one "roof" all organs, organizations and institutions that are somehow or other connected with the accomplishment of defense missions and the country's military security. Those people who desire to subordinate the General Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief are pursuing precisely this goal.

Second, reorganization in the spirit of our own past experience will not require a radical breakup of the currently existing structures and therefore will permit the preservation of everything valuable that has already been accumulated during the course of the structural development of the Russian Armed Forces and save resources that are so needed today.

Third, this decision will be most painless for the main mass of military cadres who have been wracked to their foundations by the numerous restructurings and organizational reshufflings and morally crushed by anti-army propaganda.

Fourth, The Ministry of Defense and General Staff will actually begin to correspond to their mission and be responsible for the country's defense and coordinate the activities of all structures that are involved in the country's defense. Their prestige will rise and it will become easier to accomplish the missions of military structural development, improve coordination of various ministries and departments and variously-tasks armed formations.

3.

These and other circumstances can have, in my view, important significance for the adoption of a final decision on the issue of ways to reorganize the armed forces command and control system.

Of course, the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff in their relatively new form must be qualitatively changed both in their composition and in their structure.

They will obviously have to correspond to the following main requirements:

- be organically part of the overall system of the country's defense (military) complex;
- be capable of encompassing with their influence all of the state's defense structures;
- become the single planning and command and control organ in wartime of those armed formations that are tasked to conduct combat operations and to ensure the country's military security;
- not only the minister of defense but also the chief of the General Staff must become members of the country's Security Council;
- receive in direct subordination the armed formations of the other force structures in the event of the introduction of martial law in the country or on part of its territory;

—be directly responsible to the Security Council and the highest legislative and executive authorities for the military structural development and the combat capability of the armed forces; and,

—in the event that the country's Defense Council is created as a special structure within the Security Council, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff would become its working organs. With the initiation of war, the Defense Council would assume responsibility for the functions of the State Defense Committee and the General Staff would be transferred to the direct subordination of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command.

In my view, we simply need to create the Defense Council already right now because the existing Security Council has been compelled to resolve a significantly broader circle of issues than military security. Its composition is not designed for this purpose. The Defense Council is needed not as a consultative organ under the president but as a permanently functioning state structure. The Constitution or a special law must define its functions, composition and powers. Defense Council members cannot be assigned or replaced based upon the desire of one individual, they must be part of the council based upon positions held. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief must head the Defense Council.

As for the Headquarters, Supreme High Command, its formation also must be stipulated by the country's appropriate legislation in peacetime. The composition, missions, operating procedures, and other issues of the creation and functioning of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command must be determined beforehand.

In my opinion, in no case should the Ministry of Defense assume responsibility in peacetime for the leadership of the internal troops, the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] forces, or a number of other armed formations and it should not functionally undermine other ministries and departments. This can only be a question of the need for unified planning of defense measures and legal consolidation of the priority of the MOD and the General Staff in interrelations with the force structures in the organization of planning and certain issues of military structural development (unified military-technical and cadre policy, troop manning, etc.).

In our view, we need to have the Main Military Inspectorate under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and not under the minister of defense. It must carry out monitoring of the department for the entire sphere of military structural development and the activities of those ministries and departments that participate in preparing the country for defense and to ensure its military security.

As for the separation of the functions of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, this is a special topic of conversation. With all of the visible difference of their duties, they are a single, integrated organism that is called upon to carry out command and control of the

armed forces and other elements of the state's military system. A man-made gap will only result in the weakening of each of them. The General Staff is an integral main organ of the military command and control system, it acts as the generator and coordinates the activities of the other elements of this system. This is why the chief of the General Staff must have direct contact with the president—the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces—on the main issues of the staff's work.

Implementation of the proposals examined above could result in the creation in the country of special organs that are directly responsible for all of the issues of military policy, organizing the country's defense, and for military reform as a whole and not only for reforming the armed forces. So far no one bears total responsibility for these issues. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff in their state today do not have the corresponding powers. Their status has fallen to such an extent that they cannot even withstand the continuing destruction of their own armed forces.

With the creation of a unified command and control system of the country's military (defense) complex, the Russian Federation president as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will be able to rely on the variously-tasked special organs of military command and control (the Defense Council, Ministry of Defense with the General Staff, and the Main Military Inspectorate) and purposefully carry out the management of the country's defense sphere.

In order to avoid the danger of concentrating all power over military structures in peacetime in the hands of one individual, the RF Constitution and the laws of the "military package" must equalize the legal position of all branches of power. We need to develop the corresponding mechanisms to implement these rights.

So, reform of the armed forces command and control system, as can be seen from what has been set forth above, cannot be conducted in isolation from the reorganization of the state's military command and control system as a whole. And this only confirms the need to develop an overall concept of military reform and thorough scientific support—each practical step of the government and each decision of the legislators on issues of military structural development.

Contemporary military practice, including in the course of military operations in the Chechen Republic, has shed light upon dozens of the most varied problems that require timely resolution. They exist both in the sphere of command and control and in the sphere of material-technical support of the armed forces, in the organization of operational and combat training, troop manning, scientific and pedagogical activity of military cadres and the morale-psychological support of personnel.

Today the armed forces, for well-known reasons, do not meet the increased requirements of war based upon their

qualitative parameters. They are not at all prepared for combat operations in local conflicts and their authorized organizational structure has not been adapted for the accomplishment of these missions.

Having destroyed the previous system of political work in the army, we have found ourselves without any effective apparatus whatsoever for spiritual-ideological influence on personnel. Information-psychological support of combat operations in Chechnya is practically not being conducted. We have nothing with which to counter hostile propaganda. We are utilizing neither our own, nor foreign experience of organizing psychological operations. Even the experience of the Afghan war for work with the local population has become impossible due to the absence of special subunits and units and the required special propaganda systems. Isn't this why the refusal to carry out orders and the withdrawal from the battlefield of individual servicemen and OMON [Special-Purpose Militia Detachments] forces became possible?

The mission of the qualitatively new training of a corps of junior command personnel—sergeants—is one of the most complex tasks that must be carried out if we are to succeed in raising the combat capability of the troops. The contemporary system of manning, training and organizing the service of sergeants has become totally obsolete and requires reorganization. Today our junior commander is not superior to his subordinates either professionally, morally or based upon life experience. And legal status and material position do not cause him to strive to command soldiers or to be interested in occupying "leadership" positions. On this issue, it is worthwhile to turn to foreign experience, for example, the American experience where a corps of sergeants is equated with the officers. They create not only material but also morale conditions for him. In each unit, formation and even in larger military formations, the second person after the commander is the sergeant major who represents the interests of sergeants and soldiers at the corresponding level of command and control.

Service on contract, that has been introduced into the RF Armed Forces, first of all must be extended to sergeants. Their training must be conducted not for six months like right now but for a longer period and we need to ensure their strict professional selection, high salary, reliable social protection, high legal status, respect and support not only by the command authorities but by society at large—only then will we have a professional sergeant who is really capable of commanding and controlling subunits in battle and of training—in peacetime. Many of today's problems would be eliminated. Combat losses and serious injuries during the course of everyday service would be reduced, discipline in the army would improve, and therefore it would become qualitatively better. We need to regard the creation of a sergeants' corps just as responsibly as we regard the officer corps.

Very many of these problems have accumulated and we will have to resolve them despite the serious financial

and material situation of the country and its armed forces. We only need to select the key problems, forgo the secondary problems for the sake of the main goal and remember that the state is strong through its defense and to strengthen it—is a matter not only for the military.

Let it not seem strange to anyone that, after raising problems of military strategic significance, it would seem that I have turned to the rank and file tactical issues of everyday life of the troops. By this I wanted to stress the entire complexity and multifaceted nature of the tasks of military structural development which we all are faced with solving.

And finally, the last thing. Rumors that military leaders allegedly forced a decision on the need to conduct a small victorious war in Chechnya and that it would dramatically raise the rating of the current leadership and consolidate its positions in future elections are being actively spread in the mass media. The generals counted on obtaining supplemental dividends for themselves and new financial infusions into the defense budget.

These opinions are calculated on gullible persons since every sensible man understands that military personnel, who for some reason could be killed or wounded, desire any war least of all and not as an example for certain office "thinkers".

As for the rating of the political leaders, we must not think that they are so untalented as to not understand that a forceful solution of such problems as the Chechen problem will not add the victors' laurels to them. Certainly everything is not as simple as it sometimes appears to be from the sidelines. Only a thorough and unbiased analysis of the causes, nature, course and results of the still continuing conflict can provide the true answer to the just questions of life. Our mass media should turn more often to this truth.

Col-Gen Samasonov on Steps for Army Reform

95UM0239A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Colonel General Viktor Samsonov: "Military Reform Is Inevitable—On Certain Problems of the Russian Federation's Military Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The seemingly reliable system of the USSR's military security that existed after World War II has been thoroughly destroyed. But even if it continued to exist, it would not be up to the challenge posed by the new political conditions.

Russia is forced to create a new military security system almost from scratch. Such a task can be accomplished most successfully, comprehensively, and fully within the framework of a unified state military reform. It is surprising that in a country that has adopted a course of political, economic, social, and legal reform, as well as fundamental change in almost all spheres of national and public life, a reorganization of the military sphere of

activity has not become a matter that is being addressed at the state level. The cheerful reports of the Defense Ministry leadership on this score should not be taken seriously. On the other hand, no one doubts the objective need for such reform. The urgent need for it is also confirmed by the recent events in Chechnya.

The military security of the state must be ensured first of all through the full array of the manpower and assets at its disposal. In the Russian Federation, these manpower and assets are currently represented by the Armed Forces, the border troops, the internal troops and other units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the railroad troops, the troops of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the governmental communications and information troops, the civil defense troops of the Ministry of Emergencies, and many other troop units and subunits, including the various security services.

Objectively, all the aforementioned military components of the Russian Federation are united by:

- a commonality of missions in the field of defense, as established by national legislation;
- the need for central planning of their combat use in wartime and for the establishment and practicing of cooperation in peacetime;
- a common system of manpower acquisition based on both conscription and contracts in both peacetime and wartime;
- a need to be equipped with standardized weapons, combat hardware, and military equipment;
- a common system of legislation (the Russian Federation Law "On Compulsory Military Duty and Military Service," the Russian Federation Law "On Defense," the "Basic Principles of Russian Federation Military Doctrine," a common military oath, and so forth);
- a common system of social protection for servicemen and their families.

At the present time, however, despite the commonality and interrelated character of the missions confronting these force-wielding structures in the field of state defense, as defined by national legislation, despite many other unifying factors, and despite the practice of military development in recent decades and even the experience of the war in 1941-1945, they have all been dismembered and artificially separated from one another by departmental barriers. As a result, in practice they often find themselves in a state of unnecessary competition with and even opposition to one another on the basis of narrow departmental positions. One needn't go far to find examples of this.

In our view, there exists an objective need, including an objective need from the standpoint of economic expediency, to merge all the state's military structures into a single entity (perhaps some of them would be merged with this entity only in wartime) and to create a clear-cut system of centralized command and control of them in all areas—political, administrative and economic, and military per se.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Up until 1988, the concept of the "USSR Armed Forces" included not only the Army and Navy (the Armed Forces branches, the specialized troops, and the Armed Forces rear services), but also the civil defense, border, and internal troops. In terms of organization, the railroad troops were also a part of the specialized troops. And this at a time when, in terms of their composition and training, the Soviet Army and Navy had the capability, perhaps even without the other force-wielding structures, to accomplish the missions of the Armed Forces in defending the state.

However, under the influence of a temporary, transient factor (a desire to artificially reduce the overall strength of the Armed Forces used in international negotiations), many components were pointedly excluded from the makeup of the Armed Forces, thereby disrupting their mutual ties and cooperation and destroying the clear-cut, integral structure of the Armed Forces generally, especially their actual composition in wartime. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation leadership has not only inherited this situation, but even further exacerbated it (for example, the State Security Committee and its troop units have been dismembered into many parts).

As mentioned above, all this could be corrected and restored within the framework of a **unified state military reform**, a concept of which should be comprehensively developed and discussed in detail and only then approved by directive by constitutional bodies and systematically implemented **within the framework of the overall set of state reforms**. This is also necessitated by the fact that the conduct of military reform requires a certain economic base.

In order to improve the leadership of the force-wielding ministries and departments in ensuring the country's military security and to establish the closest cooperation among them, as well as to enhance the operational efficiency of centralized command and control of the Armed Forces and to strengthen political (civilian) control of them, the following steps, in our opinion, should be taken within the framework of military reform.

First, it is essential to strictly define and legislatively codify the composition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. First and foremost, their composition should include the border troops and the internal troops (especially in wartime).

This must be done because in the event of war, the border and internal troops, in accordance with the "Basic Principles of Russian Federation Military Doctrine" and other directives, have quite specific missions and cannot "be enlisted in defense," as the Russian Federation Law on Defense states.

In the past (and apparently today as well), plans called for transferring the border troops, once a threat had already emerged, to the operational subordination of the troop commanders of the military districts (fronts) and the fleet commanders, who were to be responsible as of

that moment for safeguarding and protecting the state border in their respective sectors. With the adoption of a defensive military doctrine, this is especially urgent.

The **internal troops**, in addition to protecting important state installations in wartime, are to be enlisted in missions relating to territorial defense, the organization of which is the responsibility of the fronts and military districts in wartime. They are also charged with enforcing a wartime regime in rear areas, escorting and protecting military cargo, holding prisoners of war, and carrying out other missions.

The border and internal troops accomplish their assigned defensive missions in close cooperation with the manpower and assets of the Armed Forces branches, and their operations should be reflected in plans for the country's defense (plans for the use of the Armed Forces) drawn up by the General Staff.

In addition, it would be desirable, insofar as possible, to pursue a policy of reducing the overall number of the country's armed components, as well as the number of command and control bodies to which they are currently subordinate.

Second, we must establish in the country a unified supreme body of military administration to deal with matters relating to the defense of the state in peacetime. Reference is to a military body. In our view, such a body could be the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To this end, we should elevate its role and enhance its authority in defense organization and make it subordinate, where paramount, fundamental issues are concerned, to the Russian Federation President as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces. The General Staff should become a true General Staff of (all) the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and not the General Staff of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, which is what it has essentially become today. Various command and control structures have been created and are operating within the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense that duplicate the work of the General Staff in many areas, diminish its responsibility, and thus introduce a certain amount of disorganization into its operation.

Under such an arrangement, the General Staff would not only plan military operations and defense as a whole, but also be charged directly with the day-to-day management of the Armed Forces (and their peacetime composition), their development and training, and efforts to maintain the required level of military preparedness of the command and control system and the troops and forces. Consequently, it would also be accountable for these matters to the Security Council and the President.

In this event, the Ministry of Defense, perhaps led by a civilian minister, as was previously envisioned in our country and as is current practice in many of the world's developed countries, would be charged with the most important, overall problems of formulating military

policy, as well as with comprehensive efforts to ensure the Armed Forces' combat readiness (financing, orders and purchases of weapons and military hardware, their repair and maintenance, the supply of other military equipment, provisions, and materials, major construction projects, and so on) and with exercising civilian (political) control of them. The Defense Minister, being a civilian, would in this case devote far more attention to work in the Council of Ministers, to cooperation with legislative agencies and the defense industry, and to relations with the public and with local government bodies, and, finally, he would be much more involved in solving problems relating to servicemen's rights and to the social protection of servicemen and members of their families.

Given the continuing economic and financial crisis in the country and the continuing political and social instability, this is an extremely important field of activity and one whose results would be a primary determinant of the level of the Armed Forces' security. The Defense Ministry and the defense minister would play a very great role in this. In addition to everything else, such a delimiting of functions would eliminate the possibility of periodic sharp disagreements on fundamental issues of military development between the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff, which have always had a negative impact on the state of the Armed Forces.

In general, the question is not one of completely withdrawing the General Staff from subordination to the Defense Ministry; rather, it is proposed only that their powers and responsibilities be delimited more explicitly.

If the proposed arrangement were to be codified in a legislative act, many current problems relating to interaction among the force-wielding ministries and departments and their military structures could be solved. In peacetime, the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would rightly come to play the role of coordinator of these structures with respect to many facets of their readiness to accomplish their missions in the event of war. In our view, such areas of cooperative activity could be the following:

- participation in operational planning (formulation of plans for the use of the Armed Forces, mobilization plans, territorial defense plans, etc.);
- manpower acquisition in peacetime and mobilization;
- the organization of research and development, orders, and the production and supply (purchase) of weapons, combat hardware, and certain types of materiel;
- the coordination of efforts relating to the operational outfitting of the country's territory for defense purposes;
- the organization of the command, control, and communications system;
- manpower training and rotation;
- the conduct of military research of an operational and strategic character (participation in the formulation of doctrines, concepts, directives, and regulations);
- participation in measures relating to the operational training of commanding officers and staffs.

Other areas of activity are possible as well. For example, it is not clear at present exactly which of our state structures is responsible for the highly important and complex task of ensuring the mobilizational preparedness of state leadership and administrative agencies.

Third, the time has clearly come, on the basis of existing experience and the recent events in the Northern Caucasus, to take a critical approach to the structure and activities of the Russian Federation Security Council with respect to its work in solving problems relating to the country's military security. In seeking to improve the functioning of this constitutional body with respect to defense matters, the emphasis should obviously be on establishing and organizing the work of a Standing Interdepartmental Commission for the formulation and implementation of Russian Federation military policy (the establishment of such commissions is envisioned in the Statute on the Russian Federation Security Council). Such a commission should be granted a great deal of independence in decision-making, and its activities should receive as much media coverage as possible (in other words, its work should be more open). In determining the makeup of the commission, we must not overlook the fact that those involved in organizing the country's defense include not only the force-wielding ministries and departments, but also certain economic sectors, above all the defense industry, rail, air, and maritime transport, public health agencies, and others. At the same time, the position of secretary of the standing commission should be created.

There is an objective need to include the chief of the General Staff in the Russian Federation Security Council. The chief could simultaneously be charged with supervising the work of the aforementioned Standing Interdepartmental Commission.

Fourth, in order to directly involve senior officials of the force-wielding ministries and departments in the consideration and adoption of decisions on practical matters relating to the preparation and organization of the country's defense, it would be possible to consider the expediency of making the chief of staff of the Russian Federation border troops a full member of the Collegium of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, along with one of the deputy ministers of internal affairs, the deputy director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, and executive officials of certain other departments.

Subsequently, after the proposed reorganization of the Defense Ministry, it would be possible to establish a **Committee (Council) of Chiefs of Staff**, whose permanent members would include not only the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the commanders in chief of the Armed Forces branches (the chiefs of the main staffs), but also officials of other force-wielding structures.

Fifth, an important condition for ensuring Russia's military security is civilian control of military activity in general and of the implementation of plans and projects

for reforming the Armed Forces in particular, as elements of the country's overall military reform effort. Such control should be effected on a permanent basis through the spheres of military organization: military-economic, military-personnel, military-social, and military-financial.

Only civilian (political, social) control will make it possible to solve problems of safeguarding the international and constitutional rights and freedoms of individual servicemen and their social protection, acquiring manpower, keeping the Armed Forces' strength at the required level, and so forth. In other words, military activity, like military reform, must be carried out not on a subjective basis, but within the framework of federal laws. To this end, all previously adopted state legislative acts on defense should be brought into conformity with the Russian Federation Constitution of December 12, 1993. This applies first and foremost to the Russian Federation Laws "On Defense," "On Compulsory Military Duty and Military Service," and "On Security," as well as to the "Basic Principles of Russian Federation Military Doctrine." At the same time, certain provisions of the aforementioned laws should be clarified. The content of the Russian Federation Law "On Defense" requires significant adjustment.

Sixth, in implementing its military policy, the Russian Federation, proceeding from its state interests, must make the fullest possible and skillful use of the potential for alliances.

Russia's defense and security will become far more reliable and, no less importantly, more economical if they are based on a clear-cut and streamlined system of collective military security along regional lines. The need to create such a system has clearly become urgent. Its realization is possible within the framework of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992.

It is also very important for the country's defense that all the Russian Federation's force-wielding ministries and departments, in their relations and contacts with government bodies and structures analogous to themselves in the other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, follow a coordinated, interrelated, and goal-oriented line as an element of Russia's overall foreign military policy. Their activity in the field of foreign relations must also be directed and coordinated. Here too, there is a need for a body that would perform this function.

Incidentally, it should be pointed out that the Soviet Union had such structures, and now that we have abandoned our ideological prejudices, it would be a good idea to study their experience and to take it into maximum consideration.

In conclusion, it must be said that national military reform is a complex social process that involves shifting the entire state military system, the backbone of which is the Armed Forces, to a qualitatively new state that will enhance the country's defense capability and its military security.

Reform of the Armed Forces is an inalienable part of military reform, in the course of which we must seek to accomplish a whole array of tasks, most of which should be addressed not so much by the Armed Forces alone as by society as a whole. At the same time, the "coordinating and supervisory agency capable of implementing military reform" that the Russian Federation President spoke of quite correctly in his 1994 Message to the Federal Assembly has yet to be identified, unfortunately.

In our view, therefore, this is precisely where we should start.

Critique of Current Approach to Civilian Control Over Military

95UM0240A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Col Valeriy Cheban, doctor of philosophical sciences and officer on the central apparatus of the RF Ministry of Defense: "Incompetence Has Many Faces, but the Truth Is One: A Contribution to the Debate Over the Institution of Civilian Control Over the Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army is not a medieval principality and not someone's private fiefdom, but a state institution, and every taxpayer has the right to know where his money is going, how the military department is managing it, and whether there is any need at all for such a costly organization as the Armed Forces.

During troubled times the interest in the Army increases sharply, and citizens are quite justifiably concerned about the problem of whether the Army, as a force-wielding structure, might not abuse its "official position" in order to advance its own or someone else's selfish interests.

At the same time, the Armed Forces is a specific type of organization, for which an unwanted information leak can seriously damage its qualities and, consequently, the security of the state. For these reasons, a number of problems of military development have not been the subject of general discussion. After all, nothing can cause quite as much damage as the divulgence of a state secret and incompetent interference in the specific affairs of the army organism.

This circumstance, however, by no means eliminates the need for civilian control. On the contrary, an appropriate mechanism of communications between the Army and society is needed that would make it possible, on the one hand, to realize the demand for quality military development, and on the other, to keep "butchers out of the surgeon's office."

In essence, it is proposed that the process of civilian control answer the following questions.

First. Is military development in keeping with new geopolitical realities, and how does it fit into the structure of present-day politico-military relations?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Second. Based on the state's specific geostrategic features, its capabilities, and the logical of military affairs themselves, how justified are outlays for the Army and Navy?

Third. How are the considerable state budget funds being spent for defense directly by the military department itself? It is no secret that instances of luxurious living by the top military leadership create special resentment among taxpayers in a situation of inflation and price increases. Since the beginning of perestroika, the critical arrows of public opinion have been targeted at privileges for servicemen, the generals and their dachas, and personnel policy and hazing in the Army. Of course, the turning of the image of the defender into that of a parasite who is milking the sacred cow of the defense budget has not happened without "personal exemplariness" on the part of the man with the rifle. On this score, a good many cases of abuses on the part of military personnel are known. But as far as the purposeful campaign to discredit the Army is concerned, that is an entirely independent subject, and one that pertains, among other things, to the issue of civilian control, since what is involved is the prestige of an institution called on to ensure the security of the state.

A fact remains a fact. In-depth, comprehensive information about the mechanism of budgetary spending for defense is an essential condition for society's competent intervention in the problems of military development.

Fourth. How are military training and the life and activities of army and navy personnel organized? Doesn't the content of military work come into conflict with the interests of the country? If the state professes a defensive doctrine, but the forces are oriented exclusively toward aggression; if the proclaimed humanization of military service presupposes the development of servicemen's culture, but the army way of life forms an unfeeling robot who blindly carries out orders; and if society has set a course on creating a civilized, rule-of-law state (that is, on establishing a kind of single chain of command with the law at the top), but bureaucratic perversions and administrative tyranny degrade the man in the military uniform, then such practices in the Armed Forces will clearly not be to society's liking.

A fifth question is of great interest to citizens: what is the mechanism for preparing and taking decisions to use the Armed Forces or carry out actions involving the military?

One can say with absolute confidence that a preliminary, thorough discussion of the idea of Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace program, enlisting a wide range of experts, would have eliminated many problems and would not have been subjected to bitter criticism. The same thing can be said about the procedure for taking the decision on holding joint exercises with the Americans at the Totsk camps.

Reports of the leaders of the Russian military department holding discussions "face to face" and "behind

closed doors" with their colleagues from analogous agencies in other countries have a negative effect on citizens' attitudes. The logic of their reasoning is simple: are there are no secrets for foreign states, while there are secrets for citizens of our own country, whose money supports that department?

Finally a sixth and last question, but not least in terms of its importance, about the Army's attitude toward politics. Especially during critical moments in the development of society, citizens are worried by the degree of the Armed Forces' participation in societal life. The public is equally frightened by the possibility of a military coup d'etat and establishment of a military dictatorship, on the one hand, and the Army's total indifference to the acute problems of societal life, on the other.

In addition to everything else, the Khrushchev "thaw" and Gorbachev's perestroika were marked by bloody events involving the military. The shooting in Novochoerkassk, and the use of the military in Tbilisi, Vilnius and Moscow.

The heat of political passions inevitably spreads to the Army, and in such a situation appropriate civilian control is simply essential as a means of preventing the Army from deserting from the front of defending the state against foreign aggression to the front of civil war.

In short, civilian control is a complex mechanism of interaction between the Army and society, which presupposes seeing not only its financial and economic, political and legal, technical and organizational, and humanitarian and moral aspects.

Unfortunately, the way that the issue of civilian control is being currently raised cannot withstand criticism.

First of all, the superficiality and lack of seriousness of the approach are extremely surprising. Sometimes everything is reduced merely to the need to appoint a civilian as minister of defense. As though changing the sex of the minister and replacing a military uniform with civilian dress would be a serious obstacle to the military department's converting an outsider to its own faith.

Second, many present-day social initiatives and versions of civilian control have the air of vengefulness, political hazing, and the desire to strike the pride of the military with an original and unassailable truncheon. This is evident from the fact that civilian control (as subjectively interpreted) is championed by former servicemen who have been offended by someone and whose careers have not worked out, as well as by civilians who feel no particular love for military "idlers" and "parasites."

Third, a fundamental initial premise is overlooked: civilian control is understood as the control of military men by civilians, whereas it should be viewed as the control of the military department by all the state's citizens. From this perspective, the military person himself changes from the object to the subject of control. His first-rate knowledge of the essence of the matter and the

specifics of the soldier's work enable him to make the control that is so essential to society both specific and effective.

On the other hand, excluding the "citizen in the military uniform" from the system of civilian control turns him into that very "cog" who thoughtlessly carries out orders and who under certain conditions can be turned in any direction, including against our own citizens. The legal restrictions and guarantees that are discussed so much today cannot work without the serviceman himself. In order to not carry out a criminal order, he must know not only the difference between it and a legal order, but the legal actions for the serviceman to take in such a case. Obtaining information about shortcomings in the Army is possible without the involvement of military personnel, but what sort of information it will be and what sort of shortcomings they will be, one can only guess, since incompetence has many faces, but the truth is one.

'Catastrophe' Foreseen if Decline in Pay Continues

95UM0279A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Feb 95 pp 1,3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Oleg Vladikin: "A Declining 'Curve' of the Military Salary Level Is Becoming Increasingly Threatening: Current Social and Financial Policy With Regard to Servicemen Is Leading to a Cadre Catastrophe in the Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Troop operations in Chechnya have suddenly prompted interest in society in a problem that until quite recently many "major minds" callously ignored, considering it an exclusively internal army concern. Now nearly all of the mass media and, with their presentation, "wide strata" have become seriously concerned about the level of professionalism of military personnel. It is urgently desired that first of all the cadre backbone of the Armed Forces—the officers—would be irreproachable... That is in general a natural desire. Only isn't that realization coming a bit late?

Today voices are sometimes heard: "Just how did it happen that our Army has found itself in the current extremely difficult situation!" Some people are already panicking. They say that right now we don't have an army at all... But all of those same events in Chechnya refute the latter thesis. They attest to the fact that there is still potential, combat capability and morale in the troops. However, the fact is indisputable that all of this is—at the limit and that many army structures and organisms are functioning only on enthusiasm and on the selflessness of the people in uniform.

Today it is not society that must ask of the Army: How can that be? Today the Army can justifiably request from both statesmen and society: why in all of the recent years did you not hear the despairing appeals of the military to direct maximum attention to the very urgent problems of the Armed Forces? Why did "no one threatens us" so

captivate the consciousness of Russians in such a care-free manner? Why even now, after the Chechen lesson, do only emotional "oohs" and "aahs" sound but attempts to go even further are not being observed? And the "holy faith" is being preserved that talented commanders and knowledgeable military specialists will appear from somewhere at the required moment and in the required quantity. Isn't it time to understand: there are always as many... as we permitted ourselves to train and maintain ahead of time.

And the situation here is as follows. From 1990 through January 1995, manning of the most numerous primary officer billets has fallen from 90 to 70% on the whole throughout the Armed Forces. The RF MOD Main Cadre Directorate presented this data to me, having stressed in the process that the number of vacancies is increasing much more rapidly than the number of authorized billets is being decreased within the framework of the Armed Forces reductions that have been conducted in recent years.

Officers are leaving the Army. Beginning with 1992, those officers who are being released in accordance with their own desires and who have not reached the maximum age for military service have annually become twice as numerous as in the previous year. And in 1994, their strength was already 30 percent greater than the number of all military personnel who retired due to age. Even lieutenants who have barely completed military schools contrive to find methods to not serve the minimum term of five years in the troops that is prescribed by law. Last year 1,630 officers from 21-22 years of age considered it better to seek employment for themselves in the civilian sector and not in the Army's ranks. Meanwhile, there is an acute shortage of precisely those officers who, based upon their billets, are obliged to work directly with the troops.

According to some experts, manning has already crossed the threshold of the critical minimum. Say, there are only 36 percent of the ground-based artillery experts in primary officer billets. The shortage of these officers has increased by a factor of four (!) in the last two years. The losses are comparable only to those at the front. So you yourself can imagine what kind of difficulties the command authorities have encountered while manning the military units that have been introduced on the territory of Chechnya with gun platoon commanders, that is, with the direct executors of the so-called precision-guided artillery strikes.

Any officer knows the causes according to which the emergency cadre situation in the Army has developed. He himself senses them. If the resolution of social problems in the Armed Forces does not immediately and radically improve then, according to RF MOD GUK [Main Cadre Directorate] predictions, a real avalanche of requests for release will occur already this year. To those citizens who cannot immediately glimpse a direct link between these two phenomena, I recommend they submit themselves and their adult sons for testing.

Will many people be found who desire to become involved in professional activity under the following conditions? First of all, obtain a specialty at a restricted regime educational institution. Then submit to the requirements to carry out any order of a senior in position or military rank for a minimum of twenty years (until receipt of the right to a pension). Augment the 135,000 man group of homeless servicemen, while having the chance at best to obtain your own housing in about 10 years and prior to that live with your family in a barracks, small construction rail car, or rent a tiny apartment for a sum that is equal to your monthly salary. Be prepared to always go where they send you, be under fire at the first requirement to do so, lead tens or hundreds of subordinates there while bearing the entire responsibility for the safety of their lives. At the same time, regularly read in newspapers and hear on radio and television only commentaries on the topic of your multifaceted detriment. And for all of that receive on a monthly basis as society's material assessment of your person a salary that lags behind even the salary of a station platform cleaning person at the metro or of any worker at a construction site.


The paradox consists of the fact that the majority of people who consider these conditions to be unacceptable for themselves are absolutely certain for some reason of the existence of a large number of young people somewhere who have agreed to undergo all of this. And the most curious thing is that, judging by everything, many Russian legislators and government bureaucrats when they decide to resolve issues of the social security of the Army discuss this: why, they say, should the military live better than the rest, we have more than enough of our own...

This is already not a question of worthy material compensation for very difficult military labor. Where else! They propose to the military that they be happy that they have not yet been reduced to abject poverty. Although it is becoming obvious even to a blind person how officers are consistently and purposefully being lowered to the very bottom of the social pyramid of Russian society.

Here are data that were obtained at the RF MOD Main Military Budget and Financing Directorate. They reflect the dynamics of the changes since January 1, 1994 of the amount of the monthly salary of a company commander in the rank of captain (the primary subunit of a tactical element) with all of the percentage increases for seven years of officer service and a 1st class specialist.

Of course, the figures increase when expressed in rubles. But life has already taught us how to properly deal with inflation "astronomy". Let's recalculate into a hard currency equivalent based upon the current exchange rate and... we see a quite different picture. Not only does an officer's monetary salary appear to be quite modest and rapidly devalued between the indexes but it also turns out to be substantially less than the previous result after each of them (see the figure).

DYNAMICS OF CHANGES IN THE SIZE OF THE MONTHLY PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF OFFICERS (EXPRESSED AS CURRENCY)



— For a company commander: a captain, length of service, 7 years, 1st class.
---- Prognosis if present trend continues.

Since January 1, 1994, a captain was paid a ruble sum that was then equal to 186 U.S. dollars. In June, the salary amount fell to \$117 due to inflation. Since July 1, they reindexed it but only to \$164. Once again, depreciation and a new increase of the amount they will pay due to some sort of percentage increases: since January 1, 1995—\$103. And by February 10, a captain once again managed to become poorer to \$89.

I anticipate that rebukes will follow from experts: they will say, those recalculations into dollars are not totally correct. I agree that there is a certain conventionality here. But with all of the calculations that we conducted, the figure shows a very graphic picture. In any case, the declining "curve" certainly coincides with the "curve" of the general social physical and mental state of many military collectives. To do that, you don't even need to conduct global sociological research.

It is sufficient to visit any unit and to simply speak with people in order to understand: social tension is extremely high. And the matter clearly is not only in peoples' material infringement as such. The issue is much more serious. The Army's current situation is humiliating which is like requesting alms: give us money for equipment, for combat training, and for construction of housing for servicemen. It is also humiliating that officers have to become involved with the problems of survival and endlessly "patch all kinds of holes" instead of accomplishing their primary duties and work based upon their vocation.

You can also say quite a bit about this—moral humiliation. And it affects the cadre situation even more than purely mercantile issues. But I am consciously emphasizing only one of the problems in this article—the problem of salaries because the amount of servicemen's salaries most graphically shows the degree of society's unfairness toward the military today.

Tell me what a man should feel who sincerely desires to dedicate his life to service to the Fatherland in the Army

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

when he reads numerous proclamations in the newspapers to citizens to earn wages of 2-3 million rubles. And in the underground crossings in Moscow, in general among those standing here and there are representatives of various firms who will hire you without delay as a courier, a delivery man of small goods shipments, a secretary, or an inspector of sales points scattered throughout the city with a guaranteed salary of \$250-300. Well, how can you not note all of this and not one day write a request to be released from the ranks of the Armed Forces in a fit of inescapable resentment?!

Of course, we have trained and will train replacements for those departing. Lieutenants will be promoted to the position of company commander in one year instead of the at one time customary 3-4 years in the position of platoon commander and to battalion after another one or two years. And in their places we anticipate ever newer graduates of military schools.

But there are the same contradictions and troubles. The number of young people who desire to become officers has been drastically reduced. Competition has actually totally disappeared at entrance examinations at individual military schools.

Personnel in the RF MOD Military Education Directorate told me that in 1987 no one would even have thought that someone could be accepted into higher educational institutions with a "two" on the examinations. However, it was in that year that the first powerful campaign of criticism and psychological pressure on the Army arrived. And in 1988, already 93 people who received an "unsatisfactory" on their entrance examinations had the opportunity to enroll as cadets. Because schools are obliged to select and then graduate a strictly calculated number of future military specialists. All the more so when a shortage of them begins to be highlighted.

The number of "two's" who have been accepted at VUZ's [higher educational institutions] has increased somewhat from year to year. But in 1993, it suddenly increased very dramatically and totaled 3.16 percent of all those enrolled as cadets. Last year, 1,030 young people who failed the entrance examinations began their mastery of VUZ programs. And approximately half in many schools—with satisfactory grades. Ponder that...

Until quite recently the influx of candidates for entry into military schools was nearly comparable with the competition at theatrical schools. Young people entered the most prestigious military schools, having received marks of at least no less than 14 on three entrance examinations. In 1989, there were more than 1,500 gold medalists and holders of diplomas with honors among those accepted as cadets. But last year their percentage among those enrolled turned out to be already three times lower. Young people see everything and understand everything.

When a young person is confident in his strengths and has some sort of ambition, he naturally does not burn with desire to tie his fate with a profession, the social

significance of which is rapidly declining. He doesn't want to find himself in the position of a man with limited life opportunities. Therefore, it's no accident that last year even the percentage of those who were dismissed from schools for a lack of desire to study at a military VUZ turned out to be three times higher than in 1987. Frequently, the most capable and promising cadets are leaving. And those who remain... are those who entered with "two's". You will agree that in any society the people who simply cannot or are incapable of rising higher occupy the bottom of the social pyramid. Or those who, while soberly assessing their own capabilities, do not pretend to any more. They are satisfied with social roles that don't require more energetic, active and talented fellow citizens...

One can continue to list the facts that attest to how serious and dramatic the situation is in the Armed Forces. And if you also lay the impact of the Chechen events, and all of that emotional anti-army background that has been engendered by them, on it.... Will our society finally understand that we are standing at a very dangerous line where there is a real threat of losing the Army? Or will everything end once again only with cunning "political games"?

We need to recognize that the military have taught the people about the Army's misfortunes and pains and then the reassuring promise mandatorily follows: "Despite everything... combat readiness is being maintained at the proper level." But it's as if the time for such sayings has ended. It's time to tell the truth: the limit has arrived! It's impossible to further humiliate the Army or to tax the Army's patience.

Text of Statement on WGF Bank Account in Zossen

95UM0279B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 95 p 1

[Statement by the RF Ministry of Defense Information and Press Directorate: "The Account in Zossen Was Opened Legally"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In February the newspaper SEG-ODNYA published an article which placed in doubt the correctness of the opening of an RF Ministry of Defense account at the Zossen Branch of Deutsche Bank (FRG). An explanation on the essence of this issue has arrived from the RF MOD Main Budget and Finance Directorate.

The account at the Zossen Branch of Deutsche Bank was opened based upon the October 9, 1990 Agreement Between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the FRG on Certain Transitional Measures.

Foreign hard currency was deposited into this account that was allocated by the FRG for the maintenance and withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces and that was earned from the sale of goods and services.

The technical procedures and conditions for conducting this account were stipulated by a separate July 19, 1991 Agreement between the WGF [Western Group of Forces] financial service and the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] Field Institution, on the one hand, and Deutsche Bank, on the other hand.

Hard currency assets from the account were utilized in strict conformity with legislative acts and with other normative documents for the maintenance and withdrawal of the WGF and support of other social needs of servicemen.

The transactions conducted for this account were repeatedly verified by representations of the Procuracy General, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Russia, by monitoring organs of the staffs of the President and the Russian Federation Government, by the Russian Federal Service for Hard Currency and Export Control, and by the RF MOD Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate. The indicated inspections did not reveal any substantial violations whatsoever.

At the present time, the account continues to function with the goal of producing final settlements for the maintenance and withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces as stipulated by the October 9, 1990 Intergovernmental Agreement and the June 13, 1994 Protocol of the treaties between the chairmen of the Russian Federation Commission for the Management of the Social Transition Fund and the FRG Federal Ministry of Transportation on the Final Measures while taking into account the withdrawal of the WGF.

RF Ministry of Defense Information and Press Directorate

Pay Supplements for Work With Secrets Explained

95UM0254A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Additional Pay for Secrecy (We Continue To Inform Our Readers About Orders Signed by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Minister of Defense Order No 440 of 30 December 1994, On the Procedure for Payment of Percentage Increases to Pay for Military Appointment (Salary, Wage Rates) of Servicemen (Civilian Personnel) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Cleared for State Secrets.

In accordance with Russian Federation Government Decree No 1161 of 14 October 1994, it calls for payment of monthly pay supplements to servicemen and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense who work with documents comprising state secrets. The size of the supplements amounts to: for work with secret documents—10 percent of the pay for appointment for servicemen or the wage rates for civilian personnel; for work with top secret documents—20 percent; for work with documents of special importance—25 percent. Payment is made beginning in January 1995 in the following

month for the past month together with pay and allowances according to the actually established salary.

The supplements are paid to those having access to state secrets on a constant basis, who are the following: servicemen and civilian personnel having a security clearance for information of the corresponding degree of classification. The supplements are paid based on an order of the commander (chief) of the military unit, which is issued, as a rule, before the start of the training year (training period), but at least once a year. It should be noted that payment of the supplements is not suspended during the period servicemen and civilian personnel are on temporary duty assignments, on leave, in treatment, or in training, except in those cases established by legislation when pay for military appointment (salary, wage rates) is not paid with retention of the duty assignment or job.

An order by the commander (chief) based on one of the following may serve as grounds for suspension of payment of the supplements: loss of state security clearance; dismissal from a position; or release from work on a permanent basis with access to information of the corresponding degree of classification.

This order of the minister of defense calls for payment of a percentage increase to pay for military appointment (salary, wage rates) for the length of service in structural subunits for protection of state secrets. [passage omitted]

Amendments to Law on Status of Servicemen

95UM0248B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Feb 95 p 9

[Federal law "On Amending and Supplementing Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection With Adoption of the Law of the Russian Federation 'On the Status of Servicemen', adopted by the State Duma on 15 December 1994 and approved by the Council of the Federation on 20 January 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] Article 1. Amend and supplement the following legislative acts of the Russian Federation:

1. The RSFSR law "On State Pensions in the RSFSR" (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV RSFSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 27, 1990, Article 351; No 11, 1992, Article 531):

word Article 90 as follows:

"Article 90. Military service and other service equated to it shall be included in the total working time.

"Service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and in other military formations created in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation, in the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in the armed forces of the former USSR, in internal affairs agencies, in foreign intelligence agencies,

in counterintelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, in ministries and departments of the Russian Federation in which military service is foreseen by law, in former state security agencies of the Russian Federation, and in state security and internal affairs agencies of the former USSR (including in the period when these agencies were referred to by other names), and participation in partisan detachments during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars shall be included in total working time on an equal basis with work listed in Article 89 of the Law.”;

word item “g” [transliteration], Article 92 as follows:

“d) residence of wives (husbands) of servicemen undergoing military service under contract together with their husbands (wives) in locales where they were unable to work in their specialty in connection with the absence of job placement opportunities.”;

supplement the first part of Article 94 after the seventh paragraph with a paragraph of the following content:

“military service by conscription—double the amount.”.

2. The second part of Article 34 of the Russian Federation Labor Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 50, 1971, Article 1007; VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 41, 1992, Article 2254); replace the words “workers who are extended-service servicemen, shore-based or seagoing warrant officers, or officers who are discharged into the reserves or retired—in relation to the first job they took after discharge from active military service” by the words “wives (husbands) of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service—in relation to the first job they took after discharge from military service”.

3. The RSFSR law “On Freedom of Religion” (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV RSFSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 21, 1990, Article 240);

supplement Article 17 with a fourth part of the following content:

“Creation of religious associations in military units shall not be permitted.”;

supplement the fourth part of Article 22 after the words “The administration of these institutions” with the words “, with the exception of the command of military units.”.

4. Article 3 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On Personal Income Tax” (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 12, 1992, Article 591; No 34, Article 1976; No 4, 1993, Article 118; No 14, Article 486; SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 27, 1994, Article 2823; No 29, Article 3010; No 35, Article 3654);

supplement item 1 with subitem “ya¹¹” [transliteration] of the following content:

“ya¹¹) pay, monetary remunerations and other payments received by servicemen in connection with the duties of military service.”;

replace the words “servicemen (including ex-servicemen) and persons with a military obligation called up for training and muster” in subitem “b” of item 3 by the words “citizens discharged from military service or called up for muster.”;

delete the words “servicemen,” and “military service or” from the second paragraph of item 4.

5. Article 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On Personal Property Tax” (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 8, 1992, Article 362; No 4, 1993, Article 118; SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 16, 1994, Article 1863);

supplement item 1 after the sixth paragraph with a paragraph of the following content:

“servicemen as well as citizens discharged from military service upon attaining the maximum age of military service for reason of health or in connection with organizational and staffing measures having a total time of military service of 20 or more years.”.

6. Supplement Article 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation “On Tax on Property Transferred by Inheritance or as a Gift” (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 12, 1992, Article 593; No 4, 1993, Article 118; No 14, Article 486) after the fifth paragraph with a paragraph of the following content:

“transportation resources transferred by inheritance to the families of servicemen that had lost their breadwinner. Members of the family of a deceased (killed) serviceman possessing the right to a pension in the event of the death of the breadwinner shall be treated as having lost their breadwinner.”.

7. The RSFSR Code of Administrative Violations (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 27, 1984, Article 909; No 40, 1985, Article 1398; No 12, 1988, Article 341; No 15, 1989, Article 369; VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 3, 1993, Article 97);

Replace the words “and in relation to extended-service servicemen—a fine as well” in the first part of Article 16 by the words “and additionally in relation to servicemen, a fine and forfeiture of driving rights”;

in Article 215:

replace the words "only a fine" in the third part by the words "a fine or forfeiture of driving rights";

delete the fourth part.

8. The Law of the Russian Federation "On Employment of the Population in the Russian Federation" (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV RSFSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 18, 1991, Article 565; VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No 34, 1992, Article 1974);

Supplement the footnote to the preamble with the words "Citizens discharged from military service and their families shall not be included in this category.";

word the sixth paragraph of Article 2 as follows:

"undergoing military service and service in internal affairs agencies";

in Article 13:

supplement the reference to item 1 after the words "resettled individuals" with the words "citizens discharged from military service, and their families.";

supplement the article with item 3 of the following content:

"3. The wives (husbands) of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service shall under otherwise equal conditions have a preferential right to jobs at state (municipal) enterprises and in state (municipal) institutions and organizations.";

supplement item 3, Article 23 after the words "places" with the words "and the wives (husbands) of servicemen and citizens discharged from military service.";

replace the words "from the armed forces, internal railroad troops, state security agencies and" in the title and in the first part of Article 36 with the words "from military service and from agencies".

9. The RSFSR Housing Code (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR, No 26, 1983, Article 883):

Word item 1 of the first part of Article 60 as follows:

"1) conscription for military service—during the entire time of service by conscription; upon entering military service under contract—for the first 5 years of military service under contract (not counting time of acquisition of a professional education in military educational institutions);";

word Article 104 as follows:

"Article 104. Official Residential Quarters for Certain Categories of Servicemen

"In accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation, official residential quarters may be granted to certain categories of servicemen.".

Article 2. This Federal Law shall become effective from the day of its official publication.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
27 January 1995
No 10-FZ

Russian Federal Law on Veterans

95UM0223A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Jan 95 pp 3-5

[Text of Federal Law on Veterans]

[FBIS Translated Text] Passed by the State Duma on 16 December 1994

This federal law establishes the organizational, economic, and legal fundamentals of social protection of veterans in the Russian Federation for the purpose of creating conditions ensuring for them a fitting life, active activities, honor, and respect in society.

Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1. Categories of Veterans

The following categories of veterans are established taking into account services in protecting the homeland, impeccable military service, and prolonged conscientious labor: Great Patriotic War veterans; veterans of combat operations on territories of other states; veterans of military service; veterans of bodies of internal affairs, the procuracy, justice, and the courts; and veterans of labor.

Article 2. Great Patriotic War Veterans

Great Patriotic War veterans are persons who participated in combat operations to in defense of the homeland or in support of military units of the active army in areas of combat operations, as well as persons who performed military service or worked in the rear area during the years of the Great Patriotic War at least six months, excluding the period of work on temporarily occupied territories of the USSR, or who performed military service or worked less than six months and were awarded orders or medals of the USSR for selfless labor and impeccable service during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

Great Patriotic War veterans are:

1) Participants of the Great Patriotic War:

- a) servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), who have performed military service (including students in training in military units and sea cadets) or were located temporarily in military units, headquarters, and institutions that were part of the active army during the years

of the Civil War or Great Patriotic War or during other combat operations to protect the homeland, as well as partisans and members of underground organizations that operated during the years of the Civil War or Great Patriotic War on temporarily occupied territories;

- b) servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), and rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security who performed service during the years of the Great Patriotic War in cities, participation in the defense of which counts toward required length of service for granting pensions on preferential terms established for servicemen of military units of the active army;
- c) civilian personnel of the Army and Navy, troops, and bodies of internal affairs and state security who during the years of the Great Patriotic War held staff positions in military units, headquarters, and institutions that were part of the active army or during this period were located in cities, participation in the defense of which counts toward required length of service for granting persons on preferential terms established for servicemen of military units of the active army;
- d) workers in intelligence and counter-intelligence, and also persons who performed special assignments in military units of the active army, in the enemy's rear area, or on territories of other states during the Great Patriotic War;
- e) workers of enterprises and military installations, people's commissariats, and departments who were transferred to the status of persons in the ranks of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War and who performed missions in the interests of the Army and Navy within the rear boundaries of the active fronts or operational zones of operating fleets, as well as workers of institutions and organizations (including institutions and organizations of culture and art), correspondents of central newspapers, journals, TASS, the Soviet Information Bureau, and radio, and film operators of the Central Documentary Film Studio (news films) sent to the active army during the years of the Great Patriotic War;
- f) servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security, soldiers and command personnel of hunter battalions, platoons, and people's protection detachments who participated in combat operations when performing government assignments on the territory of the USSR during the period from 1 January 1944 through 9 May 1945;
- g) persons who participated in combat operations against fascist Germany and its allies as part of

partisan detachments, underground groups, and other anti-fascist formations during the years of the Great Patriotic War on territories of other states;

- h) servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), who performed military service during the period from 22 June 1941 through 3 September 1945 in military units, establishments, and military-educational institutions not part of the active army, who were awarded the medal "For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" or "For Victory over Japan;"

The list of military units, headquarters, and establishments that were part of the active army during the years of the Great Patriotic War and the list of cities, participation in the defense of which counts toward required length of service for granting pensions on preferential terms established for servicemen of military units of the active army, are approved by the President of the Russian Federation at the recommendation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

- 2) persons who worked during the years of the Great Patriotic War within the boundaries of active fronts and other persons:
 - a) persons who worked at installations of air defense and local air defense, on construction of defensive structures, naval bases, airfields, and other military installations within the rear boundaries of active fronts, and in front-line railroad and highway sectors;
 - b) crew members of vessels of the transport fleet who were interned at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in ports of other states;
 - c) persons enlisted by local authorities to assist in collecting ammunition and military equipment and clearing mines from territories and installations during the years of the Great Patriotic War;
- 3) persons who worked at enterprises, establishments, and organizations of the city of Leningrad during the blockade from 8 September 1941 through 27 January 1944 and were awarded the medal "For Defense of Leningrad" and persons awarded the badge "To the Resident of Blockaded Leningrad;"
- 4) persons who worked in the rear area during the period from 22 June 1941 through 9 May 1945 at least six months, excluding the period of work on temporarily occupied territories of the USSR, or who worked less than six months and were awarded orders or medals of the USSR for selfless labor during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The procedure and conditions of considering other persons veterans of the Great Patriotic War and the scope of their rights and privileges are determined by legislation of the Russian Federation.

Article 3. Veterans of Combat Operations on Territories of Other States

Veterans of combat operations on territories of other states are:

- 1) servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), persons liable to military service, persons called up for military assemblies, rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security, workers of these bodies, and workers of the USSR Ministry of Defense or Russian Federation Ministry of Defense sent by bodies of state power of the USSR or bodies of state power of the Russian Federation to other states and who participated in combat operations in the performance of official duties in these states;

servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security, soldiers and command personnel of hunter battalions, platoons, and people's protection detachments who participated in combat operations while performing government combat missions on the territory of the USSR during the period from 10 May 1945 through 31 December 1951;

- 2) servicemen of motor vehicle battalions sent to Afghanistan to deliver freight to this state during the period of conducting combat operations;
- 3) servicemen who completed combat mission flight sorties to Afghanistan from the territory of the USSR during the period of conducting combat operations;
- 4) workers (including Civil Aviation flight crew members making flights to Afghanistan during the period of conducting combat operations) who serviced military contingents of the USSR Armed Forces and the Russian Federation Armed Forces on territories of other states and received wounds, contusions, or injuries or were awarded orders or medals of the USSR or the Russian Federation for participation in support of combat operations;
- 5) workers who were sent to work in Afghanistan during the period from December 1979 through December 1989 and who completed their established tour or were transferred early for legitimate reasons.

The procedure and conditions of considering other persons veterans of combat operations on the territories of other states and the scope of their rights and privileges are determined by the Government of the Russian Federation after six months have passed since the start of participation by citizens of the Russian Federation in combat operations on the territories of other states and no later than one month from the date of their conclusion.

A list of states, cities, territories, and periods of conducting combat operations with participation by citizens of the Russian Federation is contained in an attachment to this federal law.

Changes to this list are made by the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

Article 4. Disabled Persons of the Great Patriotic War and of Combat Operations on Territories of Other States

Disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War and of combat operations on territories of other states are:

servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), who performed military service (including students in training at military units and sea cadets) or were temporarily located in military units, headquarters, and establishments that were part of the active army, partisans, and blue- and white-collar workers who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, injury, or illness received during the year of the Civil War or Great Patriotic War in areas of combat operations, in front-line railroad and highway sectors, and in the construction of defensive lines, naval bases, and airfields and equivalent in pension to servicemen of military units of the active army;

servicemen who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, injury, or illness received when protecting the homeland or performing duties of military service at the front, in areas of combat operations, and during periods indicated by this federal law;

rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, injury, or illness received in the performance of official duties in areas of combat operations;

servicemen, rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security, soldiers and command personnel of hunter battalions, platoons, and people's protection detachments who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, injury, or illness received when performing government combat missions during the period from 1 January 1944 through 31 December 1951;

persons enlisted by local authorities to assist in collecting ammunition and military equipment and clearing mines from territories and installations during the years of the Great Patriotic War and who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, or injury received during this period;

workers servicing active military contingents in other states and who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, injury, or illness received during the period of conducting combat operations there.

Article 5. Veterans of Military Service

Veterans of military service are servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces, the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Combined Armed Forces of the member-states of the

Commonwealth of Independent States, created in accordance with the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, servicemen of the Border Troops, Internal Troops, and Railroad Troops, government communications troops, civil defense troops, and servicemen of ministries and departments, in which military service is called for and which are created in accordance with legislation of the USSR and legislation of the Russian Federation, and who have been awarded orders or medals or conferred honorary titles of the USSR or the Russian Federation, or have been awarded departmental badges of distinction and are authorized a pension for years of service, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), and also who have become disabled as a result of a wound, contusion, injury, or illness received in connection with performance of duties of military service.

The title "Veteran of Military Service" is established for this category of persons.

The procedure and conditions of conferring the title "Veteran of Military Service" are determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 6. Veterans of Bodies of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy, Justice, and the Courts

Veterans of bodies of internal affairs, the procuracy, justice, and the courts are rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and workers of bodies of the procuracy, justice, and the courts who have been awarded orders and medals or conferred honorary titles of the USSR or Russian Federation, or who have been awarded departmental badges of distinction and are authorized pensions for years of service or age.

The title "Veteran of Bodies of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy, Justice, and the Courts" is established for this category of persons.

The procedure and conditions of conferring the title "Veteran of Bodies of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy, Justice, and the Courts" are determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 7. Veterans of Labor

Veterans of labor are persons awarded orders or medals, or conferred honorary titles of the USSR or the Russian Federation, or awarded departmental badges of distinction in labor and having labor service authorizing a pension for age or years of service.

The title "Veteran of Labor" is established for this category of persons.

The procedure and conditions of conferring the title "Veteran of Labor" are determined by the President of the Russian Federation.

Article 8. State Policy With Respect to Veterans

The state policy with respect to veterans calls for:
creation of a state service for veteran affairs;

development and implementation of specific-purpose state and local programs for social protection of veterans ensuring realization of the rights and privileges established by this federal law and other standard legal acts for veterans and their family members;

allocation of the funds necessary to implement these programs from the federal budget, budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation, and local budgets;

use of the mass media for purposeful propaganda of the importance of conscientious military service and labor activities, and the prestige of state awards for military and labor achievements.

Article 9. State Service for Veteran Affairs

The composition and structure of the State Service for Veteran Affairs and the procedure of its creation and activities are determined by the President of the Russian Federation at the recommendation of the government of the Russian Federation.

Direction of the State Service for Veteran Affairs is exercised by the bodies of executive power of the Russian Federation, bodies of executive power of the corresponding subjects of the Russian Federation, and also bodies of local self-government.

Article 10. Financing Measures of Social Protection of Veterans

Expenditures for implementing the rights and privileges granted veterans by this federal law are made by using funds from the federal budget and budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation; the procedure for reimbursing these expenditures is approved by the government of the Russian Federation and the bodies of executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation, respectively.

Additional funds for financing measures established by this federal law for social protection of veterans may be received in the prescribed manner from any source not prohibited by law.

Financing of measures of social protection of veterans established by the bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation is accomplished by using funds of budgets of the corresponding subjects of the Russian Federation and other sources not prohibited by law.

Financing of measures of social protection of veterans additionally established by bodies of local self-government is accomplished by using funds from the corresponding local budgets.

Article 11. Legislation of the Russian Federation on Veterans

Legislation of the Russian Federation on veterans consists of this federal law, other federal laws, and other standard legal acts.

If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules different than those provided for by this federal law, the rules of the international treaty apply.

The rights and privileges and other measures of social protection established earlier for veterans and their family members by legislation of the USSR and legislation of the Russian Federation cannot be repealed without their equivalent replacement.

Laws and other standard legal acts of the Russian Federation and laws and other standard legal acts of subjects of the Russian Federation which restrict the veterans' rights and privileges specified by this federal law are invalid.

Bodies of legislative power of the Russian Federation and bodies of legislative power of subjects of the Russian Federation, bodies of executive power of the Russian Federation and bodies of executive power of subjects of the Russian Federation, bodies of local self-government, enterprises, institutions, and organizations within the limits of their jurisdiction and available funds have a right to make decisions about additional measures of social protection of veterans not provided for by this federal law.

Article 12. Sphere of Application of This Federal Law

This federal law applies to citizens of the Russian Federation indicated in articles 2-7 of this federal law and also foreign citizens and persons without citizenship belonging to the category of veterans indicated in articles 2-4 of this federal law and residing permanently on the territory of the Russian Federation. The rights and privileges of foreign citizen and persons without citizenship belonging to the category of veterans indicated in articles 2-4 of this federal law and temporarily residing or temporarily staying on the territory of the Russian Federation are determined by international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Chapter II. Social Protection of Veterans

Article 13. Content of Social Protection of Veterans

Social protection of veterans calls for implementation of a system of measures aimed at creating conditions which ensure the economic and moral well-being of veterans and also at granting them additional rights and privileges:

for pensions, taxation, and payment of benefits in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

for the receipt, acquisition, construction, and maintenance of housing;

for municipal services and trade services;

for medical, prosthetic, and orthopedic services, sanatorium and resort treatment, and supplying medicines and medical devices;

for providing means of transport and payment of fare;

for job placement, training, retraining, and labor conditions;

for using services of communications institutions, cultural-entertainment establishments, and sports and health establishments;

for receiving services of institutions of social services and social and legal assistance.

Article 14. Measures of Social Protection of Disabled Persons of the Great Patriotic War and Disabled Persons of Combat Operations on the Territories of Other States

Disabled persons of the Great Patriotic War and of combat operations on the territories of other states (hereafter referred to as war disabled) are granted the following rights and privileges as measures of social protection:

an increase in the size of pensions and preferential taxation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, and garden cottages and providing utilities for garden plots;

capital repair of housing belonging to them using funds from local budgets on terms to be determined by bodies of local self-government;

priority receipt of local construction materials for housing construction and distribution of standing timber for the construction of apartment houses on terms to be determined by the bodies of local self-government;

priority (out-of-turn for Group I war disabled) free granting of housing in houses of state and municipal funds to those in need of an improvement in housing conditions and out-of-turn repair of housing occupied by them; additional grounds for recognizing war disabled in need of an improvement in housing conditions are established by the bodies of local self-government;

out-of-turn free installation of an apartment telephone;

impermissibility of evicting war disabled from official housing occupied by them without providing them other housing free of charge;

preferential right to join housing, housing-construction, garage, and dacha cooperatives and gardening associations, to free receipt of plots of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction or gardening, and also to the receipt of plots for mowing hay and livestock pasture;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of total housing area occupied (within limits of the social standard), including for family members of war disabled who live with them (in municipal apartments—50-percent discount in payment for housing area occupied). Housing payment benefits are granted to persons residing in houses of state and municipal housing funds and also privatized housing;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of municipal services (water supply, water disposal, household and other waste removal, gas, electrical and thermal energy—within limits of municipal services consumption standards, telephone user fees, radio, collective antenna), and war disabled residing in houses without central heating receive a 50-percent discount in the payment of fuel acquired within norms established for sale to the population and transportation services for the delivery of this fuel. War disabled are provided fuel on a priority basis. Benefits for the payment of municipal services are granted to war disabled residing in houses, regardless of the type of housing fund;

a 50-percent discount in the monthly payment of non-departmental security for war disabled living alone and for married couples living alone, in which one of the spouses is a war disabled;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and out-of-turn free medical aid (including a free annual checkup) at state and municipal treatment establishments (including at war veterans' hospitals);

free prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

payment of temporary disability benefits to working war disabled in the amount of 100 percent of their wages, regardless of the length of service, and temporary disability benefits as a result of a common disease up to four months in a row or up to five months in a calendar year;

admission without competition into state educational institutions of higher and secondary vocational education and to courses of instruction for the corresponding vocations, and payment of special grants established by the government of the Russian Federation to students from among war disabled studying in these educational institutions;

free training for new occupations for the work place, at refresher courses in the system of state personnel training and retraining, preserving wages (100 percent of the wage rate) according to the last place of work during the entire period of instruction;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for them and granting of unpaid leave of up to one month a year. Group I and II war disabled, in the event of insufficient annual or annual supplemental leave for treatment and travel to and from sanatoriums, it is authorized to issue temporary disability sheets for the necessary number of

days and make payment of benefits for state social security, regardless of who granted the pass and at whose expense;

if medical evidence is available, priority supplying employed war disabled with passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes for the work place and supplying unemployed war disabled with free passes by bodies running the pension system. Based on their desire, war disabled may be issued monetary compensation instead of passes to a sanatorium or rest home once every two years in the manner and amounts to be determined by the government of the Russian Federation;

if established medical evidence (for Group I war disabled for eyesight or loss of both arms—without medical evidence) is available, receipt for free use of a motorized wheelchair or automobile, the type and duration of use of which are established by the government of the Russian Federation. In the event of contra-indications to driving an automobile or motorized wheelchair, a war disabled is granted the right to transfer control of them to another person residing with this disabled at the same populated area;

free allocation of a horse and harness and the appropriate cart equipment to war disabled residing in rural areas, at their desire, instead of an automobile;

in a war disabled's death, transfer to the family of the deceased ownership of an automobile (motorized wheelchair, horse with harness and appropriate cart equipment) previously transferred to him free-of-charge;

for war disabled who received means of transport free or acquired by them on favorable terms and also to Group I and II disabled who acquired means of transport at full cost, payment of compensation for expenditures for gasoline, repair, maintenance of means of transport, and spare parts for them, in the manner and amounts to be determined by the government of the Russian Federation;

instead of receiving means of transport, for war disabled having the appropriate medical evidence for free receipt of means of transport, payment of annual monetary compensation for expenditures for transportation services in the manner and amounts to be determined by the government of the Russian Federation;

free travel by war disabled on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

free travel by war disabled on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

free travel by Group I and II war disabled once a year (round trip), as they desire, on rail, air, water, or inter-city motor vehicle transport. A person accompanying a Group I disabled person on such trips is granted a 50-percent discount on the fare on these types of transport;

free travel by Group III war disabled once every two years (round trip), as they desire, on rail, air, water, or inter-city motor vehicle transport or travel, as they desire, with a 50-percent discount on the fare once a year (round trip) on these types of transport;

a 50-percent discount on the fare during the fall and winter period on rail, air, water, or inter-city motor vehicle transport for a war disabled and person accompanying a Group I disabled on such trips;

out-of-turn use of all types of services of communications establishments, cultural and educational institutions, and sports and health establishments, out-of-turn acquisition of tickets for all types of transport, and out-of-turn service by retail trade and consumer services enterprises;

the right to out-of-turn admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also to services by social assistance offices at home.

Elimination of war veterans' hospitals is permitted only by decision of the government of the Russian Federation.

Privileges granted to war disabled extend to servicemen and rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs who have become disabled as the result of a wound, contusion, or injury received in the performance of the duties of military service (official duties).

Article 15. Measures of Social Protection of Great Patriotic War Participants

Great Patriotic War participants from among those persons indicated in subparagraphs "a-g" of paragraph 1 of the second part of Article 2 of this federal law are granted the following rights and privileges as measures of social protection:

an increase in the size of pensions and preferential taxation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages, providing utilities for garden plots, and organizing a subsidiary plot or farm;

priority free granting of housing in houses of state and municipal housing funds to those in need of an improvement in housing conditions; priority repair of housing occupied by them; additional grounds for recognizing those in need of an improvement in housing conditions are established by bodies of local self-government;

impermissibility of evicting Great Patriotic War participants from official housing occupied by them without providing them other housing free of charge;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of total housing area occupied (within limits of the social standard), including for Great Patriotic War participants' family

members living with them (in municipal apartments—50-percent discount in payment for housing area occupied). Housing payment benefits are granted to Great Patriotic War participants residing in houses of state and municipal housing funds and also privatized housing;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of municipal services (water supply, water disposal, household and other waste removal, gas, electrical and thermal energy—within limits of municipal services consumption standards, telephone user fees, radio, collective antenna), and Great Patriotic War participants residing in houses without central heating receive a 50-percent discount in the payment of fuel acquired within norms established for sale to the population and transportation services for the delivery of this fuel. Great Patriotic War participants are provided fuel on a priority basis. Benefits for the payment of municipal services are granted to Great Patriotic War participants residing in houses, regardless of the type of housing fund;

a 50-percent discount in the monthly payment of non-departmental security for Great Patriotic War participants living alone and for married couples living alone in which one of the spouses is a Great Patriotic War participant;

out-of-turn free installation of an apartment telephone;

preferential right to join housing, housing-construction, garage, and dacha cooperatives and gardening associations and to free receipt of plots of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction or gardening;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and free medical aid (including a free annual checkup) at state and municipal treatment establishments (including at war veterans' hospitals);

free prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for them and granting of unpaid leave of up to one month a year;

if medical evidence is available, priority supplying employed Great Patriotic War participants with passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes for the work place and supplying unemployed Great Patriotic War participants with free passes by bodies running the pension system;

if medical evidence is available, supplying passes for outpatient-health resort treatment during the period October through April and preferential granting of places in retirement homes;

free travel by Great Patriotic War participants on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

free travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

free travel by Great Patriotic War participants once every two years (round trip) on rail, air, water, or inter-city motor vehicle transport or, if a Great Patriotic War participant desires, travel on these types of transport at a 50-percent discount once a year (round trip);

preferential use of all types of services of communications establishments, cultural and educational institutions, and sports and health establishments, out-of-turn acquisition of tickets for all types of transport, and out-of-turn service by retail trade and consumer services enterprises;

the right to out-of-turn admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also to services by social assistance offices at home.

Great Patriotic War participants who have become disabled as a result of a general illness, work injury, or other causes (except persons whose disability is the result of illegal actions) are granted the rights and privileges of war disabled in accordance with the established disability group without additional expert medical examination.

Article 16. Measures of Social Protection of Veterans of Combat Operations on the Territories of Other States

Veterans of combat operations on the territories of other states (hereinafter referred to as combat operations veterans) are granted the following rights and privileges:

1) for servicemen indicated in paragraphs 1-3 of the first part of Article 3 of this federal law:

an increase in the size of pensions and preferential taxation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages, providing utilities for garden plots, and organizing a subsidiary plot or farm;

priority free granting of housing in houses of state and municipal housing funds to those in need of an improvement in housing conditions; priority repair of housing occupied by them; additional grounds for recognizing those in need of an improvement in housing conditions are established by the bodies of local self-government;

impermissibility of evicting combat operations veterans from official housing occupied by them without providing them other housing free of charge;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of total housing area occupied (within limits of the social standard), including for combat operations veterans' family members residing with them (in municipal apartments—50-percent discount in payment for housing area occupied). Housing payment benefits are granted to persons residing in houses of state and municipal housing funds and also privatized housing;

preferential right to installation of an apartment telephone;

preferential right to join housing, housing-construction, garage, and dacha cooperatives and gardening associations, to free receipt of plots of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction or gardening;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and free medical aid (including a free annual checkup) at state and municipal treatment establishments (including at war veterans' hospitals);

free prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for them and granting of unpaid leave of up to three weeks a year;

if medical evidence is available, priority right to receive passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes;

free travel by combat operations veterans on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

free travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

for those having a wound, contusion, or injury—free travel once every two years (round trip) on rail, air, water, or inter-city motor vehicle transport or, if a combat operations veteran desires, travel on these types of transport at a 50-percent discount once a year (round trip);

preferential use of all types of services of communications establishments, cultural and educational institutions, and sports and health establishments and out-of-turn acquisition of tickets for all types of transport;

free training for new occupations for the work place at refresher courses and at refresher courses in the system

of state personnel training and retraining, with pay (100 percent of the wage rate) based on the last place of work during the entire period of instruction;

admission without competition into state educational institutions of higher and secondary vocational education and into courses of instruction for the corresponding vocations, and payment of special grants established by the government of the Russian Federation to students from among combat operations veterans studying in these educational institutions;

2) for persons indicated in paragraph 4 of the first part of Article 3 of this federal law:

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work;

if medical evidence is available, preferential right to receive passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes;

preferential right of admission into gardening associations (cooperatives) and to installation of an apartment telephone;

right to use annual leave at a time convenient for them and also the granting of unpaid leave of up to one month a year;

right to obtain loans on favorable terms for housing construction in accordance with existing legislation;

free training for new occupations for the work place at refresher courses and at refresher courses in the system of state personnel training and retraining, with pay (100 percent of the wage rate) based on the last place of work during the entire period of instruction;

payment of special grants established by the government of the Russian Federation to students from among combat operations veterans studying in state vocational educational institutions;

impermissibility of evicting disabled persons from among the persons indicated in this paragraph from official housing occupied by them without providing them other housing free of charge;

3) for persons indicated in paragraph 5 of the first part of Article 3 of this federal law:

if medical evidence is available, preferential right to receive passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes;

preferential right of admission into gardening associations (cooperatives) and to installation of an apartment telephone;

right to use annual leave at a time convenient for them;

right to obtain loans on favorable terms for housing construction in accordance with existing legislation.

Article 17. Measures of Social Protection of Servicemen, Including Those Discharged Into the Reserve (Retired), Who Performed Military Service During the Period from 22 June 1941 Through 3 September 1945 in Military Units, Establishments, and Military-Educational Institutions Not Part of the Active Army and Awarded the Medal "For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" or the Medal "For Victory over Japan"

Servicemen, including those discharged into the reserve (retired), who performed military service during the period from 22 June 1941 through 3 September 1945 in military units, establishments, and military-educational institutions not part of the active army and awarded the medal "For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" or the medal "For Victory over Japan" are granted the following rights and privileges as measures of social protection:

an increase in the size of pensions and preferential taxation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages, or providing utilities for garden plots;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages, providing utilities for garden plots, and organizing a subsidiary plot or farm;

preferential right to join housing, housing-construction, garage cooperatives, and gardening associations;

impermissibility of evicting from official housing occupied persons indicated in this paragraph who have become disabled without providing them other housing free of charge;

preferential right to installation of an apartment telephone and apartment repair;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and free medical aid at state and municipal treatment establishments (including at war veterans' hospitals);

a 50-percent discount on prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for them and granting of additional unpaid leave of up to two weeks a year;

free travel by persons indicated in the first part of this article on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

a 50-percent discount on the cost of travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

preferential admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also out-of-turn receiving services by social assistance offices at home.

Article 18. Measures of Social Protection of Persons Who Worked at Enterprises, Establishments, and Organizations of the City of Leningrad During the Blockade from 8 September 1941 Through 27 January 1944 and Were Awarded the Medal "For Defense of Leningrad" and Persons Awarded the Badge "To the Resident of Blockaded Leningrad"

Persons who worked at enterprises, establishments, and organizations of the city of Leningrad during the blockade from 8 September 1941 through 27 January 1944 and were awarded the medal "For Defense of Leningrad" and persons awarded the badge "To the Resident of Blockaded Leningrad" are granted the following rights and privileges as measures of social protection:

an increase in the size of pensions and preferential taxation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages, providing utilities for garden plots, and organizing a subsidiary plot or farm;

priority free granting of housing in houses of state and municipal housing funds to those in need of an improvement in housing conditions; priority repair of housing occupied by them;

out-of-turn free installation of an apartment telephone;

preferential right to join housing, housing-construction, garage, and dacha cooperatives and gardening associations, to free receipt of plots of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction or gardening;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and treatment at state hospitals and other state inpatient medical facilities;

free prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for them and granting of unpaid leave of up to one month a year;

if medical evidence is available, the preferential right to provide persons indicated in this article with passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes for the work place and to provide those unemployed with free passes by bodies running the pension system;

if medical evidence is available, supplying passes for outpatient-health resort treatment during the period October through April and preferential granting of places in retirement homes;

free travel on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

free travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

free travel once every two years (round trip) by persons indicated in this article on rail, air, water, or inter-city motor vehicle transport or, if they desire, travel on these types of transport at a 50-percent discount once a year (round trip);

preferential use of all types of services of communications establishments, cultural and educational institutions, and sports and health establishments, out-of-turn acquisition of tickets for all types of transport, and service at retail trade and consumer services enterprises;

the right to out-of-turn admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also to services by social assistance offices at home.

The following additional privileges are established for persons indicated in the first part of this article who are considered disabled as a result of a general illness, work injury, or other causes (except persons whose disability is the result of illegal actions):

an annual free medical examination at state and municipal treatment facilities;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of total housing area occupied (within limits of the social standard), including for these persons' family members living with them (in municipal apartments—50-percent discount in payment for housing area occupied). Housing payment benefits are granted to persons residing in houses of state and municipal housing funds and also in privatized housing;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of municipal services (water supply, water disposal, household and other waste removal, gas, electrical and thermal energy—within limits of municipal services consumption standards, telephone user fees, radio, collective antenna), and those residing in houses without central heating receive a 50-percent discount in the payment of fuel acquired within norms established for sale to the population and transportation services for the delivery of this fuel. Fuel is provided on a priority basis. Benefits for the payment of municipal services are granted to persons indicated in the first part of this article who reside in houses, regardless of the type of housing fund;

a 50-percent discount in the monthly payment of non-departmental security for persons indicated in the first part of this article who live alone and for married couples living alone in which one of the spouses has a right to the privileges indicated in this article;

impermissibility of evicting from official housing occupied persons indicated in the first part of this article without providing them other housing free of charge.

Article 19. Measures of Social Protection for Persons Who Worked During the Years of the Great Patriotic War at Air Defense and Local Air Defense Installations, on Construction of Defense Installations, Naval Bases, and Other Military Facilities Within the Rear Borders of Operating Fronts, and at Front-line Sections of Railroads and Highways

Persons who worked during the years of the Great Patriotic War at air defense and local air defense installations, on construction of defense installations, naval bases, and other military facilities within the rear borders of operating fronts, and at front-line sections of railroads and highways are granted the following rights and privileges as measures of social protection:

an increase in the size of pensions in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages and providing utilities for garden plots;

preferential right to join gardening associations;

free receipt of plots of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction, gardening, or farming;

preferential right to installation of an apartment telephone;

impermissibility of evicting from official housing occupied these persons who have become disabled without providing them other housing free of charge;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and free medical aid at state and municipal treatment establishments (including at war veterans' hospitals);

a 50-percent discount on prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for these persons and granting of unpaid leave of up to one month a year;

if medical evidence is available, the preferential provision of passes to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes for the work place;

free travel on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

a 50-percent discount on travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

preferential right to admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also to out-of-turn receipt of services by social assistance offices at home.

These measures of social protection also extend to persons enlisted by local authorities to assist in collecting ammunition and military equipment and clearing mines from territories and installations during the years of the Great Patriotic War and also to crew members of vessels of the transport fleet who were interned at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in ports of other states.

Article 20. Measures of Social Protection for Persons Who Worked in the Rear Area During the Period from 22 June 1941 Through 9 May 1945 at Least Six Months, Excluding the Period of Work on Temporarily Occupied Territories of the USSR, or Who Worked Less than Six Months and Were Awarded Orders or Medals of the USSR for Selfless Labor During the Years of the Great Patriotic War

Persons who worked in the rear area during the period from 22 June 1941 through 9 May 1945 at least six months, excluding the period of work on temporarily occupied territories of the USSR, or who worked less than six months and were awarded orders or medals of the USSR for selfless labor during the years of the Great Patriotic War are granted the following rights and privileges:

an increase in the size of pensions in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages and providing utilities for garden plots;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

preferential right to join gardening associations and free receipt of a plot of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction;

upon going on pension, use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work;

a 50-percent discount on prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation;

free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence, as well as free provision of other prosthetic and prosthetic-orthopedic devices;

free travel on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

a 50-percent discount on travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

use of annual leave at a time convenient for these persons and granting of unpaid leave of up to two weeks a year;

preferential right to admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also to out-of-turn receipt of services by social assistance offices at home.

Article 21. Measures of Social Protection of Family Members of Deceased War Invalids, Great Patriotic War Participants, and Veterans of Combat Operations on the Territory of Other States

Privileges established for families of deceased war disabled, Great Patriotic War participants, and veterans of combat operations on the territories of other states (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) are granted to incapacitated family members of a deceased who are his dependents and receive (are authorized to receive) pensions for loss of the breadwinner in accordance with pension legislation of the Russian Federation.

The above-indicated family members of the deceased are granted the following rights and privileges:

a pension and preferential taxation in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation;

receipt of one-time preferential credits from banking institutions for the acquisition (construction) of apartments, residential houses, garden cottages, providing utilities for garden plots, and organizing a subsidiary plot or farm;

preferential right to join housing, housing-construction, garage, and other cooperatives and gardening associations;

priority free granting of housing in houses of state and municipal housing funds to those in need of an improvement in housing conditions; additional grounds for recognizing those in need of an improvement in housing conditions are established by the bodies of local self-government;

free receipt of a plot of land, the size of which is determined by existing legislation, for housing construction, gardening, or farming;

impermissibility of evicting the families of the deceased from housing occupied by them without providing them other housing free of charge;

upon going on pension, free use of the polyclinics to which family members were assigned during the life of the deceased;

free prescription medicine within the norms and in the manner established by the government of the Russian Federation for the parents or spouse of the deceased;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of total housing area occupied (within limits of the social standard), including for the deceased's family members living with him (in municipal apartments—50-percent discount in payment for housing area occupied). Housing payment benefits are granted to family members of the deceased residing in houses of state, municipal, and departmental housing funds and also in privatized housing;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of municipal services (water supply, water disposal, household and other waste removal, gas, electrical and thermal energy—within limits of municipal services consumption standards, telephone user fees, radio, collective antenna), and those residing in houses without central heating receive a 50-percent discount in the payment of fuel acquired within norms established for sale to the population and transportation services for the delivery of this fuel. Fuel is provided to families of the deceased on a priority basis. Benefits for the payment of municipal services are granted to family members of the deceased residing in houses, regardless of the type of housing fund; these benefits are provided regardless of who of the family members is the tenant (owner) of the housing;

priority receipt of local construction materials for housing construction and distribution of standing timber for the construction of apartment houses on terms to be determined by the bodies of local self-government;

if medical evidence is available, the preferential provision of passes, according to the last place of work of the deceased, to sanatoriums, disease-prevention centers, and rest homes;

free travel for the parents or spouse of the deceased on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

free travel for the parents or spouse of the deceased on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

right to priority admission into boarding houses for the elderly and the disabled, social services centers, and also to out-of-turn receipt of services by social assistance offices at the home of the spouse of the deceased.

Regardless of the dependency for support on a deceased war disabled, Great Patriotic War participant, or combat operations veteran and the receipt of any type of pension and wages, the privileges are granted to the parents or a spouse who has not remarried, and also to the parents or spouse, who has not remarried and lives alone, of a Great Patriotic War participant, or veteran of combat operations on the territories of other states.

The privileges established for family members of the deceased extend to family members of servicemen and of rank-and-file and supervisory staff of bodies of internal affairs and state security who died while performing duties of military service (official duties). The privileges indicated in this article are granted to family members of servicemen who died in captivity, are considered missing in action in areas of combat operations in the manner established by law since exclusion of the serviceman from the rolls of a military unit.

Family members of persons who died in the Great Patriotic War from among personnel of self-protection groups of installation and emergency teams of local air defense and also family members of workers of Lenin-grad hospitals who died are granted the privileges for family members of the deceased.

Article 22. Measures of Social Protection for Veterans of Labor

Veterans of labor, upon going on pension, retain the rights of members of the labor collective of the enterprise, institution, or organization in which they worked before going on pension. They retain the right to an improvement in housing conditions, to the use of facilities in the social and domestic sphere and the services of cultural and educational institutions, and to participation in privatization and transfer of an enterprise, institution, or organization into a joint-stock company.

Upon going on pension, veterans of labor are granted the following rights and privileges as measures of social protection:

upon going on pension, use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned during the period of work and free medical aid at state and municipal treatment establishments;

upon reaching retirement age, free manufacture and repair of dentures (except those made of precious metals) at state and municipal treatment establishments for their place of residence;

granting of annual leave at a time convenient for them and granting of unpaid leave of up to one month a year;

free travel on all types of urban passenger transport (except taxis) in any city, regardless of their place of residence, and in rural areas—also on common-carrier motor vehicle transport (except taxis) of suburban and inter-city service;

a 50-percent seasonal discount on travel on rail and water transportation of suburban service;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of total housing area occupied (within limits of the social standard), including for these persons' family members living with them (in municipal apartments—50-percent discount in payment for housing area occupied). Housing payment benefits are granted to veterans of labor residing in houses of state and municipal housing funds and also in privatized housing;

a 50-percent discount in the payment of municipal services (water supply, water disposal, household and other waste removal, gas, electrical and thermal energy—within limits of municipal services consumption standards, telephone user fees, radio, collective antenna), and veterans of labor residing in houses without central heating receive a 50-percent discount in the payment of fuel acquired within norms established for sale to the population and transportation services for the delivery of this fuel. Fuel is provided on a priority basis. Benefits for the payment of municipal services are granted to persons residing in houses, regardless of the type of housing fund.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of the form of ownership, and bodies of self-government have the right to establish, based on the specific nature and conditions of labor, additional privileges for citizens having special services to the enterprise, institution, or organization.

Bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, at the expense of budget funds of subjects of the Russian Federation, have the right to establish additional privileges for veterans of labor.

Article 23. Measures of Social Protection of Veterans of Military Service and Veterans of Bodies of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy, Justice, and the Courts

Measures of social protection of veterans of military service and veterans of bodies of internal affairs, the procuracy, justice, and the courts are established by legislation of the Russian Federation. Upon reaching retirement age, these veterans acquire the right to the privileges established for veterans of labor.

Article 24. Providing Ritual Services

Burial of deceased war disabled, Great Patriotic War participants, combat operations veterans, and veterans of military service is done at burial sites taking into account the desires of their relatives (servicemen—with military honors). Expenses associated with preparation for shipment of the body, shipment of the body to the

burial site, cremation, burial, and manufacture and installation of tombstones are paid from funds of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation or other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation in whose troops or institutions the deceased war disabled, Great Patriotic War participants, combat operations veterans, or veterans of military service performed military service or worked.

For other categories of deceased veterans, these expenses are covered with funds from local budgets and also funds of the enterprises, institutions, or organizations where the deceased worked; for unemployed veterans—from funds of bodies paying their pensions.

If the expenses for arranging funerals of deceased veterans are covered by funds of family members of the deceased veterans or other persons, they are paid burial benefits in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.

Chapter III. Final Provisions

Article 25. Public Veterans' Associations

Public veterans' associations are created to protect the rights and legitimate interests of veterans in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.

Federal bodies of state power and bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation render assistance to the activities of public veterans' associations.

Decisions on questions of social protection of veterans and the activities of public veterans' associations are made by federal bodies of state power and bodies of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, and by bodies of local self-government with participation of representatives of the corresponding bodies of veterans' associations.

Article 26. Responsibility for Failure To Observe or Improper Observance of Legislation of the Russian Federation on Veterans

Officials of bodies of state power and bodies of local self-government of the Russian Federation bear responsibility for failure to observe or improper observance of legislation of the Russian Federation on veterans in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.

Article 27. Judicial Protection of Veterans' Rights

Veterans have the right to turn to the courts for protection of their rights and privileges established by this federal law, other federal laws, and other standard legal acts.

Article 28. Documents Confirming Veterans' Rights

Realization of veterans' rights and privileges is accomplished based on their submission of certificates of a standard model established for each category of veterans by the government of the USSR prior to 1 January 1992 or by the government of the Russian Federation.

Article 29. Implementation of This Federal Law

This federal law enters into force on the day of its official publication.

The president of the Russian Federation and the government of the Russian Federation shall bring their legal acts in line with this federal law within three months.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin
Moscow, The Kremlin
12 January 1995
No 5-FZ.

Attachment

List of States, Cities, Territories, and Periods of Conducting Combat Operations Involving Citizens of the Russian Federation

Section I

Civil War: from 23 February 1918 through October 1922.

Soviet-Polish War: March-October 1920.

Combat Operations in Spain: 1936-1939.

War with Finland: from 30 November 1939 through 13 March 1940.

Great Patriotic War: from 22 June 1941 through 9 (11) May 1945.

War with Japan: from 9 August 1945 through 3 September 1945.

Combat operations to eliminate the Basmachi Movement: from October 1922 through June 1931.

Combat operations in the vicinity of Lake Khasan: from 29 June through 11 August 1938.

Combat operations on the Khalkhin-Gol River: from 11 May through 16 September 1939.

Combat operations in the reunification of the USSR, Western Ukraine, and Western Belorussia: from 17 through 28 September 1939.

Combat operations in China: from August 1924 through July 1927; October-November 1929; from July 1937 through September 1944; July-September 1945; from March 1946 through April 1949; March-May 1950 (for personnel of the Air Defense Troops group); from June 1950 through July 1953 (for personnel of military sub-units that participated in combat operations in North Korea from the territory of China).

Combat operations in Hungary: 1956.

Combat operations on Damanskiy Island: March 1969.

Combat operations in the vicinity of Lake Zhalanashkol: August 1969.

Section II

Defense of the city of Odessa: from 10 August through 16 October 1941.

Defense of the city of Leningrad: from 8 September 1941 through 27 January 1944.

Defense of the city of Sevastopol: from 5 November through 4 July 1942.

Defense of the city of Stalingrad: from 12 July through 19 November 1942.

Articles 2 and 4 of the Federal Law on Veterans extend to persons who participated in wars and combat operations in states (on territories) and in the defense of cities indicated in sections I and II.

Section III

Combat operations in Algeria: 1962-1964.

Combat operations in Egypt (United Arab Republic): from October 1962 through March 1963; June 1967; 1968; from March 1969 through July 1972; from October 1973 through March 1974; from June 1974 through February 1975 (for personnel of minesweepers of the Black Sea Fleet and Pacific Ocean Fleet that participated in clearing mines from the Suez Canal).

Combat operations in the Yemen Arab Republic: from October 1962 through March 1963; from November 1967 through December 1969.

Combat operations in Vietnam: from January 1961 through December 1974.

Combat operations in Syria: June 1967; March-July 1970; September-November 1972; October 1973.

Combat operations in Angola: from November 1975 through November 1979.

Combat operations in Mozambique: 1967-1969; from November 1975 through November 1979.

Combat operations in Ethiopia: from December 1977 through November 1979.

Combat operations in Afghanistan: from April 1978 through 15 February 1989.

Combat operations in Cambodia: April-December 1970.

Combat operations in Bangladesh: 1972-1973 (for personnel of ships and auxiliary vessels of the USSR Navy).

Combat operations in Laos: from January 1960 through December 1963; from August 1964 through November 1968; from November 1969 through December 1970.

Combat operations in Syria and Lebanon: June 1982.

Articles 3 and 4 of the Federal Law on Veterans extend to persons who participated in combat operations in states (on territories) indicated in Section III.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

U.S. Views on Counterinsurgency Discussed

95UM0258A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Leonid Kosyakin: "How the United States Has Combated Them Separatists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news media have recent claimed that the conflict in Chechnya will inevitably develop into a guerrilla war. Whether or not these predictions come true is open to question. But we cannot totally rule out such a possibility either, in which case we would have to wage anti-guerrilla warfare based on our existing experience. But perhaps the greatest experience in such warfare to date has been gained by the U.S. Armed Forces.

In 1962, then U.S. President J. Kennedy said: "War against insurgents, guerrillas, and bandit groups is a different type of war, new in terms of its intensity and old in terms of its origin. It is warfare that uses infiltration, not offensives, in which victory is achieved by dissipating and exhausting the enemy's forces, not destroying him. It demands a new strategy and tactics, specialized forces, and new forms of combat operations." On this basis, the Pentagon set up a research facility for planning and conducting anti-separatist, counterinsurgency, and anti-guerrilla operations of a military and nonmilitary character.

In the view of American military specialists, insurgency movements can be divided into three phases:

The first phase is the covert, initial phase—the inception, strengthening, and development of the insurgent movement. In this stage the insurgents still lack the necessary strength and try to organize and consolidate their forces in order to eventually attain superiority over government forces. During this period the insurgents are quite vulnerable, and governing circles have a fairly good chance of stopping their movement, primarily through the use of police methods.

In the second phase (guerrilla warfare), the insurgents already have sufficient strength and are capable of seizing the initiative from the government. This phase is characterized by unconventional combat operations involving irregular insurgent units pursuing primarily psychological objectives that have the effect of weakening government forces. The insurgents' advantage in this phase consists in that they put the military in an unaccustomed situation that forces them to take unconventional actions;

The third stage is civil war—i.e., combat operations in which large military formations are used on both sides. In the view of military specialists, troops become more accustomed to fighting insurgents in this stage. But they are also confronted with serious difficulties arising from limitations on the use of heavy weapons, since combat

operations take place on their own territory, as well as from the potential for large losses among the civilian population. Moreover, the very fact that resistance has reached such a level indicates that the government is in trouble.

For this reason, all the initial measures used by government institutions should be of a preemptive character and aimed at preventing opposition from growing to this level. In this phase, the military, despite sizable losses, can exert the greatest influence on the outcome of the fight against the insurgents. However, this is not a purely military problem, but rather a political one, in which combat operations are aimed at lowering the intensity of the insurgency movement to a level corresponding to its first phase.

In the opinion of American specialists, the greatest difficulty is posed by combating guerrillas (the second phase). Guerrillas make successful use of the fact that government troops are intended and trained to destroy an enemy in open battle or to hold onto important terrain using their firepower and combat hardware, while the guerrillas themselves operate covertly and with the element of surprise. Controlling terrain is not particularly important to them. All this diminishes the troops' superiority in terms of equipment and sharply limits their ability to fight the guerrillas.

The guerrillas' objective is to prove their invincibility and the government's inability to oppose them, and they therefore join battle only if they are sure of success. As a rule, guerrillas avoid clashes with military units and mount strikes against weakly defended targets involving rear services, supply, and command and control, which greatly impedes troops' operations and makes their operations relatively ineffective.

The guerrillas often use the following techniques to achieve their political objectives: persuading the population that they, not the government, are defending their interests and that only they are capable of dealing with the country's problems; using the press to demonstrate the government's inability to cope with the insurgents; persuading the population that the insurgents are strong; assassinating government leaders; demoralizing government forces; and provoking the government to take actions that arouse public indignation.

The key to success in fighting guerrillas is well-organized and continually operating intelligence, which allows the use of comparatively small forces to gather information for counterinsurgency warfare. In each specific instance, based on a study of the guerrillas' strategy and tactics, a counterstrategy and countertactics are formulated, and a plan is drawn up to destroy them. It is essential above all to convince the population that the government can uphold their interests better than the guerrillas. The American Army's FM90-8 field manual says that concentrating all efforts on combat operations does not ensure victory in counterinsurgency warfare. One can win at the tactical level but lose the war. Victory requires elimination of the social, political, and economic factors that led to the insurgency.

It is recommended that special attention be paid to isolating the guerrillas' commanders, since they are not only military commanders but also political leaders. Replacing these leaders will be difficult, because the guerrilla movement is very decentralized. Moreover, replacing these leaders could also change the aims of the movement.

All theoreticians of guerrilla warfare call attention to the exceptional importance of promptly identifying and destroying guerrilla supply bases. The guerrillas should not feel safe even if their bases are on the other side the state border. The armed forces must always take the initiative and prevent the guerrillas from planning, organizing, and preparing operations.

Effective work with the population requires an effective and active police force. The role of the police in ensuring citizens' safety and public order is even greater than that of the army. The police are better prepared for such work, are in constant contact with the local population, and can more easily obtain information needed to combat the guerrillas. Joint operations between the police and the army will facilitate the successful conduct of counterinsurgency warfare.

One should not rely on high technology in counterinsurgency warfare. Superior training on the part of the counterinsurgency forces' personnel is of decisive importance. The simpler and more maneuverable the forces used and the greater their firepower, the better. They must have a dependable command, control, and communication system.

Infantry units are best suited for counterinsurgency operations. They must have special training, be small, autonomous, and highly mobile, and their commanders must be decisive and ready to take the initiative. In addition, these units must have good intelligence support, good communications equipment and, as a rule, combat helicopters. Artillery and tactical aviation can be used to provide support by striking staging areas (owing to the difficulty of reconnoitering targets).

AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Underspending on Helicopter Development, Production Deplored

95UM0265A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 95 pp 3-4

[Article by Colonel Aleksandr Manushkin: "Military Commentator's Notes: 'Black Shark' Soars Into the Skies—But Supplying New Attack Helicopter to Forces Has Been Subject to Unwarranted Delays"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia produces unique world-class helicopters. But on account of the practice of financing their development, production, and procurement

on the basis of the residual principle, Army aviation in our country will cease to exist as an arm of the Armed Forces in 10 years' time.

There have been many articles recently that analyze the use of Army aviation in the Chechen conflict. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has not ignored this subject either. Readers no doubt noticed the interview, published on February 4, with Hero of the Soviet Union and Colonel General of Aviation Vitally Pavlov, Commander of Ground Troops Aviation, in which he discussed lessons from the use of helicopters there. Unfortunately, those lessons are often bitter ones.

Why have operations by Army aviation proved not as effective as one would like? Are our combat helicopters capable of competing with the best world models? What is the role of Army aviation not only in the Chechen conflict, but also in the local conflicts continually rocking this world generally? This is the subject of the following article we present to our readers.

In connection with the events in Chechnya, many specialists and analysts (both military and civilian) are now recalling and analyzing other armed conflicts in order to draw lessons for the future. Operation Desert Storm is also mentioned frequently. We have already heard much about the fact that the outcome of the armed conflict there was decided by active aviation operations. But the attention of the general press has overlooked a seemingly insignificant episode. During the preparation period, the Americans transported to the Persian Gulf area, along with other aircraft, eight of their latest attack helicopters, the Apache Longbow. Before "major" aviation took to the air at dawn, these supersophisticated helicopters, operating in pitch darkness with night-vision and night-sighting devices, flew precisely to their preselected targets and destroyed Iraqi radar stations, command facilities, and air defense command and control installations. The multi-purpose fighters, attack aircraft, and bombers that took off in the morning operated in enemy skies with virtual impunity.

It is hard to overestimate the role of transport-combat helicopters in modern warfare. Suffice it to say that no local conflict of the slightest significance has been fought without the use of helicopters. In Afghanistan, for example, helicopters accounted for two-thirds of the Soviet military contingent's entire aviation forces, and not a single operation was carried out without them. They provided fire support to troops, landed forces, transported ammunition and various kinds of cargo, escorted columns, evacuated the wounded from the battlefield, and other functions.

In short, the helicopter as an aircraft that nonspecialists had never even heard about before the 1940s has undergone such intensive development in recent decades that today it is hard to imagine the Armed Forces of any country, even the smallest, without it.

Historical Note: The ability of a rotating propeller to rise into the air was known in China back in the Middle Ages.

In 1475, Leonardo da Vinci "designed" a flying machine capable of lifting itself into the air by means of the so-called Archimedes' screw. The first helicopter model—the "aerodynamic machine"—was made by Mikhail Lomonosov in 1754. It had two propellers driven by a clockwork spring.

Although a large number of flying models were built in the previous century, the first vertical takeoff using propellers on a manned aircraft took place only in 1907 in France.

In Russia, the first domestically produced helicopter intended for series production was built in 1940 at Ivan Bratukhin's Special Design Bureau, but the war blocked the bureau's plans. The serially produced Mi-1 helicopter first took to the skies only in 1948, by which time the Americans already had helicopters in military service. The Mi-4 was put into serial production in 1952—a helicopter that, in terms of lifting capacity (1.6 tonnes), was superior to all the helicopters in existence in the world at the time. Helicopters were first supplied to the Army in the 1950s.

Helicopters designed for variety of uses are in service in the Russian forces today—the Mi-8, Mi-6, Mi-24, and Mi-26.

Through the years, the helicopter experienced both oblivion and rejection, but it ultimately won world acclaim. At a time when the production and development of airplanes of various classes were in full swing, design efforts were still struggling with seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the form of vibration problems, "ground resonance," dynamic strength, helicopter design stability, and so on. The fate of various design projects was also subject at times to arbitrary decisions on the part of statesmen.

But life won out. Experience in using the first helicopters in local wars and in the national economy showed that the aircraft was unique by virtue of its ability to take off and land vertically from small areas, to hover motionless in the air, and to load and unload cargo without landing.

Attempts were made to mount various types of weapons on the very first types of helicopters. But the Americans' experience in using helicopters in Vietnam and other conflicts showed that a specialized helicopter was needed to provide air support for ground forces and to accomplish other missions.

The American Defense Department adopted a decision to order more than 1,000 AN-1 Huey Cobra helicopters, and it was not mistaken: That helicopter was indispensable in escorting transport helicopters, and especially in providing fire support for ground forces. Its successes in Vietnam and later in the Near and Middle East (for example, Israeli Cobras destroyed 40 tanks in Lebanon in 1982) promoted the further development of the AN-1 helicopter family. About 10 different modifications had

been developed and more than 2,000 helicopters produced by 1989. The AN-1 has been in military service for more than 25 years.

After studying the use of helicopters in Vietnam, the Military Technical Council of the USSR Ministry of Defense adopted a decision in 1967 to develop a combat helicopter. The development of the Mi-24 proceeded simultaneously with preparations for its serial production, making it possible to gain time. An experimental model of the new helicopter took to the air for the first time in 1969, and it began being supplied to the forces in 1971 (see the table for its tactical and technical specifications).

Through the late 1970s, the Mi-24 was on a par with the best world models. Efforts to modernize the helicopter were made continually. The Mi-24 was first armed with four manually operated Falanga antitank missiles. Later modifications were armed with supersonic Shturm antitank guided missiles. Changes were also made in its small arms. The first Mi-24s carried a single-barreled machine-gun, then a four-barreled set of 12.7-mm machine-guns, and finally a 23-mm gun on a movable mount. And considering that 132 unguided missiles, sets of machine-guns or grenade-launchers, and two or four aerial bombs with a total weight of 500 kg could be mounted on the Mi-24's struts, one can get an idea of the awesome fire support the helicopter could provide to infantry on the battlefield.

In the early 1980s the Americans began developing the AN-64 Apache helicopter on a competitive basis. The first serially produced helicopter was assembled in September 1983, and the helicopter was turned over to the Army in February 1984 (see the table for its tactical and technical specifications).

The Apache was designed for coordinated operations with ground forces on the forward edge of battle and for antitank warfare. It is distinguished by the large amount of electronic equipment it carries. This allows the crew to accomplish navigational and fire missions day or night and in favorable or adverse weather conditions. It was the first combat helicopter to provide the pilot with a helmet-mounted sight. The Apache's armament includes laser-guided antitank missiles, a 30-mm automatic gun, and other weapons. This attack helicopter was tested in combat conditions (in the Persian Gulf) as part of the 12th Aviation Brigade (which has 130 helicopters of this type in service).

And what about our country? At roughly the same time the United States was developing the Apache, the M. Mil and N. Kamov Special Design Bureaus in the Soviet Union began designing a new-generation attack helicopter (also on a competitive basis). But the competition became drawn out. And when the Apache was already being placed in service in the United States, we still hadn't decided which helicopter to choose—the Mi-28 or the Ka-50. And then came so-called perestroika. Wholesale cuts in defense spending compounded the situation.

And the result is this: Production of the Mi-24 helicopter, which had given a good accounting of itself but had grown obsolete, was halted in 1989. True, the Arsenyevskiy Aircraft Plant (the Progress Aircraft Company) has fully completed tooling for production of the new Ka-50 attack helicopter (its NATO designation is the Hokum). It also has another name—the "Black Shark." This helicopter, which has been recommended for military service, has won world acclaim at international airshows.

Background: The Ka-50 made its first flight on July 27, 1982. With a maximum flying speed of 350 km per hour and a static ceiling of 4,000 m, the Hokum is capable of making an abrupt 180 degree change of course and sharp lateral moves at speeds of more than 100 km per hour. The K-50 is armed with laser-guided antitank missiles. Its small arm is a 30-mm gun. In addition, unguided aviation missiles can be attached to the helicopter (up to 80). Other types of detachable weapons can be used as well.

In short, Russia could already have the fully modern, world-class Ka-50 helicopter in service in the Ground Troops aviation. But on account of insufficient financing, the Russian Army has been unable to buy attack helicopters for several years now. Yet such helicopters would stand us in good stead in Chechnya. And, no doubt, not in Chechnya alone.

It happened in Afghanistan. Surrounded by Afghan guerrillas from all sides, a paratrooper company was destroyed. It was clear that the Russian lads could not maintain their defenses until morning. But how could help be provided to them? The Mi-24 combat helicopters that often came to our soldiers' aid during daylight hours were impotent in this situation. They had neither radar nor night-vision devices. But there was no other choice, and a helicopter crew took to the air at its own risk.

It reached the site. But the crewmen could see nothing in the pitch darkness. How could they support the soldiers? Where were our men, and where was the enemy? The company commander shouted at the crew over the radio: Illuminate yourself, and I'll direct you to the target. The crew did so. And the guerrillas, firing at the illuminated helicopter, shot it down. The next morning the staff learned that the both the helicopter crew and the entire company had perished. It is a paradox, but a fact: The Mi-24, which can destroy more than 10 armored targets in one sortie, costs only half as much as one T-72 tank, for example.

One would think that we should only be pleased with the low cost of our aircraft. But how is that low cost achieved? Any modern tank, for example, has both laser sights and night-vision devices. The Mi-24 attack helicopter has none of this. As it turns out, its low cost is achieved at the expense of needless combat losses. How many Soviet soldiers' lives could have been saved in Afghanistan were the Mi-24 equipped with the latest technology and equipment?

We all know what a tough time our infantry is having in Chechnya. About how there not enough all-weather

attack helicopters there that can carry out combat operations at night! Take the storming of Grozny. I am sure its results would have been different had Army aviation had helicopters capable of fighting at night. The infantry knows how much easier it is to go on the attack with air support. And how many times, in the dirt and slush of Chechnya, have our commanding officers-fathers, as they watched their comrades and subordinates die, cursed those politicians and statesmen who, sitting in easy chairs in their warm and comfortable offices, have slashed the budget's defense spending items year after year?

The result of those budget cuts is well known: The Army has virtually ceased buying new equipment and doesn't have enough money for spare parts to keep its old hardware in combat-ready condition. There is no money for clothing and equipment.

Let us recall the first Mi-8T helicopter show down in Chechnya. It should not have been there in the first place because it does not have any armor. The helicopter crews in Chechnya do not have enough bullet-proof vests and protective helmets. The military collected them from all over the country, and it still wasn't able to scrape up enough for all the crewmen. Such is the degree of poverty to which the Army has been reduced! I'd like to send the officials who think they can economize on the Armed Forces into battle without bullet-proof vests.

The advantages and unique character of combat helicopters, and hence the need for them, has been demonstrated by life itself. The experience of local conflicts, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other trouble spots provides sufficient confirmation of this. And unless we resume production of attack helicopters in the next few years, Russia will have no Army aviation at all 10 years from now.

Comparative characteristics of combat helicopters

Characteristics of helicopter type	Mi-24 (Russia)	AN-64A Apache (United States)
Year placed in service	1971	1984
Crew members	2(3)	2
Maximum takeoff weight, kg	12,000	8,000
Maximum speed, km per hour	335	320
Ceiling, m	4,500	6,250
Flight range, km	500	610

NAVAL FORCES

Gromov: The Navy in the Last Year

95UM0242A Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 12, Dec 1994 pp 3-7, 21

[Article by Admiral F. Gromov: "The Navy in the Last Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At present the developed countries of the world are devoting a larger and larger role to naval forces in safeguarding their national interests and security. This is because in contrast to other armed services, the Navy can be used effectively both in war and in peace, and in practically region of the World Ocean. According to specialists, 70 percent of the planet's population now lives within 320 km of the coast, and 80 percent of the capitals of states and the largest cities are no more than 500 km from the coast, i.e. within the reach of present-day naval weapons. For this reason, when considering the problems of cutting armed forces and limiting armaments, the military-political leadership of the leading naval countries persistently keep their naval component out of the negotiating process and at the same time, and while making some quantitative reduction in the numerical strength of their naval forces, also carry out their modernization, making it possible to improve the combat capabilities of their navies by a factor of 1.5 to 2 by the year 2000.

Under these conditions, Russia cannot get along without an effective navy. This need is dictated by a whole group of factors, in particular:

- the military-geographic position of the state (the longest maritime borders, comprising 38 thousand km);
- the continuing threat of armed conflicts and the possibility of strikes delivered from sea and ocean axes during them;
- the need to protect the country's national interests in different regions of the world, as well as to monitor activities in territorial waters, maritime economic zones and the air space over them;
- obligations to world society to participate in collective measures aimed at keeping the peace and maintaining military-political stability.

Within this context, Russia is not some sort of exception, for similar factors influence the strategy of all naval powers. Now in a number of countries, however, there is an increased desire to expand and to strengthen their influence in various regions which they have openly proclaimed zones of national interest. This will inevitably exacerbate contradictions between individual states, and these will be resolved not least of all by their real naval might. Besides this, experience in the use of the forms and methods of modern conflict resolution testifies to the reorientation of possible threats to security from traditionally continental axes to sea and ocean axes. On the other

hand, the history of the fatherland offers many examples of the significant role which the Russian Navy played in defense of the country and protection of its national interests, in the strengthening of the military and economic might of the state, in the development of science, technology and culture, in the enhancement of international prestige, and in the growth of Russia as a great power. Thus the possession of a strong navy has been and remains an objective necessity for our country. Otherwise its sovereignty and even its territorial integrity will be threatened, not to mention the loss of its great-power status.

On this basis, our new military doctrine defines the basic ways to achieve the foreign security of the state. The following main tasks facing the Navy proceed from these:

- jointly with the other armed services of Russia, deterrence of attempts by any states to implement their intentions with respect to our country and its allies by military means;
- together with the other armed services, repulse of aggression from ocean and sea axes, protection of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, and also the conduct of all characteristically naval combat actions against an enemy in order to create the conditions to stop a war and conclude peace;
- participation in measures to localize armed conflicts in border regions of Russia that threaten its security;
- protection of national interests and citizens of Russia in the course of economic activity in the World Ocean (navigation, fisheries, exploration and development of mineral resources, etc.);
- support of peace-keeping actions, including jointly with the naval forces of other countries under the aegis of the U.N.;
- assistance to civilians in emergencies, and participation in various humanitarian missions.

These particular tasks and ones flowing from them may be effectively accomplished only by a universal armed service like the Navy, which now includes all modern component services and combat arms, and has virtually a complete arsenal of weapons. Like no other armed service, the Navy has high mobility, considerable autonomy, great fire power, and the capacity to operate in all media (under water, on the surface, on the coast, in the air, and even in space), and at long distances from its own bases, both in war and in peace. Only the Navy, finally, is capable of "showing the flag," as it is called, now the only method of a legal power projection in regions remote from our own territory that are important to the national interests of the state.

In the just-ended year of 1994, despite the difficulties associated first of all with logistic support of its activity, the Navy continued to perform the missions assigned to it. Strategic missile submarines put out to sea for combat

patrols and performed alert duty at bases. General-purpose forces, including nuclear and diesel attack submarines, as well as surface combatants of the main classes accomplished their missions of combat service, including in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, in the Mediterranean Sea and in Far Eastern waters. A group under-the-ice voyage was accomplished by two nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet, in addition to a trans-Arctic crossing from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet by one nuclear submarine. The operational regime in zones of responsibility of the fleets was maintained, and in the course of it, just in the waters abutting the coast of Russia, around 70 foreign submarines were detected and an even larger number of surface ships.

Overall the annual plan for combat training of naval forces was accomplished. In accordance with it around 500 ships and submarines completed more than 3000 sea voyages. In the process, tactical exercises were conducted basically in integrated voyages of diverse forces under the leadership of fleet commands. In these exercises, under conditions of confrontation and with mutual support, a large number of exercises were carried out with actual use of practice weapons, including successful missile fire from a strategic missile submarine under the supervision of the supreme commander-in-chief, the president of Russia, as well as of the RF Defense Ministry. Nearly one hundred and fifty of our ships and vessels participated in eight joint exercises with the navies of foreign states. Other combat training measures were also carried out, in particular competition for prizes of the Navy CINC in twenty types of fire, and in seamanship and tactical training.

The activity of our fleets was also characterized by the fact that ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Caspian Military Flotilla participated jointly with the border guards in the "Putina-94" operations. Ships of the Pacific Fleet supported operations to eliminate the consequences of floods in Primorye, and also delivered equipment and cargoes and evacuated the populace after an earthquake in the Kuriles. More than a hundred Navy auxiliary vessels and combat ships, particularly landing ships, were put into action to deliver supplies and winter stores to various remote points, not only for the needs of the fleets, but also for the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, and the Border Troops of the Russian Federation, and also for the local populace. By now the shipments of the announced volumes of these cargoes are nearly completed.

Measures to reform our Navy continued in 1994. Basic efforts were concentrated on:

- Optimization of the organizational-personnel structures and the system of command and control of the Navy, in particular the consolidation of operational and tactical formations, and elimination of some small sub-units and units.
- Prevention of a drop in the combat readiness of fleet forces during the reduction in personnel strength and in the number of ships.

- Assimilation of new ships and other modern arms and combat equipment.
- Salvaging of combat ships, vessels and equipment removed from the Navy, including in the execution of international treaties to reduce and limit armed forces and arms.
- Redeployment and accommodation of the naval forces that have been withdrawn from abroad.

But still the maintenance of ships and special support vessels in technical operating condition remains the main problem. Despite the fact that we have practically no combat ships that have served out their service lives, there continues to be an extreme shortage of funds for maintenance and repair of fleet forces, and this has forced us to write off a significant number of ships for this and other reasons even before the expiration of their established operating lives. Measures taken just within the Navy—extension of the between-maintenance periods established by the norms, repair priority for the most valuable ships, tightening up of demands on their operating standards, location of off-budget sources of financing for ship repairs, and recruitment of enterprises with non-governmental and mixed forms of ownership for these tasks—were far from sufficient. The situation has been exacerbated not only by insufficient financing, but also by its irregularity, which caused the repair deadlines to be extended, exceeding the norms several times over and increasing the general expenses for their conduct. The question of repair of gas-turbine engines, with which many of our surface ships are equipped, has been greatly complicated because the monopoly enterprise which manufactures these plants is in Ukraine.

The question of maintaining naval ships and vessels in technically serviceable conditions is also complicated by the fact that as a result of their going public and changing the forms of their ownership, a large number of Russian enterprises have reoriented their production to implement conversion, creating a great shortage in a long list of removable equipment and spare parts. In addition, there has been a roll-back of the previous system of technical maintenance of ships, particularly nuclear submarines, by the corresponding enterprises in the between-overhaul period, and the shortage of financing prevents us from duly utilizing the productive capacities of our ship-repair plants for this purpose. Poor supply of the fleets with fuels and lubricants also remains a major problem. All this forces the main command of the Navy to constantly take measures for optimal distribution of finances in order to assure maintenance of the technical readiness of ships at the required level.

Replenishment of fleet forces remains one of the most important problems for present and future retention of a combat-ready Russian Navy. We know that a long-term state shipbuilding program, an armament program calculated for 10-15 year period, is the basis for development of any navy. Our Navy has devised a concept and

program for military shipbuilding, but it requires state support, without which there will be a reduction in the scientific-technical potential for shipbuilding, as the most labor-intensive branch of industry, the loss of qualified experts, and even the disappearance of individual areas and branches of shipbuilding. Recently we have only been finishing submarines and surface combatants started earlier. In the process, although the cycle of ship construction is 5-7 years, financing for it is determined by the framework of individual annual plans or special separate decrees of the government, and the amounts do not ensure the required rates of construction. As a result, last year for example more than half of the ships planned for completion were not finished, and the conclusion of these tasks was put off for this year. But in 1994 too, the Navy will probably receive at best only a third of their planned number. For this reason one can say that if the situation does not change, we will find ourselves on the threshold of a full curtailment of military shipbuilding in Russia.

The problem of manpower acquisition remains another difficult one for us. Despite the significant reduction, not a single category of naval service member is at authorized strength. We are especially worried about the shortage of junior officer personnel. This is the consequence of failure to implement the RF Law "On the Status of Service Members," the further worsening of their social and living conditions, the continuing drop in the prestige of military service, and the low pay and the uncertainty of service and living prospects. This forces them to try to leave the service in order to more quickly adapt to the new living conditions. The shortage of warrant officers springs from the same causes. As for petty officers and enlisted, their shortage is due to the failure of the military commissariats to execute the Navy conscription plan, and also to the disinclination of young people to sign a contract for service in the Navy under the conditions that now prevail.

As before, the problem of providing service housing is a very urgent one. As we seek somehow to remedy the situation, practically all the funds going to the Navy from the state budget (up to 75 percent) are directed toward these ends. In the last four years we have built around 22 thousand apartments, allowing us to reduce the number of apartment-less families from 23.5 thousand to 16.7 thousand. This index could be much greater if the number of apartment-less families had not grown sharply in connection with the withdrawal of nearly 9 thousand officers and warrant officers from abroad and the countries of the near abroad, and also if there had been more adequate financing of capital construction in the Navy. Another aspect slowing solution of this problem is the failure of local authorities to carry out the approved "State Program for Provision of Housing to Service Members and Persons Discharged from Military Service to the Reserve or Retirement," with the result that they have been forced to stay in garrisons, and the Navy to expend funds to build them housing in order that they can move.

A few words about the problem of salvaging nuclear submarines, now a matter of concern to everyone, and in particular about making their nuclear reactors safe. As has been noted, this work was also a priority in the activity of the Navy. However, since less than a quarter of the funds earmarked for the year by the State Defense Order solely for these purposes were allocated, of course we were not able to accomplish the planned volume of work. Nonetheless, Navy personnel have unloaded the nuclear fuel from two reactors at our former training center in Estonia (Paldiski), and have reduced the total number of nuclear submarines with unloaded fuel cores to 42, and brought the number prepared for long-term safe storage afloat to 16. On the remaining ships of this list, whose number exceeds 100, even to the detriment of maintaining the technical readiness of combat ships, personnel are taking all prescribed and possible measures to ensure the control and safety of these facilities.

At present the Navy is devising a variant for resolving the problem of salvaging nuclear submarines based on a more optimal approach to this task and presupposing a different method of storage of reactor compartments, while keeping the existing sequence of tasks. It should be noted that in other countries which have nuclear ships, their navies are not involved in the problem of their salvaging, but such tasks are assigned to the corresponding civilian departments.

In this article I have not touched on a number of important areas of work in the Navy in 1994, such as the attempt to maintain scientific-technical production in naval fields at the necessary level, to improve the system of training of personnel for the Navy, to adapt the system of basing and rear and special technical support of its forces to the new conditions, etc. I believe the main thing is that CINCs, commanders and chiefs, staffs, directorates, departments and services profoundly analyze their work last year, and self-critically extract the lessons from their lost opportunities, which without a doubt did occur. The new year of 1995, unfortunately, still does not promise tangible changes for the better, but this must not generate apathy. Preservation of the basic core of the Navy, its survival, and preparation of the conditions for the buildup of the naval potential of Russia, remain our main tasks.

In accordance with this, in the new training year it is necessary to:

- for purposes of reliable safeguarding of state security, support in every way the combat readiness of operational and tactical formations of the Navy to accomplish their inherent missions, applying all of our ability and experience toward this end, while also showing reasonable prudence in making decisions to improve it under the present-day conditions, in order to prevent a reduction in combat potential and real combat readiness of naval forces during further cuts.

- for all levels of command and control elements of the Navy, to ensure efficient and economic expenditure of their allocated finances and other materiel, concentrating them on the resolution of priority tasks.

- in the daily work to maintain law and order and military discipline on ships and in naval units, to consider it a priority to prevent the death and injury of personnel, to preserve weapons, ammunition and military equipment, to create conditions preventing evasion of military service, violations of regulations governing relations between service members, theft of state and other property, and commission of crimes against the local populace.

In the coming year of 1995, the first half of the new training year will take place during preparations for and celebration of the 50th Anniversary of our Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Indisputably the large number of memorial anniversary festivities will encourage patriotic sentiments in society and its attention to the country's Armed Forces and their combat traditions. This must also be used to raise the quality of accomplishment of missions assigned to the Navy, to achieve high results in combat training, improvement of order and organization, and the strengthening of military discipline and ties with veterans and other social organizations. I am confident that Navy personnel will continue to show steadfastness and endurance, initiative and persistence in performance of their military duty and will successfully deal with the tasks assigned to them. We all must remember that at the end of our new training year, we will begin the 300th year since the foundation of a regular national navy, when against the background of its rich and complex history, the contribution of each generation to the cause of maintaining, developing and strengthening the naval might of our country will be seen with particular clarity.

The Problem of Unidentified Submarines in the Waters of Sweden

95UM0242B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 1994 pp 8-10

Article by Rear-Admiral (Ret) V. Prosvirov: "The Problem of Unidentified Submarines in the Waters of Sweden"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Accusations of deliberate incursion of submarines of the Soviet and later the Russian Navy into the territorial waters of Sweden have been on the pages of the Swedish press for many years. But our press has given this subject much less attention. Suffice to say that even MORSKOY SBORNIK ran material on this matter just once, in No issue 1 of 1993. Of course it was quite detailed and well argued. From it and a few articles in other mass media our readers and in particular our naval readers were able to get an idea of the essence of the accusations made against us, and also of the true facts, the arguments from our side refuting these claims.

At the same time the Swedish public was deprived of an opportunity to become acquainted with the Russian side's view of this problem, since they received only the official version of the Swedish authorities, and only their commentaries about our country's position in this

matter. In this regard, at their insistence the work of a group of Russian and Swedish naval experts was also made confidential.

However the one-sidedness of these claims, which are constantly spread by the official Swedish press without any proof, and the lack of success of the many widely covered "show-operations" in search of submarines off their coasts, generated skepticism among the Swedes themselves regarding the statements of officials of their government about the threat to their security from Russia. The sensible portion of the Swedish public began to doubt the soundness of the claims against Russia in this question, and suspicions of an unseemly political basis to these actions began to arise. Then the refusal of the government of Karl Bildt to present to a parliamentary commission the documents having to do with the incursion of foreign submarines into the territorial waters of the state strengthened these suspicions even more.

As a result, in April 1994, at the initiative of Ingemar Reksed, a member of the Supreme Court of Sweden, the industrialist Gustav Vibum, professor of philosophy Lars Bergstrom, Capt.-1st-Rank (Ret) Karl Andersson and a number of other figures, an independent Public Group was formed. It decided to independently investigate all the existing materials on this question and to shed light on this controversial problem. Thus began a new stage in the years-long discussion.

The leaders of the Public Group informed the Riksdag of Sweden and the State Duma of Russia of their intentions, as well as the military departments of both countries. In their message to them, the initiators of the Group expressed the hope that they would gain access to official government materials on this question. However to this point there has been no answer from either of those organs. True, there was a reaction from the Swedish government, but it was expressed on the form of consultations on the submarine problem, which were conducted in September of this year by the advisor of the Swedish Prime Minister for Military-Political Questions, Emil Swensson, with the Deputy President of Russia for National Security, Yuriy Baturin.

However back on June 27, the leaders of the Swedish Public Group appealed to the League of Submariners of the Russian Navy, suggesting that it take part in the investigation of this question at the non-governmental level and provide assistance in selecting the necessary materials, and also in recruitment of independent Russian experts, acquainted with the given problem, for the work. Believing that the Swedish public must be made acquainted with the materials we have, and also with the arguments of Russian specialists proving Russia's non-involvement in the violations of the territorial waters of Sweden with its submarines, the League of Navy Submariners cooperated with these proposals.

On September 30, the President of the League, Fleet Admiral (Ret.) V. Chernavin, received representatives of

the Swedish Public Group headed by G. Vibum. A working meeting was held, during which they exchanged views on the essence of the problem under study and agreed on the procedures for further joint work. Our side expressed support for the initiative of the Swedish Group and announced that this was in the interest of both countries and would help bring positive results to the intergovernmental negotiations and consultations. The Swedes were made acquainted with Russian assessments of the known facts that were the basis for the accusations of the Swedish government, and with certain documents published earlier in our press, including in the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK. The members of the Swedish delegation shared their dissatisfaction with official information regarding the course of intergovernmental negotiations and consultations on this problem. In their opinion, while for Russia it is more of a diplomatic matter, for Sweden it involves domestic policy questions. This determines the constant interest of the Swedish public in it, and their desire to establish a true picture of events and the motives of actions of their own authorities. The participants of the working meeting agreed to hold a concluding joint session in October, 1994 in Stockholm.

On October 27, a delegation of the League of Navy Submariners of the Navy, headed by V. Chernavin, arrived in Stockholm, and on October 29 and 30 they participated in the planned concluding session of the group. At it they discussed provisions of the report of the Swedish government commission that worked on the problem of protecting their territorial waters from the incursion of foreign submarines back in 1982, the subsequent government version of incursion of submarines into Swedish waters, and "confirming" information of the so-called "tracks on the sea floor" and "typical sounds." Fleet Admiral (Ret.) V. Chernavin, commented on this matter on our side, while Rear-Admiral (Ret.) V. Prosvirov delivered a report on the accident of submarine S-363 of the Baltic Fleet in 1981. The participants of the session were given copies of true documents regarding this accident, and also open materials regarding the mini-submarines built for the USSR's Navy in the 80's. The arguments adduced in the speeches, as the documents that had been handed out, convincingly testified to the non-involvement of the Soviet and later the Russian submarines in intentional incursions into the territorial waters of Sweden.

The members of the Swedish Public Group who spoke at the session, among them the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the state, Mr. Lennart Bustrem, the commander-in-chief of the Ground Troops of the country, General (Ret.) Nils Sheld, the chief of staff of the Karlskrona naval base, Capt.-1st-Rank (Ret.) Karl Andersson, the well-known Norwegian specialist on submarines Mr. Bjorn Bratbach, as well as other scientists, engineers and journalists demonstrated their desire to objectively and open-mindedly assess all the materials that they had obtained. For this reason, in their speeches one could hear quite clearly their understanding of the

farfetched nature of the accusations lodged against Russia, and the speculative nature of the campaign of the authorities to find a "submarine enemy."

As a result of the discussion, the session adopted a Report containing the conclusions of the Swedish Public Group on this problem. In it the participants of the session agreed with the soundness of our statements regarding the unintended entry of Swedish territorial waters by the submarine S-363 in 1981, and confirmed our conclusion regarding the impossibility of identification of the "tracks on the bottom" and the "characteristic sounds," and thus the illegitimacy of their use as proof of the activity of any submarines off the shores of Sweden. It also noted that the officially declared "evidence of this" could not be applied to the actions of Soviet and Russian submarines. It was acknowledged that the approach of the Swedish authorities to the problem of incursion of our submarines into their waters suffered from serious shortcomings, and the practice of concealment of information and even direct disinformation of the Swedish public were unworthy of a democratic state.

Session participants called upon the new government of Sweden to form an independent commission, reinforced with international experts, to make a critical analysis of all the facts and materials associated with the question of incursions into Swedish territorial waters by submarines, and to remove this question from the political agenda in order thus to normalize Russian-Swedish relations. The Public Group also expressed special gratitude to the delegation of the League of Navy Submariners for their assistance in investigating the questions put forward for discussion by the concluding meeting.

During its stay in Sweden our delegation enjoyed the marked attention of the country's public. On the day of arrival in Stockholm, the leader of the delegation held a press conference for Swedish and foreign journalists, and before departure participated in a final press conference organized by the Public Group. Members of our delegation were received by the mayor of Stockholm, and at the invitation of the Stockholm Institute for Problems of Peace they talked with scientists and met with students, and also met with the public of the city of Lund in the south of Sweden. At these meetings, the Russian position on the problem of accusations that we violated the sovereignty of the Swedish territorial waters with Soviet and Russian submarines was argued. Dealings with the Swedes confirmed that the official Swedish propaganda had intentionally distorted the essence of the problem and hushed up our arguments. They also demonstrated the growth of a critical attitude in society toward the version of their authorities and a readiness to listen closely to the opinion of the other side.

It should also be noted that government quarters of Sweden and the official mass media, on the contrary, showed no interest at all either in our presence in their country, nor in the work of the Public Group, despite individual calls for this on the part of the independent

press. This would seem to testify to the unreadiness of the new Swedish government to make a change in attitude toward this problem. Nonetheless, the participation of the League of Submariners in investigating this problem at the non-governmental level, in our view, elevated the importance of the work of the Swedish Public Group, and helped to disrupt the tendentiousness of coverage of this question and bring our position to the country's public. For this reason one can consider that the goals announced in the formation of the Swedish Public Group have been achieved at this juncture.

There are also grounds to assume that our joint activity will help the quest for a way out of the impasse that has arisen in official intergovernmental negotiations, and will promote the adoption of decisions which would close this subject in Russian-Swedish relations. This is also indicated by certain signs that the new government of Sweden has begun looking for its own approaches to this problem. Thus Yu. Baturin, in an interview with the *RUSSKAYA GAZETA* on September 15 of this year, reporting on the consultations between him and E. Swensson on the submarine problem, noted that these consultations make it possible to approach the resolution of this problem without being restricted solely to the military-technical aspect. Thus the intergovernmental negotiations at the level of naval experts and the non-governmental activity of public organizations of the two countries are supplemented by consultations of political figures, which inspires hope for a favorable conclusion of the years-long discussions on this question, and the removal of the claims against our country and restoration of trust between the states in this area.

Results of Training Year Summed Up

95UM0242B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 12, Dec 1994 pp 3-10; 21

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Official Department"; "Results of Training Year Summed Up"]

[Excerpt] The results for 1994 were summed up on November 15 at the Main Staff of the Navy. Participating in this were the CINCs of fleets, flotillas, squadrons, and fleet air forces, and officers of staffs and directorates. In his report, Navy Commander-in-Chief F. Gromov noted that despite insufficient financing and logistic support, the Navy had maintained its combat readiness and accomplished its combat training plan. The tasks of combat patrolling by strategic submarine cruisers had been accomplished. Development of Arctic steaming areas was continued. "In the last training year, around 50 command and staff and performance-graded exercises were conducted in the Russian Navy, and ships and submarines practiced more than 800 course missions," stressed the Navy Commander-in-Chief. "At the same time the level of repairs for ships and vessels of the Navy was on the order of 36 percent, which extends the time required for repairs. This situation places special responsibility on the command and technical engineering personnel to maintain the established technical

readiness of ships to set out into the sea, to ensure safe operation of weapons of equipment, and extend between-servicing periods through careful, quality maintenance." The Navy CINC called technical readiness, the upkeep of ships, the most difficult problem, and the priority job of commanders and staffs of all levels.

Speaking of the problems of naval manpower acquisition by contracts, the Navy CINC noted that the number of contract sailors, who primarily determine the level of combat readiness, is still insufficient.

In his speech Admiral F. Gromov noted that although there had been a 35-percent reduction in the number of violations of the law in comparison with last year, overall the state of affairs in this area demands purposeful and effective actions on the part of command personnel to strengthen law and order and organize service. In the summary of results, the Baltic Fleet was named the best of the fleets, and the units of the Black-Sea Fleet the best coastal defense units. The air bases of the Baltic Fleet were also named the best.

Then the Navy CINC assigned the specific missions of operational and combat training of the naval forces for 1995. In the words of Admiral F. Gromov, next year it will be hard to count on vital improvement in Navy financing. For this reason, it is necessary to seek a way out of the situation by improving organization, searching for optimal ways to expend finances and materiel, and raising the quality of base and special training.

Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Admiral V. Selivanov, Deputy CINC of the Navy, Admiral I. Kasaton, Deputy CINC of the Navy and Chief of Combat Training Vice Admiral A. Gorbunov, Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet Vice Admiral I. Naletov, Chief of the Department for Personnel Work of the Black Sea Fleet Rear-Admiral A. Penkin, CINC of the Baltic Fleet Admiral V. Yegorov, and CINC of Air Forces of the Pacific Fleet Maj-Gen of Aviation V. Bumagin spoke at the conference.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

'Bureaucrats' Assailed Over Army Food Supplies

95UM0276A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Feb 95 pp 1, 3

by Ivan Ivanyuk: "Feeding the Troops at Stan-
dard Levels Gets Harder as the Bureaucratic Appetite
Keeps Growing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As you know, the soldier warms himself with smoke and shaves with an awl. But to this point no one has managed to think up similar replacements for food. Feeding the Army and Navy is a state concern, and it can't be shifted to others under any conditions. The question is how to best organize this difficult work under present-day conditions.

The answer was supposed to be given by documents adopted recently—the decree of the RF Government No 1121 "On the Creation of a Federal Food Corporation and System of Wholesale Food Markets," adopted by the State Duma on November 10, 1994, the Law "On Deliveries of Food for Federal State Needs," and finally, the decree of the RF Government of January 26, 1995 No 82 "Questions of the Federal Food Corporation."

Some might express doubts: was it necessary to adopt these normative documents at all? After all, as recently as 1992 the President of Russia signed the Ukase on Organization of Food Support of Military and Equivalent Users. Later on, in 1992-93, two fundamental decrees of the government were adopted which, one would think, arranged everything in its place. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Russian Federation, the RF Committees for Commerce and Fishing and others were defined as those responsible for deliveries of food to the Armed Forces.

However experience soon showed that in reality these departments do not bear responsible for whether or not food products go to the troops on time. But on the other hand, when issuing orders and job authorizations, they conscientiously take up to 12 percent of the cost of the delivered food in return for their mediation. They have no real administrative levers of influence on the enterprises, which have now become independent. Thus for example, the former Leningrad Meat-Packing Plant, which has become the "Samson" Joint-Stock Company, has become like that biblical hero, and has begun to rend the fetters of the state order with ease. What of it that the Armed Forces needed 100-gram tins for the dry ration—the producers really did not want to deal with such trifles. And the governmental decrees did not provide any sort of benefits to the enterprises working to satisfy state needs, including to supply the Armed Forces.

The subcontractors too began to play by the harsh rules of the market. Thus the basic suppliers of food-container tin for those same canned goods, the Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combines, prefer to sell it abroad and have little concern for the problems of the domestic market.

The cluster of problems has grown from month to month, and the Central Food Directorate of the Defense Ministry has had to exert maximum efforts to organize the most vital troop supplies, food products, in these conditions of economic license.

Says the Chief of the Central Food Directorate Lt-Gen Vyacheslav Savinov: "There was only one way out from the very start, to develop direct ties with the food suppliers. Our specialists actively conducted their search and contract work, and signed the best contracts possible. The principle of territorial rear-service support of the troops began to really be implemented. But here new difficulties arose—the ever-worsening financing of the Defense Ministry."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Indeed, how can you work through direct ties if prepayment is demanded everywhere, and there is no money? Gradually the prestige of the Army and Navy food service as reliable, solvent partners began to drop sharply. Thus the funds allocated to them last year sufficed only to partially pay for the food delivered earlier. Overall the debts last year varied from 100 to 300 billion rubles. And in some months the received funds were expended only to pay for bread and to pay off debts.

In sum, only 78 percent of the funds approved by law were allocated to the Defense Ministry for purchase of food. But you know, no one had abolished the food standards for personnel. And if you think about it, money is not needed in this case. In the opinion of specialists, a variant in which each oblast and kray delivers food to the troops in accordance with special job orders, and presents their bills to the ministry of finance, would be optimal.

But in reality now there is a shortage both of money and of food. It was necessary to seek untapped reserves. What sort of reserves could the Army have, however, except for its untouchable reserve, the NZ [emergency reserve]? But then now it would be more logical to call it not the NZ, but say the PRPNZ—the gradually expended and practically unrenewable reserve. The current reserves of food in the districts and in the fleets have also diminished considerably.

In particular it was necessary to shake up the central food warehouses. And this when the Army to a significant degree feeds itself, through the military agricultural enterprises, special dairy farms, and the welfare farms of military units. For instance, just the military state farms of the Northern Caucasus military district in January delivered more than 3 thousand tonnes of food—groats, flour, cheese, butter, lard, curds, juices and compotes—for the needs of the grouping of Russian troops in Chechnya. Another 500 million rubles worth of food was sent off to Grozny as humanitarian aid.

But now it has become evident that without real assistance from the state, the situation will reach an impasse. At the request of the Defense Ministry, the First Deputy Economic Minister Ya. Urinson sent a letter to the First Deputy Minister of Finances V. Petrov asking that he consider the question of allocating the independent expense item of "Food Support" in national defense spending. This decision was not taken.

This is why such hopes are reposed in the most recent government decisions regarding state deliveries of food. But what happened? The already-mentioned two-week-old decree has created yet another bureaucratic structure which allegedly will bear responsibility for food supplies to the troops—the Federal Food Corporation. But in fact, in the subsequent governing document there is not a word about its specific responsibility for ensuring that the Russian service member is fed. On the other hand, Point Five of the Decree reads that the corporation is allowed to deduct 3 percent from the purchases of

agricultural products, raw materials, and food to finance its activity, including for the maintenance of its administrative apparatus.

Thus it will again be necessary to feed the bureaucrats, whose monopoly might disrupt the direct ties of the district and fleet food services with the suppliers, while again there are no guarantees of uninterrupted supplies.

They say that before, two or three men in the government organs were responsible for food supply to the power structures. And this was the so-called administrative-command system, as was asserted in the years of perestroika, with its excessively bloated bureaucratic apparatus. Now a whole directorate has been created in the Economics Ministry under this guise! They say they have shifted to a self-regulating market economy. With this organization of the matter, it is possible that more and more the soldier of the Russian Army will have to look into an empty mess tin. The government must finally realize that it is obliged to feed the soldier in accordance with the norms established by the government itself.

'Dual Book Keeping' in Main Trade Directorate

95UM0267A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Shinkin: "The Defense Ministry Burns Up Deutschmarks in the Furnace, but the Department's Bureaucrats and Commercial Banks Are Happy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If you believe the words of the great generals, adequate financing is needed to support the combat potential of our Armed Forces. In the words of the First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, the state even owes the Army and industry 8,400 billion rubles for the defense order.

In the alarmed rumble of the generals one can also hear the voice of the Main Military Trade Directorate. It has set its hopes on the fact that now the shortage of working capital is more than 250 billion rubles.

The problem is not a new one. The leadership of the Defense Ministry went to the government with similar arguments back two years ago. And taking advantage of this, at that time it transferred 30 million German marks from the Western Group of Forces to the Main Trade Directorate.

Judging from the documents which have become known to the editors, here began the next adventures of the deutschmarks in Russia. The Main Directorate of Military Trade, with the consent of the Chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces Vladimir Churanov, who recently became the Deputy Defense Ministry, deposited this sum in a deposit account in the not-unknown "Most-Bank," at nine percent interest. It was necessary, they said, to ensure a reserve for the existence of military trade after the reform of the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces.

True, the argument was rather shaky. Several specialists whom I asked about the advisability of such an investment spoke literally about one thing. Goods, they believe, are always goods. So money put in circulation brings higher profits than money in a deposit account, a lot more.

Nonetheless the Defense Ministry decided to freeze the 30 million German marks. And then, judging from the documents, quite strange things began to happen around them.

The safekeeping period of the marks in the deposit account was not yet over when the Chief of the Main Directorate of Military Trade, General Viktor Tsarkov, signed a supplemental agreement to the former contract with the Most-Bank, according to which the safekeeping of the 30 millions was extended by another year (until April 14, 1995), but now at a rate, note this, of five and three tenths percent.

Here the interesting point 6 appeared. It read: "In the event of the onset of circumstances which might entail early withdrawal of the funds from the deposit account without the bank's consent, the depositor will pay bank penalties in the amount of 0.5 percent of the sum of the investment for each day of early withdrawal of the funds..." In other words, if the depositor wanted to cut short the contract by three months, he would be deprived of exactly half of the amount. In the opinion of experts, such conditions would be agreed to either in an extreme case, or through stupidity.

Neither of these applies to the workers of the Defense Ministry. They know what they are doing. "The reduction in the interest rate is a crime," noted the Deputy for Security of the Chief of the Main Trade Director of the Defense Ministry Sergey Kireyev in our talk. For that reason new papers were then drawn up. First they made changes in the former contracts. The Main Trade Directorate asked "Most-Bank" at the end of the life of the deposit, to transfer the 30 million marks, without the supplemental agreement, to the account of a certain "Amsokon" company. And literally a month later, on April 12, 1994, another dispatch was sent to the "Most-Bank" from Viktor Tsarkov. In it he now asked that the preceding "amendments" to the contracts be considered null and void.

And the chief of the Trade Directorate had suddenly seen the light. He wrote: "Since at present the average annual rate of currency deposits on the territory of the Russian Federation is from 20 to 30 percent annually, we ask that the supplemental agreement of December 10, 1993 be considered null and void."

The work of the chief of the Main Trade Directorate is worthy of the exclamation of the great poet: "Well done, Pushkin, well done!" You see, now the general, it turns out, had done everything he could. Now he could say to anyone: "I had a lapse there, my subordinates let me down, but I fixed the error. Only, this "Most-Bank"! It

sent a note signed by the Vice President of the bank, Mr. Zaman, which rightly said that there were no legal grounds for considering the supplemental agreement of December 10, 1993 made with the Main Trade Directorate null and void. And in fact, General Tsarkov had cited none in his own letter.

The Vice President of "Most-Bank" went on to write that in the event of a proposal to dissolve the contract of April 9, 1993, an inalienable part of which was the supplemental agreement of December 10, 1993, the sum transferred to the account of the Main Trade Directorate would have to be assessed by the procedures provided for by point 6 of the supplemental agreement.

The trap was sprung. And all participants of the deal were satisfied.

General Tsarkov himself, citing pressure of work, refused to speak with me on this topic. And his deputy and bookkeeper, Col Viktor Belyy, when asked why the period of safekeeping of 30 million marks had been extended by another year at a lower interest rate, answered with military categoricalness: "The deposit was extended at a higher rate—14 percent." According to him, this was done on April 14, 1994. And any other documents were counterfeits, forgeries.

But Col Belyy refused to show this supplemental agreement; it was a trade secret. And furthermore, according to his eloquent description, the correspondent of the government newspaper was akin to the spy James Bond.

But let us leave the flights of imagination to the conscience of the bookkeeper. If there is indeed such an agreement, then judging from the documents which are at the disposal of the editors, this only suggests "double bookkeeping" in the Main Trade Directorate. We know that the necessary papers appear and disappear there depending on the circumstances.

However, I still am more inclined to the idea that the assertions of a 14 percent annual rate were an outright lie, for another circumstance has forced me to doubt the veracity of the leaders of this department. Colonel Belyy and the Deputy General for Security Kireyev argued in concert that the currency account was needed to have guaranteed funds to obtain credit and goods for sale, which they say, serves the better social support of the service members. "Exactly what social program did you obtain credit for?" I asked at the time. The answer I heard was "The Main Trade Directorate has not obtained credit at its initiative."

But then soon after our talk, new documents turned up. It turns out that the leader of the Main Trade Directorate Tsarkov and his bookkeeper Col Belyy, having thought up a project for social support of service members and their families, went with it to the Foreign Trade Bank asking for credit in the amount of 15 million dollars. Naturally using the deposit of 30 million marks as collateral. Allowing for the purposes of the program,

concern for service members, the Foreign Trade Bank on June 24, 1994 issued this credit at a rate of 14 percent a year.

But staple goods did not afterwards appear on the shelves of the military shops, for Tsarkov and Belyy were not thinking of service members. After obtaining this sum of dollars, the Main Trade Directorate literally the next day transferred them to the commercial bank "Vozrozhdeniye," which is across the street from the military department. And at a return of fourteen and a half percent.

The logic of the General of Trade is astounding. After having once been ashamed that keeping money in the bank at 5.3 percent interest is now somehow indecent, two months later he makes a deal of 15 million dollars for a benefit of half a percent! One cannot speak here of any commercial benefit. At the same time, military shops are forced to obtain credit at 160 to 180 percent, which is a heavy burden on the shoulders of service members and their families. You see, just because of this the prices for goods increases by roughly 15 percent a month on the average. This is the type of program of social support of service members emerging from certain leaders of the Defense Ministry.

But when I recounted the ins and outs of currency operations of the Main Trade Directorate to a specialist from the Directorate on Organized Crime of the Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], he colorfully explained that in the financial sphere, the so-called paper doll principle was commonly used. The account is wrapped up in various papers, and then one fine day it disappears. The state is left holding a paper doll. And with this it is often content. But he pointed out that the deadline for the safekeeping of money in the bank deposits and that for paying off the credits was the same, April 14-15, 1995.

It would be naive to assume that the leaders of the Main Trade Directorate of the Defense Ministry and their supervisors, in running money through the banks, are simply engaged in philanthropy. When as an experiment I offered credit of 30 million marks at five percent annually to a banker friend, he as a businessman said: "Come on over! You're can safely count on seven percent!"

So how much did the generals get?

List of Officer-Training Institutions

95UM0255A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Feb 95 p 6

[Article by Col Illarion Kosse, group chief of the Military Education Directorate: "Military-Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. Military Academies

Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, 103074, Moscow, K-74, Kitayskiy Proyezd, 9/5, Tel. 298-35-68, 298-34-50.

Military Artillery Academy, 195009, St. Petersburg, K-9, Ul. Komsomola, 22, Tel. 275-41-43, 542-15-71.

Military Air Defense Academy of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation, 214027, Smolensk, Ul. Kotovskogo, 2, Tel. 2-65-63.

Military Air Engineering Academy, 125802, Moscow, Leningradskiy Prospekt, 40, Tel. 155-10-15, 155-11-03.

Military Engineering Academy, 109028, Moscow, Zh-28, Pokrovskiy Bulvar, 11, Tel. 916-83-95, 916-82-13, 916-82-08.

Military Chemical Defense Academy, 107005, Moscow, B-5, Brigadirskiy Pereulok, 13, Tel. 265-92-22.

Military Engineering and Space Academy, 197082, St. Petersburg, Zhdanovskaya Naberezhnaya, 13, Tel. 235-88-74, 235-87-23, 235-88-43.

Military Medical Academy, 194175, St. Petersburg, K-175, Ul. Lebedeva, 6, Tel. 248-32-66.

Military University, 103107, Moscow, K-107, Ul. B. Sadovaya, 14, Tel. 299-69-84, 299-71-60, 362-41-55.

2. Military Institutes

Military Electronics Institute, 394020, Voronezh, Ul. Krasnoznamennaya, 153, Tel. 36-95-41.

Military Engineering Construction Institute, 191185, St. Petersburg, D-185, Ul. Zakharyevskaya, 22, Tel. 272-82-02, 275-83-69.

Military Motor Vehicle Institute, 390014, Ryazan, Tel. 76-12-80, 76-78-23.

Military Physical Education Institute, 194353, St. Petersburg, Prospekt B. Sampsoniyevskiy, 63, Tel. 248-31-37, 248-31-50.

Military Faculties at Civilian State Higher Educational Institutions

Military Conductor's Faculty at the Moscow State Conservatory, 125284, Moscow, A-284, Ul. Polikarpova, 21, Tel. 293-97-34.

Higher Military Schools

Strategic Missile Troops

Krasnodar Higher Military Command-Engineering School of the Missile Troops, 350090, Krasnodar, Ul. Severnaya, 296, Tel. 57-23-80, 55-76-02.

Perm Higher Military Command-Engineering School of the Missile Troops, 614015, Perm, Ul. Ordzhonikidze, 12, Tel. 33-85-67, 33-27-05.

Rostov Higher Military Command-Engineering School of the Missile Troops, 344027, Rostov-on-Don, Prospekt Oktyabrya, 24/50, Tel. 31-84-94, 31-84-81.

Serpukhov Higher Military Command-Engineering School of the Missile Troops, 142202, Serpukhov-2, Moscow Oblast, Ul. Oktyabrskaya, Tel. 77-76-47, 77-76-61.

Stavropol Higher Military Engineering Communications School, 355028, Stavropol, Ul. Artema, 2, Tel. 5-28-55, 4-65, 3-31, 2-55.

4.2. Ground Forces

Combined Arms

Far East Higher Combined Arms Command School, 675021, Blagoveshchensk, Amur Oblast, Ul. Lenina, 158, Tel. 2-48-43.

Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School, 109380, Moscow, Zh-380, Ul. Golovacheva, Tel. 172-90-06, 4-49, 4-27.

Novosibirsk Higher Combined Arms Command School, 630103, Novosibirsk, Sovetskiy Rayon, Akademgorodok, Tel. 32-17-40, 4-24.

Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command School, 644004, Omsk, Ul. Lenina, 26, Tel. 31-36-07, 31-41-32, 31-36-13.

St. Petersburg Higher Combined Arms Command School, 198903, St. Petersburg, Petrodvorets, 3, Ul. Volodarskogo, 25, Tel. 427-34-88.

Tank

Blagoveshchensk Higher Tank Command School, 675018, Blagoveshchensk, Amur Oblast, Pos. Mokhovaya Pad, Tel. 4-45-35, 5-84.

Kazan Higher Tank Command School, 420026, Kazan, Sibirskiy Trakt, 6, Tel. 35-85-52, 35-85-72, 37-77-21.

Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School, 454030, Chelyabinsk, Ul. Manakova, 1, Tel. 37-03-05, 36-16-03, 3-54.

Omsk Higher Tank Engineering School, 644098, Omsk, Tel. 40-25-52, 44-91-60*

Missile and Artillery

Kazan Higher Artillery Command-Engineering School, 420025, Kazan, Oktyabrskiy Gorodok, Tel. 76-75-46, 76-71-95.

Saratov Higher Military Command-Engineering School of the Missile Troops, 410082, Saratov, Ul. Artileriyskaya, 2, Tel. 99-96-20, 99-96-22, 99-96-38.

Yekaterinburg Higher Artillery Command School, 620108, Yekaterinburg, I-108, Ul. Shcherbakova, 145, Tel. 21-90-49, 21-90-53, 27-56-49.

Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School, 140403, Kolomna-3, Moscow Oblast, Ul. Krasnoarmeyskaya, 7, Tel. 2-81-44, 2-89-91.

Penza Higher Artillery Engineering School, 440005, Penza, Tel. 69-02-87, 33-13-53.*

Tula Higher Artillery Engineering School, 300029, Tula, Prospekt Lenina, 99, Tel. 25-38-72, 33-17-75*

Ground Forces Air Defense

Orenburg Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School, 460010, Orenburg, Ul. Pushkinskaya, 63, Tel. 41-95-07.

St. Petersburg Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School, 197061, St. Petersburg, P-61, Ul. Mira, 15, Tel. 233-70-49, 233-70-18.

Ground Forces Aviation

Syzran Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 446007, Syzran-7, Samara Oblast, Ulyanovskoye Shosse, 23, Tel. 7-31-11, 1-05.

Ufa Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 450010, Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, Tel. 25-52-31, 2-85.

Communications

Tomsk Higher Military Command Communications School, 634029, Tomsk, Prospekt Frunze, 9, Tel. 90-52-03, 90-52-71.

Air Defense Troops

Nizhegorodsk Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School of Air Defense, 603023, Nizhniy Novgorod, Prospekt Gagarina, 60, Tel. 64-06-51, 3-06.

Yaroslavl Higher Surface-to-Air Missile Command School of Air Defense, 150016, Yaroslavl, Moskovskiy Prospekt, 28, Tel. 22-42-28, 2-01.

Krasnoyarsk Higher Command Electronics School of Air Defense, 660053, Krasnoyarsk, Tel. 24-60-30.

Moscow Higher Electronics School of Air Defense, 143070, Kubinka-2, Odintsovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast, Ul. Prozhektornaya, Tel. 592-24-34.

Pushkin Higher Electronics School of Air Defense, 188620, Pushkin, Leningrad Oblast, Kadetskiy Bulvar, 6/43, Tel. 465-43-67, 5-87.

St. Petersburg Higher Electronics School of Air Defense, 198324, St. Petersburg, L-324, Tel. 132-02-55.

Armavir Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 352918, Armavir, Krasnodar Kray, Ul. Sovetskoy Armii, Tel. 5-90-51, 4-57.

Stavropol Higher Aviation Engineering School of Air Defense, 355021, Stavropol, Ul. Lenina, 320, Tel. 2-66-33.

4.4. Air Forces

Balashov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 412340, Balashov-3, Saratov Oblast, Tel. 3-42-88.

Barnaul Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 656018, Barnaul, 18 Altay Kray, Ul. Chkalova, 49, Tel. 22-07-03, 22-06-93.

Kachinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 400010, Volgograd, Tel. 39-32-90, 3-81.

Branch: 353660, Yeysk-7, Krasnodar Kray, Tel. 3-90-91, 3-62.

Tambov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, 392004, Tambov-4, Tel. 24-47-63, 24-48-11, 5-75.

Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation School for Navigators, 454015, Chelyabinsk, Tel. 36-03-02.

Voronezh Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, 394064, Voronezh, Ul. Starykh Bolshevikov, 27, Tel. 22-18-88.

Branch: 397140, Borisoglebsk-2, Voronezh Oblast.

Irkutsk Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, 664036, Irkutsk, Ul. Sovetskaya, 176, Tel. 27-15-58, 27-45-35.

Tambov Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, 392006, Tambov, Tel. 29-17-84.

4.5. Navy

Higher Naval School, 199162, St. Petersburg, Naberezhnaya Leytenanta Shmidta, 17, Tel. 213-94-66.

Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation, 198093, St. Petersburg, Morskoy Pereulok, 3, Tel. 251-05-96, 251-98-31.

Higher Naval Engineering School, 190195, St. Petersburg, Admiralteyskiy Proyezd, 2, Tel. 312-90-86, 210-02-44.

Higher Naval Engineering School, 189620, Pushkin, Leningrad Oblast, Kadetskiy Bulvar, 1, Tel. 465-29-06, 465-35-39.

Higher Naval Electronics School, 198135, Petrodvorets, Ul. Kominterny, 15, Tel. 420-30-97, 257-53-82.

Kaliningrad Higher Naval School, 236026, Kaliningrad, Sovetskiy Prospekt, 82, Tel. 22-78-69.

Pacific Higher Naval School, 690062, Vladivostok, Kamskiy Pereulok, 7, Tel. 46-79-18, 46-09-50, 46-09-46.

Not Part of the Branches of Service

Krasnodar Higher Military School, 350035, Krasnodar, Ul. Krasina, 4, Tel. 52-75-18, 52-78-64, 52-75-25.

Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, 390031, Ryazan, Ul. Kalyayeva, 20, Tel. 77-51-39.

St. Petersburg Higher Military Topographic Command School, 197042, St. Petersburg, Ul. Pionerskaya, 20, Tel. 235-71-35, 230-86-95.

Cherepovets Higher Military Engineering Electronics School, 162608, Cherepovets-8, Vologda Oblast, Sovetskiy Prospekt, 126, Tel. 9-03-06.

Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance School, 150038, Yaroslavl, Ul. Bolshaya Oktyabrskaya, 67, Tel. 22-95-32.

Engineer

Kaliningrad Higher Engineering School of the Engineer Troops, 236022, Kaliningrad, Ul. Yemelyanova, 258, Tel. 49-97-16, 49-97-99, 46-35-16.

Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School, 625028, Tyumen, Ul. Tolstogo, 1, Tel. 23-94-10, 23-94-88.

Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense

Kostroma Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense, 156015, Kostroma, Ul. Gorkogo, 1, Tel. 59-97-73.

Saratov Higher Military Engineering School of Chemical Defense, 410037, Saratov, Prospekt 50 let Oktyabrya, 5, Tel. 17-41-15.

Tambov Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense, 392011, Tambov, Ul. Borisa Vasilyeva, 7, Tel. 2-43-05.

Communications

Kemerovo Higher Military Command School of Communications, 650020, Kemerovo, Ul. Kosmicheskaya, 2, Tel. 28-82-09.

Novocherkassk Higher Military Command School of Communications, 346418, Novocherkassk, Rostov Oblast, Ul. Atamanskaya, 36, Tel. 2-72-27.

Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications, 290032, Ryazan, Ul. Kashirina, 1, Tel. 79-78-71.

St. Petersburg Higher Military Engineering School of Communications, 193015, St. Petersburg, S-015, Suvorovskiy Prospekt, 32b, Tel. 278-96-40.

Ulyanovsk Higher Military Engineering School of Communications, 432013, Ulyanovsk, Ul. Tukhachevskogo, 19, Tel. 34-91-58, 34-91-96.

Motor Vehicle

Ussuriysk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Command School, 692521, Ussuriysk-21, Maritime Kray, Ul. Leningradskaya, Tel. 27-35-22, 27-33-29.

Chelyabinsk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering School, 454029, Chelyabinsk-29, Sverdlovskiy Prospekt, 28, Tel. 35-26-12.

Rear Services

Vol'sk Higher Military Rear Services School, 412680, Vol'sk-3, Saratov Oblast, Ul. Maksima Gorkogo, Tel. 2-91-51, 2-24-80.

Nizhegorodsk Higher Military Rear Services School, 603125, Nizhniy Novgorod, D-125, Prospekt Gagarina, 17a, Tel. 31-83-80.

Ulyanovsk Higher Military Technical School, 432050, Ulyanovsk, Ul. K. Marksa, 39a, Tel. 34-94-90, 31-43-39.

Construction

Kamyshin Higher Military Command-Engineering Construction School, 403850, Kamyshin-10, Volgograd Oblast, Ul. Gorokhovetskaya, 1, Tel. 6-95-23, 6-95-12.

Tolyatti Higher Military Command-Engineering Construction School, 445681, Tolyatti, GSP-681, Samara Oblast, Ul. Voroshilova, 2a, Tel. 32-78-87, 32-60-61.

Pushkin Higher Military Engineering Construction School, 189620, Pushkin-10, Leningrad Oblast, Sovetskiy Pereulok, 2, Tel. 476-39-95.

Secondary Schools

Ground Forces Aviation

Kirov Military Aviation Technical School, 610041, Kirov Oblast, Ul. Moskovskaya, Tel. 62-48-52, 3-35.

Air Forces

Achinsk Military Aviation Technical School, 662100, Achinsk-1, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Tel. 7-74-57.

Kurgan Military Aviation Technical School, 640016, Kurgan Oblast, Tel. 9-98-22.

Perm Military Aviation Technical School, 614049, Perm, Ul. Karchinskogo, Tel. 27-60-50.

Footnote

*Not part of the branch of service.

GENERAL POLICY ISSUES

Shmarov Interviewed on Regional Conflicts, International Accords

95UM0273A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
10 Feb 95 p 1

[Interview with Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Valeriy Mykolayovych Shmarov by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Korol under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Davos: A New Impetus for Interpreting Mutual Relations With Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The twentieth-fifth and latest World Economic Forum recently completed its work in the Swiss mountain resort town of Davos. Ukraine was represented there by First Vice Prime Minister V. Pynzenyk, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense V. Shmarov, Minister of Economics R. Shek and Ukrainian Ambassador to Switzerland O. Slipchenko. Our correspondent asked Valeriy Mykolayovych Shmarov to share his impressions of the work of the WEF.*

[Shmarov] I would like to say, first of all, that the WEF is an international, non-governmental organization of a non-commercial nature. Its principal aim is to promote the development of contacts among the leaders of nations and governments, businessmen, scholars in the sphere of political life, in the realm of international law, mutual security, international trade and economic collaboration etc.

The forum is headquartered in Geneva. The meetings are held at the beginning of each year in Davos. I would call these sessions unique. They are conducted, after all, in an unofficial climate, without the formalities of protocol, and they frequently provide an impetus to resolve, or at least reach mutual understanding on, important international problems. The syllabus for the sessions is developed by the WEF secretariat in close collaboration with international research centers. The most important processes that are occurring around the world are taken into account without fail therein.

[Korol] Valeriy Mykolayovych, Ukraine already has some experience in the work of the forum...

[Shmarov] Yes, our representatives have already been to Davos five times. And we have a clear understanding of the priorities of these meetings, and of the fact that they are changing under the influence of events around the world.

The primary focus in 1992-93 was thus placed on the problems of Central and Eastern Europe, and especially the republics of the former USSR. This was naturally brought about by the political situation that had taken shape on their territories, the determination of guidelines for their future economic policy, the prediction of the conditions for foreign investments etc.

General global political and economic processes are now becoming the priority. The problems of individual countries and regions are being considered through that lens today.

The forum, for example, frequently touched on an expansion of the European Union. The West is seriously uneasy, owing to the fact that the countries of post-communist Europe are "knocking" more and more insistently at the doors of the EU, that the organization could increase in size and lose the ability to operate effectively. This issue, which was phrased "deeper or wider" during the forum, evoked spirited debate—the fate of the future Europe, after all, undoubtedly depends on it.

The problem is still far from its ultimate resolution. The West still does not believe in the irreversibility of the victory of democracy in the post-Soviet states. The latest confirmation of that is the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe refused Russia's request to become a member, the reason being the events in Chechnya. A group of experts came to the conclusion, immediately after a visit to the conflict zone, that Russia still does not meet the standards of the European Council.

[Korol] The regional conflicts that arose after the breakup of the socialist system have forced Europe to reconsider the problem of security on the continent...

[Shmarov] The development of a conceptual model for overall security was discussed at the last meeting, with the participation of thirty heads of state and governments and 170 ministers, not to mention hundreds of businessmen, scholars, politicians, great experts and journalists. This issue was considered in a larger context than we are accustomed to giving it. The new understanding proceeds from the call of UN Secretary General Bhoutros-Ghali for the solidarity and cooperation of all "nations united before the new demands of the times," which he made to the participants in the forum. The conceptual model for security must include, in the opinion of the participants in the WEF, both the security of the planet as a whole and the security of each individual.

The question of creating new structures that could guarantee European security was actively discussed in this regard. It is still difficult to say what they will be, on what principles they will be based. Debate also raged around such questions as the place of NATO in these new structures, and the role to be played by the United States in NATO and after it... What is left for the Eastern European countries?

The "Partnership for Peace" program is now taking on more active forms, and was also the subject of wide-ranging discussion. It could perhaps be the prototype for a future structure for European security.

[Korol] Valeriy Mykolayovych, was a place found in the broad circle of security issues for a discussion of the role of Ukraine in an overall system of European security?

[Shmarov] Ukraine, thanks to its geopolitical situation, will of course play a significant role in Europe. The leading politicians, scholars and businessmen who took part in the forum emphasized that idea repeatedly in their presentations. Ukraine is considered, on the one hand, to be an independent and influential subject of European politics, and is seen on the other hand as a buffer between Europe and Russia.

The West, without considering the accession of Ukraine to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], is still uneasy about whether our state is irreversibly parting with these unsafe weapons.

I and my colleagues repeatedly spent time convincing opponents of the political consistency of Ukraine as a non-nuclear power in the future, and informed them of the progress of nuclear disarmament, both during the sessions and in individual meetings. The accession of Ukraine to the NPT, by the way, was deemed to be one of the most significant historical events of modern times during the forum discussion of problems of nuclear disarmament.

The process of nuclear disarmament became more vigorous in Russia, the United States and Great Britain after the Ukrainian ratification of that treaty. And that is in turn accelerating the realization of the START-2 treaty.

The NPT will expire this year. The future of the treaty will have to be resolved at the corresponding international conference. It is already clear, however, that there are no unified ideas. A number of nations, including Ukraine, favor the continuation of the treaty. Against them are raised the voices of the countries that would like to possess nuclear weapons, among which the most energetic stance is being taken by India, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran...

[Korol] The interest in the process of disarmament in Ukraine is entirely natural. Did the Western countries discuss assistance to our state for disarmament with the same interest?

[Shmarov] We were forced, first of all, to inform our opponents of the state of affairs with nuclear disarmament in Ukraine. That information indeed assisted their understanding.

January made one year since the signing of the Trilateral Agreement. It stipulates the amount of assistance to Ukraine for the process of nuclear disarmament. We have already launched this activity, incidentally, without waiting for the assistance, using our own funds, even though it was exceedingly difficult to do so. And we have been waiting for what was promised for almost a year. And the times and amounts of the deliveries have only recently been established. All of the schedules for the performance of the work have been agreed upon. I think that the obligations will be met.

I would say candidly that the participants in the forum had a very unclear conception of all of this.

[Korol] But the interest in Ukraine was surely not limited to nuclear disarmament alone?

[Shmarov] Certainly not. It is simply not possible to cover all aspects of the work of the forum in a brief conversation.

Those attending the forum expressed great interest in the political situation in our state, the progress of reforms, investment policy etc. Our delegation met with representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the minister of finance of Great Britain, and with the leaders and businessmen of other countries. Our meetings and sessions undoubtedly gave them a new impetus for interpreting mutual relations with Ukraine, and for positive shifts in the attitudes toward our state.

General Sobkov Addresses Territorial Defense Conference

95UM0257E Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian
26 Jan 95 p 1

[News item from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Problems of Territorial Defense Considered"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A military-scientific conference on questions of territorial defense was held at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. It had the aim of determining the role and place of territorial defense in the system of general measures to defend the state, and devising uniform views and approaches to territorial defense.

Deputy Minister of Defense and Ground Forces Commander Colonel-General Vasyl Sobkov presented a paper. He covered the primary provisions of the substance, aims and tasks of territorial defense, defined the forces and measures that are planned to be employed to carry out the necessary measures, and dwelled in detail on the organization of training and the command-and-control of territorial defense.

It was pointed out that purposeful and concrete work has been underway in the Armed Forces for the last two years to resolve theoretical and practical problems of the territorial defense of Ukraine. Three staff operational exercises have been conducted. The corresponding changes have been made in the laws of Ukraine based on an analysis of the issues that were worked out, and a system of elements for the command-and-control of territorial defense has been created in the Armed Forces. A draft Temporary Statute on the Territorial Defense of Ukraine has also been developed and submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for consideration.

The Ministry of Defense is planning to conduct a staff exercise soon on territorial defense, enlisting the operational groups of the military districts, the commissariats

and the power ministries, as well as a strategic command/staff gaming exercise.

Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Civil Defense, National Guard and other military formations that are engaged in territorial defense also took part in the work of the military-scientific conference on problems of territorial defense.

Observers Assess New York Nonproliferation Conference Prospects

95UM0277A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
15 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA commentator Captain Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "On the Even of Events": "Opening a 'Pandora's Box'?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *An international conference on the fate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] will open in two months in New York. The closer that day approaches, the more the attention that is being devoted to this function by observers, diplomats and the military. Ukraine has obtained a voice as a full-fledged participant in that conference since its accession to the NPT. That voice could also prove to be a decisive one if the discussion concerns whether the controls over nuclear weapons will be preserved indefinitely, whether at least another twenty nations will soon be added to the five nuclear powers.*

The international conference in New York, with less and less time remaining until it begins, will be the first conference at which the nuclear card will be open played during the debates surrounding the subsequent fate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. A host of analysts are already asserting that Washington, which has the largest stake in the indefinite extension of the force of that treaty, has given other countries quite a considerable lever to assert its particular interests. Washington, by giving Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and especially North Korea concessions in exchange for good behavior in the realm of nonproliferation, has to a certain extent encouraged other countries to similar actions as well.

A number of the countries participating in the Treaty, first of all, do not agree with the fact that the NPT preserves the discriminatory system of the five nuclear owners and the other, so to speak, nonnuclear beggars. The countries that possess nuclear weapons, after all, are not fully meeting their obligations under Article 6 of the NPT, which stipulates that the nuclear countries must strive toward full or partial disarmament. As of today, even if Moscow and Washington were to ratify the START-2 Treaty soon—which, by the way, is problematic—the American and Russian nuclear arsenals would be much larger than when the Nonproliferation Treaty itself was reached. All five of the officially nuclear countries, who have rarely come together on this subject, will be present at the conference. And that signifies that heated debates will be unavoidable.

The nonnuclear states will no less energetically demand so-called negative guarantees of security, according to which the nuclear countries must give the other participants in the NPT special assistance in the case of a nuclear threat.

As for the stance of Ukraine, which will be a full-fledged voice at the conference for the first time since its accession to the NPT, official Kiev finds itself to a certain extent at a crossroads. The Ukrainians, considering the results of the last session of the preparatory committee before the conference, emphasized the necessity of the most vigorous steps among the nuclear nations to cut back their own nuclear arsenals. This demand pertains to more than the positions of Moscow and Washington alone.

Kiev does not share, at the same time, the approaches of those nonnuclear states that are insisting on an extension of the force of the NPT only for a certain period of time or with several deadlines, so as to obtain the opportunity of exerting constant pressure on the nuclear states that have assumed the obligation of complete disarmament over time. Ukraine, like the countries of the West and the CIS, will favor, or more precisely vote for, the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. This was confirmed by the chairman of the Committee on Issues of Armaments and Disarmament of the MZS [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Ukraine, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko.

It is still not entirely clear as yet, however, how the votes will be distributed during the voting. Any decision must be made by an overwhelming majority of votes, and analysts assert that if 85 of the 169 countries participating do not support the indefinite extension of the NPT, then the world risks facing a serious threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There are still 25 too few votes to prevent this, although this information is unofficial, since some of the countries, as opposed to Ukraine, are in no hurry to publicize their final decision out of tactical considerations.

Officers Union Congress Considers Quality of Life Issues

95UM0247A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
25 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Senior Lieutenant Volodymyr Horishnyak: "The 7th SOU Congress: On the Way to Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Army needs an organization such as the SOU [Officers' Union of Ukraine]; even though its size and membership have declined in recent years, the Union nonetheless remains a quite influential social organization. It moreover raises the most topical issues and tries to resolve them at the state level," was the assessment of the activity of the SOU that was given by Advisor to the President of Ukraine on Military Issues Major-General Vadym Hrechaninov immediately upon the conclusion of the 7th Extraordinary SOU

Congress that was held on January 22 at the Kiev center for education, culture and the environment.

The constructive tone of the congress was set by the chairman of the central board of the SOU, Colonel Vyacheslav Bilous. His report criticized the activity of former Minister of Defense General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskyy and his closest associates, and proposed that a fundamentally new build-up of the Armed Forces of Ukraine be launched immediately. The first steps on that path, in the opinion of the chairman of the SOU, could be an inventory of military property and a review of the professional and physical training of the officer corps, as well as the state of health of military personnel.

"The President of Ukraine has supported virtually all of our proposals, and has authorized the preparation of answers to the questions that have been advanced by the leadership of the SOU," Colonel V. Bilous summarized the policy. (According to information from reliable sources, the next meeting of the President of Ukraine with the people's deputies who are members of the SOU could take place as soon as February.)

Almost all of the representatives of the oblast cells of the SOU took part in a discussion of the report by the chairman of the SOU, along with honored guests at the Congress People's Deputies of Ukraine O. Skipalskyy, H. Omelchenko, I. Bilas and V. Mulyava. The latter in particular raised the question of military education in Ukraine, and expressed indignation at the fact that some are trying to attach the Kiev Military Humanitarian Institute to the Armed Forces Academy of Ukraine. Such actions, in his opinion, are intolerable given the prevailing state of indoctrination work among the troops.

The delegates and guests at the congress heard a speech from Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan. Agreeing with the speakers that the Armed Forces face a number of acute problems, the deputy minister of defense emphasized that despite everything, the country has its own Armed Forces as a guarantor of state sovereignty. At the same time, owing to the lack of funds, the leaders of the military department are facing the acute question of social protections for servicemen, especially providing them with housing (there are more than 70,000 officers without apartments in the Army today). Colonel-General I. Bizhan pointed out that the military construction personnel could solve this problem in three or four years, building the necessary quantity of housing, provided there was sufficient funding.

The deputy minister of defense, at the end of his speech, summoned the members of the SOU to collaboration and the joint resolution of all issues that are facing the Ukrainian military today.

The fact that the chairman of the Committee on Issues of Social Protections for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Major-General Vilen Maryosyan,

did not speak at the congress was somewhat of a surprise—he has participated in all six prior conferences and was one of the founders of the SOU.

He had had his say several days before, however, when at a session of the Cabinet of Ministers he and Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Valeriy Shmarov were able to prove to the men of state the inexpediency of imposing military taxes and depriving them of food rations.

The veterans of the Union and its new members, having received the support of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, are obviously trying to restore the prestige of the organization, which at the beginning of the 1990s was actually present at the origins of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

It was symbolic that the 7th SOU Congress was held on January 22—on the day when the 4th Universal proclaimed the United Ukrainian State in long-ago 1918. A day that was a day of unity for all Ukrainians. The banner brought by the delegates to the 7th SOU Congress could be seen among the host of yellow and blue banners on Sofia Square in Kiev during the holding of a popular assembly dedicated to the Day of Unity of Ukraine.

Armed Forces Union Head Interviewed on Defense Ministry Agreement

95UM0245A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
24 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Council of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Employees Chairman Dmytro Tymofiyovych Miroshnychenko by Colonel Valentyn Dmytriiev under the rubric "Topical Interview": "The Ministry of Defense and Trade Unions: Parity in Protecting the Interests and Rights of Workers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On January 17 our newspaper published the text of an agreement for 1995 signed between the Ministry of Defense [MO] of Ukraine and the trade unions. It is the basis for reaching collective and individual labor contracts, and envisages a rise in the effectiveness of the protection of the social, economic and labor rights and interests of the employees of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Our correspondent met with the chairman of the Council of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Employees, Dmytro Miroshnychenko, and asked him to relate how well the preceding contract was fulfilled and what prospects are revealed by the new one.

[Dmytriiev] First of all, Dmytro Tymofiyovych, it is important to specify whose interests are affected by this document.

[Miroshnychenko] The sector contract of 1995 extends to all hired employees and executives of enterprises,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

organizations and institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine regardless of their professional affiliation, as well as the workers of professional trade unions who are working in elected or regular positions.

[Dmytriiev] Perhaps another question would be natural at the beginning of our conversation: is there any difference or special feature in the past agreement for 1994 compared to the current one?

[Miroshnychenko] Indeed there is, and I would like to emphasize that. This contract with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, as opposed not only to the prior one but to all that were signed before, has been signed not only by the Council of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Employees, but also by a number of sector trade unions—the employees of state institutions, trucking and railroads, military and specialized construction organizations, trade and public catering, and the defense industry of Ukraine. Our sector agreement, that is, has gained greater weight and significance, since the responsibility for its quality and complete fulfillment is now borne by considerably more concerned parties.

[Dmytriiev] Incidentally, how was the 1994 agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Council of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Employees fulfilled?

[Miroshnychenko] Last year, as is well known, looked bad from all sides, as they say. The difficult economic and political situation in the nation was certainly reflected in all spheres of our life. The year 1994 was a difficult one not only for the personnel of the Armed Forces, but also the employees of the enterprises, organizations and institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

It must be pointed out, in summing up the results of the fulfillment of the sector contract, that 60 percent of the stipulated provisions were realized through the joint efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Council of Trade Unions, and another 35 percent were fulfilled to a significant extent, albeit not entirely.

[Dmytriiev] What were you unable to accomplish that was mentioned in the contract?

[Miroshnychenko] We had one provision that was stipulated that we certainly very much wanted to have fulfilled, but...

I am talking about the fact that the Ministry of Defense, together with the Council of Trade Unions, is obligated to take steps to avoid a drop in production volumes at enterprises. That unfortunately did not depend only, or very much, on us...

The economically accountable enterprises in particular got into a grave financial and economic state owing to the absence of orders from the Ministry of Defense and the repair fund and late payments on accounts. The proportionate share of MO orders for all the types of

products that are put out by the Chuhuyivskyy enterprise in particular was just ten percent. It was even lower—7.4 percent—for the Nizhynskyy. What lies ahead? I could unfortunately add to this list.

[Dmytriiev] I am certain that this is not the only misfortune for our military enterprises...

[Miroshnychenko] You are right. Were it just a small quantity of orders, we would manage. But the presence of the non-production sphere (this being housing settlements, and hospitals, and schools, and preschool institutions) is a heavy burden for the enterprises. The overhead is reaching a thousand or more percent, which is in turn increasing costs considerably, for the consumer goods that are produced by enterprises of the Ministry of Defense in particular, thereby diminishing their market competitiveness.

[Dmytriiev] The nation is now becoming accustomed to the fact that the working person sometimes does not receive the wages earned. This affliction is unfortunately becoming typical for servicemen as well.

[Miroshnychenko] The Ministry of Defense makes late payments of invoices for repaired hardware and manufactured products, owing to which the wages to employees are paid in irregular fashion and there is no money to purchase repair inventories or fuels and lubricants. But even that is not all. Power suppliers are turning off gas, water and electricity. The preschool institutions, schools and military compounds are virtually not being heated as a result. The enterprises themselves have been quite cut off from the suppliers of heat.

[Dmytriiev] And how are you fighting this?

[Miroshnychenko] The sole real method, to my great regret, is that the enterprises, out of desperation, are taking on bank credit at enormous interest rates, thereby complicating their already difficult financial situation.

[Dmytriiev] The mail coming to the editors of NARODNA ARMIYA has quite a few letters on the subject of the great indebtedness of the Ministry of Defense to the enterprises for manufactured products...

[Miroshnychenko] I have data from the first 11 months of the past year. I will cite just a few figures. The indebtedness of the MO to the Luhansk Repair Enterprise totaled 41.5 billion karbovantsi, to the Kono-topskyy 17.1 billion, to the Chuhuyivskyy 12.3 billion...

[Dmytriiev] I can imagine what is now being done at those enterprises. The people are desperate...

[Miroshnychenko] Here is what bothers us a great deal—the concealed unemployment at economically accountable enterprises. It has reached catastrophic dimensions. The plants are working three or four days a week. Only 60 percent of the workers are active at the Chuhuyivskyy plant, for example. The Bilotserkivskyy Repair Plant has not worked at all for a span of five months. People are being sent on forced leave. One can understand the

executives—they are trying at least to retain the specialists thereby. But the people are left without a means of existence, they are laid off anyway. Only 40—50 percent of the 1991 level of employees remains at the enterprises.

[Dmytriiev] A depressing picture, but you would not say that all of this is unknown to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Sad to say, but that is a fact, and the situation is now the same, perhaps, at all state enterprises.

[Miroshnychenko] That is so. But... Take the budgetary organizations as an example. It turns out that the employees of the Armed Forces are always in a difficult situation. While the local authorities can find an opportunity somehow from their local budgets to assist the lower-paid categories of employees in the local areas, the Ministry of Defense cannot do that owing to the lack of the proper funds. But the wages of the employees of the Armed Forces are two or three times lower than what the corresponding categories of specialists in the national economy receive. The Ministry of Defense, as we know, has put this question before the Cabinet of Ministers more than once already. But how has it been resolved? The government raised the wages for budgeted employees subordinate to the MO somewhat, but inflation left no trace of that increase a month later.

So the question, in our opinion, should be posed and tried to be resolved somewhat differently: there cannot be employees of first and second grades. A uniform rate scale is needed, without discrimination or a view to the fact that the people who are working in the Ministry of Defense system are more patient. The low wages and their late payment are creating unpleasant morale and psychological conditions that could lead to a social outburst. And the leadership of our government and the nation must take that into account.

[Dmytriiev] We have been discussing issues whose lack of fulfillment depends to a certain extent not only and not so much on the Ministry of Defense. What was envisaged in last year's agreements and could have been entirely fulfilled, and was the lack of obligation, so to speak, of some leadership individuals an obstacle?

[Miroshnychenko] The Council of Trade Unions has repeatedly asked, for example, about cutbacks in the positions of servicemen at the economically accountable enterprises. This is logical—they are maintaining a deputy commander for quality control at the rank of lieutenant colonel while the proportionate share of the products for the Ministry of Defense is less than ten percent! Or chief of the power-repair section (also with the rank of lieutenant colonel), as well as his deputy, where the section has only 16 people left. And many such examples could be cited.

It should be pointed out that the servicemen and employees of the Armed Forces receive different wages for the same work performed. This evokes natural questions and dissatisfaction among people.

Point 2.5 of the contract has not been fulfilled at most of the enterprises. I am talking about the fact that the Ministry of Defense should pay the employees by the hour for the forced idle time of shops or sections owing to the lack of repair inventory or constituent items. The Council of Trade Unions and the trade-union organizations in the local areas have asked this question repeatedly of the MO and its Main Financial and Economic Directorate, and have appealed through open letter to the President of Ukraine. But there have been no positive movements.

The fact that, for example, point 2.6 of the contract was not completely fulfilled in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "The Employment of the Population" has also elicited concern. The corresponding directive of the Ministry of Defense, which was issued on 2 March 1994, was not passed along to the commanders of two units in a timely manner. Work was thus not carried out as a result with employees of the Armed Forces to elucidate the measures that were connected with the decision-making, which was a gross violation of a series of articles of the aforementioned law and the Code of Labor Laws [KZpP].

The pay for many employees was reduced by 100,000—150,000 karbovantsi as the result of organizational measures that were carried out, although the status of the new unit was increased; the chief received the post of colonel, and two additional categories were introduced for servicemen.

This attitude of the leadership toward the reform of these two units led to mass dissatisfaction among the employees of the Armed Forces, who were twice forced to appeal with a collective letter to the Minister of Defense for the protection of their rights and interests.

There have also been instances of the failure of individual commanders or senior officers to uphold the requirements of the directive from the Minister of Defense, "Cases of Violation of Legislation on Labor and Measures to Prevent Them." We feel that the number of violations of legislation aimed at protecting the labor and socio-economic rights of the employees decreases significantly when legal training to study the labor laws of Ukraine is conducted with the senior officials.

I would explain this circumstance in particular by the incomplete fulfillment of point 2.7 of the sector contract. Safe and non-harmful working conditions have not been created in many military units and at many organizations and enterprises, and special dress and individual protective gear is not issued according to the established norms and without charge.

The question of social security has also aroused serious anxiety. According to Article 244 of the KZpP of Ukraine and taking into account the specific nature and features of the activity of the structural subdivisions of the MO, whose disposition does not coincide with the boundaries of administrative-territorial divisions, work

is performed in accordance with prevailing legislation and within the framework of the Social Security Fund of Ukraine. The board of that Fund, however, recently adopted a decree to transfer the budget for social security to its oblast and Kiev city divisions. This, we feel, will have a negative impact on the use of the social-security funds of the sector, including for the health of the Armed Forces employees; that will lead to an even greater worsening of the social tensions in the labor collectives caused by the low pay and its late payment. We will undoubtedly be making every effort to see that our people are reliably protected on the plane of social security.

[Dmytriiev] We share this anxiety with you entirely, Dmytro Tymosyiovych. To be left without funds is to be deprived of an effective lever for improving the social conditions of employees of the Armed Forces.

[Miroshnychenko] Indeed. The Council of Trade Unions, monitoring the use of the social-security funds and the timely payment of assistance for temporary disability and other payments, used 24.8 billion karbovantsi for those purposes over the first nine months of 1994. Twenty billion karbovantsi were spent on health and sanatorium treatments and vacations for employees of the Armed Forces and the members of their families. Some 4,500 people received vacations over this period.

[Dmytriiev] What was the participation of the Ministry of Defense in improving the health of the workers? To what percentage was the contract fulfilled on this point?

[Miroshnychenko] I can answer that question with satisfaction. Point 2.10 of the sector contract was fulfilled in its entirety. The employees of the Armed Forces were allocated 14,157 travel vouchers to the sanatoriums and rest homes of the MO, which was ten percent of their overall number. The Main Military Medical Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in accordance with requisitions, also sold to the Council of Trade Unions some 1,130 passes to MO sanatoriums and 700 passes to children's health institutions at their full cost.

[Dmytriiev] I have purposely left for last another difficult question which, undoubtedly, should be covered in our discussion. I am talking about furnishing the employees of the Armed Forces with apartments. This is a most painful subject for servicemen. What about for you?

[Miroshnychenko] The trade union is also concerned with the housing problem. Many of our people do not have a roof over their heads. The wait for apartments drags out for many decades. Some enterprises used to build them with their own money. The difficulties have now affected all levels. The sector contract is being fulfilled on this plane. Some 58,000 apartments were allocated from the housing stock of the Ministry of Defense for Armed Forces employees, which is almost five percent of the housing stock that was put into service

in a number of garrisons. That is the figure that was agreed upon in the contract.

[Dmytriiev] Thank you for the discussion. The editors for their part promise to support and protect the economic, labor and social rights and interests of Armed Forces employees. We will be covering the life and problems of the labor collectives of the Ministry of Defense, and the progress in the fulfillment of the sector contract for 1995 between the military department and the sector trade unions, in the pages of NARODNA ARMIYA in the future as well.

Procedures for Confirmation of Labor, Military Service

95UM0247B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
3 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by lawyer S. Streletska under the rubric "Question and Answer": "How Work or Military Service Time Are Determined"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Many readers have asked the editors this sort of question. P. Bogusevych from Mykolayiv Oblast does not know how to determine the period of work service on the editorial staff of the newspaper KOLGOSPNYK KRYVOOZERSHCHYNY, where she worked before the war. O. Musiyenko from the Vinnytsya area does not understand why the Mohyliv-Podilskyy Rayon Department for Social Protections does not take into account a certificate dated 1948 saying that she worked at the oblast agricultural administration, and is demanding more proof. V. Kucheryavyy from the Cherkasy region inquires whether he has the right to confirm time in military service during the war years for his combat comrades...*

The primary document confirming the period of work service is the labor book. If there is no labor book, as well as in cases where the necessary entries are lacking or there is a lack of clarity, various documents are acceptable to prove labor service. They could be certificates, excerpts from orders, individual accounts and notices of payment of wages, certification cards, references, written labor contracts and agreements with notations of their fulfillment, service or record lists, membership cards in industrial cooperatives and other documents that contain data on periods of work. If the cited documents are lacking, paybooks and membership cards in trade unions are considered. These documents, however, can be proof of work service only over the period for which there are notations of the payment of wages and the payment of membership dues. In a case of the absence of a union membership card, confirmation may be obtained using a registration card of the member of the trade union if it contains notations of the payment of dues.

If there are no documents whatsoever and they cannot be obtained owing to military action, natural disasters, accidents or extraordinary circumstances, labor service

is established on the basis of the testimony of two witnesses. It is necessary therein that they know the applicant from joint work with him at the same enterprise, institution, organization, kolkhoz or in the same system. The witnesses must confirm through documents their own work over the period for which they are testifying.

Military cards, Red Army books, certificates of military commissariats, staffs and institutions of the Ministry of Defense system of the USSR, the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and National Security Service of Ukraine, certificates of archival and military-treatment facilities, and records of military service that are submitted on the basis of documents in the labor book are all accepted to confirm military service or service in the bodies of national security, as well as time spent in captivity.

Time spent in partisan detachments and formations during the Great Patriotic War is established on the basis of certificates from the staffs of the partisan movement or from state archives (according to the location of the activity of the partisan detachments and formations).

If the documents have been lost, the military commissariats take into consideration the testimony of witnesses, provided that their individual files contain the necessary information about which they are testifying.

Disputes connected with the confirmation of labor service or time spent in military service, in captivity etc. are resolved legally.

Territorial Defense Amendment to Law on Defense Signed

95UM0257D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 4 Nov 94 p 1

[Text of Law: "Law of Ukraine on Changes and Amendments to Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine 'The Defense of Ukraine'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine decrees:

That changes and amendments to Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine "The Defense of Ukraine" (VIDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOYI RADY UKRAYINY, 1992, No. 9, Art. 106, No. 44, Art. 420) with the following wording be made:

'Article 17. Territorial Defense

"Territorial defense is the set of nationwide military and special measures employed during the threat or occurrence of aggression, for the purpose of the defense and protection of the State Border against encroachments from without, the provision of conditions for the reliable functioning of state bodies, the mobilization and operational deployment of troops and forces, the defense of important facilities and lines of communication, and the fight against sabotage and commando forces and other

armed groups of an aggressor on the territory of the country, as well as the radiation, chemical and biological protection of the troops and the population against the consequences of accidents or the destruction of nuclear power plants, facilities that are hazardous in a chemical regard, and the maintenance of a state of martial law.

"The Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the bodies and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Border Troops of Ukraine, the Military Civil Defense of Ukraine and other military formations created in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine are engaged in performing the tasks of territorial defense within the limits of their authority.

"The basic measures, organization of territorial defense and procedure for the interaction of ministries and agencies are defined by statutes on the territorial defense of Ukraine that are approved by the President of Ukraine."

President of Ukraine L. Kuchma

Kiev, 20 October 1994

ARMED FORCES' BRANCHES

Naval Air Chief Volovyn Remarks at First Press Conference

95UM0245B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 26 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Major Vasyl Sadovskyy: "What Do the Aviators of the Naval Forces of Ukraine Need?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We can be considered to have created the naval aviation of Ukraine (18 October 1993—*auth. note*), said Deputy Commander of the Ukrainian Navy and Commander of Aviation Major-General of Aviation Mykola Volovyn at his first press conference for Crimean journalists. The fliers are performing the tasks characteristic of them, albeit not yet at full volume. The past training year of the formation, in any case, ended pretty well. The successful actions of the helicopter crews attached to the Hetman Sahaydachnyy SKR during their cruise last year to the shores of France could serve as vivid testimony to the high proficiency of the fliers. At the same time, indicated Mykola Mykolayovych—who, by the way, has mastered several types of aircraft over his 34-year career, was deputy commander for aviation of the Baltic Fleet, and later taught the operational arts at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the former Union—the difficulties with the supply of fuels and lubricants and technical support for the flights are having a negative impact on morale and the psychological state of the flight personnel, especially the pilots. The inadequate pay for the officers and warrant officers is also impeding the acquisition of the necessary specialists for the units and subunits.

With regard to aviation hardware itself, the formation, in the words of Volovyn, currently has attack, fighter and ASW air support units. But there are not enough reconnaissance, special or transport aircraft, without which the task of protecting our nation in the southern sectors cannot be fully performed by the Ukrainian Navy in general. This problem is particularly topical given that the Ukrainian naval fleet does not have a sufficient quantity of surface forces. Where can we get the aircraft for the naval fliers?

We are counting, first of all, on cutbacks in the ground-forces aviation, indicated General Volovyn in his conversation with the journalists. We are also placing hopes on the fact that "we should break away from the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet." These hopes, however, could prove to be illusory for the Ukrainian fliers, since the BSF, according to Mykola Mykolayovych, has begun to cut back its aviation units unilaterally.

Mykola Mykolayovych dwelled in greater detail on this aspect of the problem. The problem of dividing up the BSF, in his opinion, can be resolved only after the presidents of Ukraine and Russia define the general policy on this issue. The documents that were adopted in Dahomys and Yalta, and then during the meetings in Kiev and Moscow, have so many discrepancies that it is simply impossible to use them as the basis for devising a uniform approach. Additional, unequivocal resolution of the problem of the BSF is required, since, as Volovyn put it, the Ukrainians are adhering to one set of documents, while the Russians are adhering to another. The BSF meanwhile began the unilateral disbanding of some of its aviation units last year—naturally, by order of the Russian military department. The fate of the aviation garrison of the BSF in Veselyy, twenty kilometers from the rayon center of Dzhankoy, could be typical in this regard. The garrison, where a missile-carrying regiment (Tu-22-3M) and support units used to be based, has actually been left to the mercy of fate. The aircraft and equipment have been shipped out of the garrison, some of the property has been plundered, and only the concrete runway remains. More than 5,000 servicemen and the members of their families, not counting the people who had no connection to the Ministry of Defense but who resided there, were left without heat, water, or trade and cultural support. And after that, pointed out Mykola Volovyn, they tell us to take the garrison. Where will we get enough money to restore everything in Veselyy?

The same fate, according to him, awaits the garrisons at Donuzlav, Mirnyy and Oktyabrskyy. The naval air forces command cannot fail to be troubled by the fact that cutbacks in aviation are underway in the BSF before the official resolution of the problem. The Ukrainian naval aviators in turn are ready to assist their colleagues from the BSF in finding jobs and providing their families with everything they need. Mykola Volovyn thus appealed to the representatives of the local mass media to pass along his appeal to those wishing to serve in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, that we are ready

to consider their wishes and, possibly, to enlist them in the ranks of the Ukrainian Naval Air Forces.

My colleagues clearly had many questions for the commander that they wanted to be answered. The correspondent from the newspaper of the Supreme Soviet of Autonomy, KRYMSKIYE NOVOSTI, for example, was interested in how the subordination of any unit of the BSF to the army of another nation could take place if the fate of the fleet has not been conclusively determined. "Through an expression of the will of the majority of the personnel in this or that unit," answered Volovyn. With regard to how the Presidential Edict on sponsorship by some regions of the Ukrainian Navy is being fulfilled, Mykola Mykolayovych stated that it is working. A delegation from Tysmenytskyy Rayon from the Ivano-Frankivsk area visited the naval aviators literally a couple of days ago. They brought gifts for the sailors and officers. Sponsorship ties will be expanded in the future. This testifies that the people of Ukraine are not indifferent to how their Armed Forces are being built, emphasized Colonel Petro Romanyuk, the deputy commander of naval aviation for indoctrination work, who was present at the meeting.

Incidentally, he also took quite an active role in the discussion with the journalists. Petro Vasylovych stated in reply to the question of a journalist that the officers and warrant officers of the BSF are in a more privileged position as far as monetary and material support than, say, the personnel of the other fleets of the Russian Federation. This assertion by Petro Romanyuk was confirmed by concrete facts from his own, quite recent biography. It turns out that this officer held the post of deputy commander of an air division in the Northern Fleet in Vologda Oblast. Pay had been coming to him two or three months late. The pay is received on time, as a rule, in the BSF.

To the question of whether it would be possible to continue the leasing of the training center for the training of carrier-based aviation to the Russian Armed Forces in the future (the training of crews from the Northern Fleet took place there for two months in 1994—*auth. note*), Major-General Volovyn answered yes, but on contract terms between the two nations.

The commander of Ukrainian naval aviation, Major-General M. Volovyn, and his deputy P. Romanyuk answered other questions from the journalists as well.

From the editors: Two days after the press conference, Colonel Petro Romanyuk met in Simferopol with People's Deputy of Ukraine Academician Mykola Zhulynskyy, to whom he reported the problems of the Ukrainian naval aviators. Our correspondent took a direct part in the discussion as well. Mykola Hryhorovych promised Colonel Romanyuk his assistance as a deputy. He gave an interview to NARODNA ARMIYA immediately after that. (It will be published in a future issue of our newspaper.)

Odesa Communications Brigade Accomplishments
95UM0257G Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Petro Sokalskyy: "At High Frequency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The unit commanded by Colonel Oleksiy Shykharyov has a fine combat history. It was formed in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, and took part in many battles, freeing Ukraine, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the fascist invaders. Its personnel always had good results in combat training in postwar years. The communications troops were among the first from the OdVO [Odesa Military District] to take the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

Training-methodology exercises with the commanders of communications units and subunits and based on the brigade were conducted at the end of last year under the leadership of Armed Forces of Ukraine Communications Chief Lieutenant-General Valentyn Samoylenko. Questions pertaining to the forms and methods of training for specialists, including the use of computer technology, were reviewed during those exercises. The exercises concluded with a field trip, where the subordinates of Colonel Shykharyov demonstrated actual operations using communications gear.

The communications troops have organizationally begun the new training year. There were young soldiers alongside the experienced specialists as well. They have today successfully mastered skills in operating the equipment under the supervision of the experienced commanders. And there are quite a few officers here who are truly knowledgeable in military matters. They include the chief of the radio center, Captain Serhiy Ivanov. His subunit attains better indicators in combat training every year. The young replacements join the ranks more quickly in it. The officers take less time for their emergence in this collective as well. Take, for example, a recent graduate of the Poltava Communications School, Lieutenant Viktor Chyhrenets. Quite a short period of time would seem to have passed since he took charge of a remote command-and-control platoon. But people have only good things to say about him already. The young officer skillfully cultivates his subordinates, and all exercises and drills are conducted at a high methodological level.

The recent field trip was a great benefit to Lieutenant Serhiy [as published] Chyhrenets and the soldiers of his platoon. They acquired good practical skills in the deployment of the stations and the performance of tasks to organize communications among the correspondents during it.

General Shkidchenko Praises Odesa Communications Brigade

95UM0257F Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
27 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Ovsyanykov from Odesa: "Highly Rated From the First Days of Training"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The communications personnel from the brigade of Colonel Oleksiy Shykharyev received a high rating from the commander of the ground forces of the Odesa Military District, Colonel-General Volodymyr Shkidchenko, for their actions in exercises during the new training year. The communications platoons, centers and their components operated with assurance during the alarm and in the exercises, despite the fact that the personnel of the unit had turned over by more than half after the discharge of two service conscriptions at the same time last year and the prevailing shortage of manpower.

It should be pointed out that the brigade is seeking out ways of accomplishing their assigned tasks despite all of the material and financial difficulties. The officers and warrant officers, for instance, created a fixed radio range, on which exercises in tactical and special training are conducted without leaving the compound.

The brigade was recently visited by journalists from Odesa newspapers, television and radio, and they were convinced once again that the high rating given by the commanding general of the district will be confirmed in the forthcoming exercises as well.

SERVICE SUPPORT ISSUES

Military Engineering Department To Become Separate Academy

95UM0247E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Volodymyr Shevchenko from Ukrinform: "The Department Will Become an Academy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new department has been created at the Kamyanets-Podilsk Higher Military Engineering Command School imeni Marshal Kharchenko.

The training of senior officers for the engineering service of military units and formations of the Armed Forces of our nation, the Border Troops, the Naval Forces and the National Guard has been launched here for the first time in Ukraine. The students—officers with experience, former battalion commanders and their deputies—will deepen their knowledge of combat engineering, the building of roads and bridges, including pontoon bridges, and other questions of the organization of military engineering service for two years. This department will grow into a separate military engineering academy of Ukraine in the near future.

Delay in Start-Up of New Department at Armed Forces Academy

95UM0247G Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
31 Jan 95 p 1

[News item from "Inf. NA": "When Will the New Department Open?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As NARODNA ARMIYA has reported, a new department—for the retraining and skills enhancement of command personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—was to have opened at the Armed Forces Academy of Ukraine on January 1 of this year. As opposed to the two departments where the students started the study of the operational-strategic and operational-tactical levels respectively as of 1 September 1994, officers and generals were to gain knowledge before official transfers.

The designated deadlines have passed, but the department has not yet been opened. What is going on? A NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent informed us from the academy that the new subdivision is entirely ready to go on an educational and instructional plane and in other organizational aspects. But the appropriate order to open the department has not been signed, owing to the lack of housing for the future attendees. The General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense know about this. The steps that have been taken on their part have proven to be inadequate. The matter is complicated by the fact that the situation with the provision of housing is also very acute for the other departments, taking into account the fact that the academy is to receive another class of attendees in just six months.

Who will help the academy? Representatives of legislative and executive structures of Ukraine will evidently be undergoing special training in the new department along with the military personnel. The academy, that is, is to train a new generation of leaders not only in the interests of the Armed Forces and other formations, but for the state as a whole as well. And who else but the state authorities could, albeit partially, resolve this searing problem as it should be, and as was promised at the presentation ceremony of the academy on 1 September 1994?

Certain officials in the administration of the President of Ukraine, as has become known to NARODNA ARMIYA, are up to speed on the matter.

So we will keep waiting?

Conscription, Academic Accreditation Progress Discussed

95UM0247F Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
18 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Major Volodymyr Knysh: "The Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: The Draft Plan Has Been Overfulfilled"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The press service of the military department held its latest briefing for journalists, conducted by the chief of the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Oleksandr Kluban.

He related that the training year began in the Armed Forces as of January 2. Drills were held on combat readiness along with staff exercises. Yesterday's draftees have now completed the course of study for a young soldier. The personnel have begun practicing issues of coordinated actions among squads. The larger military formations are conducting exercises at the level of battalion commanders, with the aim of improving their methodological knowledge.

Lieutenant-Colonel O. Kluban indicated that the plan for the draft campaign was fulfilled at 106 percent, with some 83,000 soldiers to be drafted into the Armed Forces. There are also objectors, numbering some ten thousand.

The accreditation of educational institutions is underway in the system of military education. Expert commissions that have completed their work at the Kiev Ground Forces Institute and the Military Engineering Department at the Kamyanets-Podilsk Agricultural Institute have submitted a proposal to the intersector accreditation commissions to accredit them at level three. They are training experts at the qualification level of specialist.

The Kiev Air Force Institute aspires to the highest, fourth level. The status of the institute would be altered to a technical university with the right to train holders of master's degrees in the event of confirmation of the corresponding resolution. Intensive work is currently underway at the Armed Forces Academy of Ukraine, which is taking a test for the status of leading military educational institution of the nation. Next are the Kharkiv Military University and the Military Institute for Pilots, as well as the Kiev Military Institute for Command, Control and Communications.

A Ukrainian Air Force plane delivered to Georgia 20 tonnes of humanitarian cargo that was collected by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the trade unions of our country. This measure was carried out within the context of the Christmas and New Year's "Mercy" program.

The journalists were also informed that a rotation of the 240th Detached Special Ukrainian Battalion of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia will take place from 2 through 28 February. Close to 500 personnel will be delivered by aircraft to Sarajevo. Five trips are planned along the route Mykolayiv—Ancona (Italy)—Sarajevo. The assembly of the personnel has actually been completed. The commander of the 240th Detached Special Battalion, Colonel Yuriy Sklyar, came to Mykolayiv, where the special selection commission was doing its work, and took direct part in the section of candidates.

Hudym Discusses Problems Confronting Military Education

95UM0257A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
26 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Captain Serhiy Zhurets under the rubric "Military Education": "Measure Seven Times..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The army feels the same as society, and the state of affairs in military education is no better than in the Armed Forces as a whole. That is the conclusion that may be drawn after a briefing with the participation of Main Directorate for Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine [MOU] Chief Major-General Viktor Hudym.*

They say that he who thinks about the future has to be concerned with education. The fate of military education in Ukraine, however, has become an example of imperfect and poorly thought-out reform, where the decisions were made faster than the consequences of any of the actions could be predicted. Although if one takes into account the information that was made public to the journalists by Main Directorate for Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine [MOU] Chief Major-General Viktor Hudym, after the break-up of the Soviet Union Ukraine inherited a significant educational and scientific base—albeit without the corresponding administrative structures, which were located chiefly in Moscow. He explained that "The network of military educational institutions numbered some 34 educational institutions and 74 military departments that put out close to 12,000 cadets for the primary officer posts and close to thirty thousand reserve officers. Ukraine did not need that many. All of the educational institutions that remained in Ukraine moreover supported only 50 percent of the specialties required in the Armed Forces of Ukraine."

A conceptual framework for reforming military education that was to conform entirely both to the needs of the independent state and to the needs of its Armed Forces was formulated on this basis. The results of the reform today are as follows. The Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been created and is training specialists at the operational and operational-tactical levels, and there are almost ten military schools and 43 military departments. This educational network is training specialists in all of the fields that are required by the Ukrainian Army. That is only one side of the coin, however. The other is the fact that unique higher educational institutions were cut back during the hasty reforms, core academic personnel were lost, and a large quantity of instructors were discharged from the army altogether. And today there are not enough instructors, textbooks or teaching aids at the institutions that remain. There is sometimes not even enough space to accommodate all of the cadets or attendees.

Chief Major-General Viktor Hudym of the MOU Main Directorate for Military Education explained the mistakes

of the past thus: "The conceptual framework for the reform of military education was adopted at a time when there was still no Military Doctrine, the very apparatus of the Ministry of Defense had not yet been created, and the branches of the service did not even exist yet. Mistakes could not be avoided, of course, and they were made at both the structural and the substantive levels."

Those mistakes have to be corrected now, when economic crisis holds sway in the nation; one sign of that is the paradoxical phenomenon that a soldier on conscript service shoots his weapon at the firing range and drives combat vehicles more often than the cadet—who will be an officer, the backbone of the Ukrainian Army, tomorrow—is able to do. The financial collapse of military education could perhaps be improved somewhat through agreements with countries that are ready to send their own representatives here to study; the average cost for a single foreigner at a Ukrainian military school will be two thousand dollars a month. Agreements of this type already exist with Bulgaria, Hungary and Belarus. India, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Uzbekistan have also expressed an interest in educating their military personnel in Ukraine.

The principal way out, however, is clearly seeing that the principle of measuring seven times before cutting once, and not the other way around, is upheld in such a difficult matter as the reform of military education. The more so when, as Major-General Viktor Hudym informed us, further cutbacks in the military educational institutions are possible.

Military Jurist on Service Computation

95UM0257B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
31 Jan 95 p 1

[Reply to reader question by Colonel Anatoliy Filimonov: "You Asked—We Answer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The editors of NARODNA ARMIYA receive many letters with requests to explain certain provisions of the legislation of Ukraine pertaining to servicemen in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We have asked the Chief of the Legal Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel Anatoliy Filimonov, to answer some of them.*

How is a period of training at a military educational institution counted toward state service time?

Colonel (Reserve) V. Marchenko

A period of service under conscript military service is counted toward the time of state service regardless of the times it is completed, while a period of training at military educational institutions is not counted toward state service time, in accordance with Decree No. 283 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 3 May 1994, "Procedure for Computing State Service Time."

Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Sponsorship, Support

95UM0257C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
31 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed news item from Ivano-Frankivsk:
"...Since It Is Our Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chairman of the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Soviet, Stepan Volkovetsky, has issued a directive to establish sponsorship ties of military units with the enterprises and organizations of the oblast.

It was recommended that the executives of enterprises with all forms of ownership, organizations, institutions, and cultural and educational establishments organize sponsorship of military units of the Armed Forces, the National Guard and the Border Troops stationed on the territory of Transcarpathia. The sponsorship ties will help to improve the military and patriotic indoctrination of the young and cultural-enlightenment work among the personnel, as well as to resolve the everyday social problems of the servicemen.

First Lectures at Cultural Center, Kobzar Speaks

95UM0247D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
20 Jan 95 p 1

[News item from "Inf. NA": "First Lectures—To Students of the University of Ukrainian Studies of the Center for Culture, Education and the Environment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first day of classes at an educational institution always arouses particular interest. Something unusual, festive, celebrative is expected from it. That day is not called the Day of Knowledge by accident.

Analogous feelings were experienced by the students at the University of Ukrainian Studies of the Center for Culture, Education and the Environment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Chief of the Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, welcomed them on the start of the school year and gave them some good advice. He also spoke briefly about the

tasks that are being resolved by the Armed Forces and the state of affairs among the troops. He devoted particular attention to the quality of the educational process and the necessity of profound study of the subjects that cover problems of patriotism, historical awareness, the dignity and honor of the protectors of the Fatherland, and the resurrection of the honored battle traditions of the Cossacks.

The chief of the University of Ukrainian Studies, Valeriy Kucher, related that two departments are functioning at the educational institution—the history of Ukraine, and the history of the Ukrainian military—and set forth the curriculum in detail.

The students attended lectures on the topic, content and tasks of the course of Ukrainian studies on the very first day of the school year.

Ministry Order Establishes Cultural Training Center

95UM0247C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Our Spiritual Resurrection": "The Activity of Ukrainian Scholars Put in Order"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Standard Statute of Universities of Ukrainian Studies in the Armed Forces of Ukraine has gone into effect by order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. These educational institutions are being created on the basis of the Centers for Culture, Education and the Environment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the structures analogous to them in the branches of the Armed Forces and military districts.

The Universities of Ukrainian Studies are a form of humanities training for the cadre servicemen and employees of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They create conditions for extensive training in the ideological and theoretical fundamentals of the national independence of Ukraine, the history of our nation and the combat traditions of its armed forces, Ukrainian culture, language and literature.

The entire educational process of the university will be conducted exclusively in the Ukrainian language. The course of study is two years. The attendees will receive a certificate after successful completion of the university.

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan's Kasymov on Military Union With Russia

95UM0259A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russia 7 Feb 95 pp 1, 3

[Kazakh First Deputy Defense Minister Alibek Kasymov interviewed by Interfax correspondent Irina Bektiyarova: "Integration: Military Alliance of Kazakhstan and Russia—Prospects for Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The following is a discussion with Kazakh First Deputy Defense Minister Alibek Khamidovich Kasymov, chief of the General Staff of the Republic of Kazakhstan Armed Forces.

[Bektiyarova] What significance do you attach to the recently signed Kazakh-Russian agreements?

[Kasymov] Both sides were able to make significant progress. And our bilateral cooperation has taken on clear-cut outlines for the future.

[Bektiyarova] What areas of military technical cooperation do the agreements deal with?

[Kasymov] Of the 17 documents signed in Moscow, eight pertain to the defense ministries. Four agreements regulate the procedure for Russia's use of military ranges in Kazakhstan. Documents were signed on interstate military shipments and on cooperation in salvaging nuclear weapons.

But the most important documents, in my view, are those on the status of Russian Federation troop formations temporarily located on the territory of Kazakhstan and on procedures governing the military service of one country's citizens on the territory of the other. These documents eliminate the internal tension and uncertainty both in Russian troop units stationed on our territory and in the Kazakh Armed Forces, where a certain number of officers are not citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan or will file documents to that effect in the near future.

[Bektiyarova] Do a lot of Russians serve in our Army?

[Kasymov] There are quite a few Russian speakers among our officers and warrant officers. But it is hard to say at present just how many of them will actually become Russian citizens. And so the agreement should alleviate their concerns about their future. We are telling these people clearly and explicitly that contracts will be concluded for their terms of service. And Russia will recognize them as Russian citizens after December 31, 1994, as well, and thus provide them with social protection and other guarantees. These people will not have to lose their ties with their historical homeland.

[Bektiyarova] The joint declaration signed by the Kazakh and Russian presidents states that the countries

"shall commence the formation of Joint Armed Forces." Could you elaborate on this?

[Kasymov] We used that wording to underscore that, as potential allies, we are going to move forward jointly to create a single defense space.

But these joint armed forces will not be a single armed force along the lines of the Soviet Army. That could frighten some people, as such a merger would cause the two countries to forfeit a part of their sovereignty. On the other hand, some people would welcome this, because it would put an end to the Army's being "up in the air" and automatically resolve many issues, in particular the leasing of ranges.

By contrast, our approach is that these will be national armed forces joined on the basis of certain principles. Either by analogy with the Warsaw Treaty or NATO. They will be integrated in order to ensure the security of the two parties to the treaty. Naturally, new relations with respect to manpower and troop training will undergo development, as well as with respect to joint planning of military preparedness and matters pertaining to supplies of equipment and arms, the technical accompaniment of weapons models in service in our country, and interaction between defense enterprises that would operate in the interests of both Russia and Kazakhstan.

[Bektiyarova] Will this be a bilateral alliance? Or will it be open to other countries?

[Kasymov] Yes, it will be subject to certain rules. Any state that desires to join it will have to assume certain commitments.

[Bektiyarova] Could you be specific?

[Kasymov] First and foremost, economic commitments. Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus have created a customs union, having adopted standardized regulations governing customs and currency. Needless to say, when there exist economic and political spaces, military and technical cooperation will undergo development as well.

Incidentally, I would like to call attention to one other important result of the Moscow meeting. We were able to put aside mutual property and economic claims that had impeded the integration process. That knot has now been untied.

[Bektiyarova] Are you referring to the problem of leasing ranges?

[Kasymov] I am referring mainly to property disputes surrounding the Baykonur space center, as well as Kazakhstan's debt arising from technical credits. Through the will of both parties, we are now able to work without the burden of debts owed to each other. We have to find a common language and move forward more quickly.

[Bektiyarova] Alibek Khamidovich, will Russia use ranges on Kazakh territory without paying leasing fees?

[Kasymov] We are striving for parity-based cooperation. We must become equal partners who trust each other on all matters. If we sense that the Russian side is going to have a proper understanding of our interests, especially with respect to supplying us with equipment, arms, and spare parts, the issue of leasing ranges will recede. Each side must accommodate the other. We are prepared to engage in such work.

[Bektiyarova] Allow me to return to the integration of armed forces. On what principles, in your opinion, should they be joined—those of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, the Warsaw Treaty, NATO?

[Kasymov] I find the NATO option to be the most appealing.

In closely studying this matter at the level of the North Atlantic alliance, I see how democratically the relations among those states are structured, the high value placed on every word and every commitment, the great extent to which their relationships are based on parity, and how much they respect each other.

I was involved in the operations of the CIS Joint Armed Forces rather often and saw how those efforts proceeded. In view of the fundamentally new relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, that model is no doubt inappropriate for us.

The Warsaw Treaty system is closest and most familiar to us. I think we'll make a choice.

[Bektiyarova] Is the establishment of single supranational bodies currently planned?

[Kasymov] I do not think the question of creating a supranational command is very urgent at present. The best working body in the current stage, and one that, moreover, will entail no financial outlays, is a committee of chiefs of staff (general and main staffs). It will operate on a modern basis and supervise all processes relating to our bilateral or trilateral cooperation. This is cheaper and more effective. In the first stage, in any case.

[Bektiyarova] Do you reject a single command and the kind of single commanding officer that Marshal Shaposhnikov represented?

[Kasymov] We may eventually sort out that issue as well.

When we conclude that our integration and relations have become so multifaceted that the joint committee of chiefs of staff can no longer cope with the amount of work involved. If the need arises to perform functions of oversight, coordination, and planning, we may conclude

that such an institution is necessary. I think this is a normal thing. But we are talking about a question for the future.

[Bektiyarova] Do you consider it necessary to join the national Armed Forces in their entirety?

[Kasymov] As regards the principles of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it will be recalled that the USSR Armed Forces were not a part of the Warsaw Treaty Joint Armed Forces in their entirety, but only in part. How we will integrate now is not yet clear. We may decide that a total joining is possible, or we may decide that only a certain portion of our forces and equipment will be joined. All this requires further study and consultation.

[Bektiyarova] Alibek Khamidovich, Kazakhstan is going to submit a pact of peace and stability to the next session of the CIS. What is the significance of that document?

[Kasymov] It is intended to prompt us to take another look around and realize that we all need peace and civil harmony. Such a document is undoubtedly needed.

I am confident that the chiefs of state will sign it. We have experienced first-hand too much violence and public grief, too many conflicts, in the recent past. It's time to stop and realize that even a bad peace is better than a "good" war.

[Bektiyarova] The Chechen war has been going on in Russia for almost six weeks. How do you assess the actions of the Russian Army?

[Kasymov] It is difficult to assess the operation in Chechnya, because I haven't seen the documents or the operational plans, and I'm not privy to the details. However, I am certain that things have been very difficult there for both the soldiers and officers.

But I wouldn't attempt to judge the state of the Russian Armed Forces solely on the basis of the Chechen operation's results. I would not want to belittle the combat potential and capabilities of the Russian Army. Although it must be admitted that there was indeed insufficient preparation for those actions and that not all the elements of the situation were taken into sufficient account. It seems to me that the command of the Russian Federation Armed Forces should draw some conclusions from that conflict, I have no doubts about that. This applies to both army reform and other matters.

We must all learn a lesson and realize that we must take a very serious approach to questions involving the use of troops. This applies first of all to the country's political leadership and to those institutions that the Constitution empowers to use the Armed Forces. Every time they adopt such a decision, they must carefully weigh all the pros and cons.

ARMS TRADE**Russian Export Controls on Dual-Use Chemicals, Technology****Presidential Directive**

95WC0017A Moscow DELOVOY MIR SUPPLEMENT
PRAVO I EKONOMIKA in Russian No 38, 28 Dec 94 p 4

[Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994, signed by B. Yeltsin: "On Control Over Export From the Russian Federation of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose, but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Federation Presidential Directive

On Control Over Export From the Russian Federation of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose, But Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons

1. Approve the List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose, But Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses (appended), submitted by the Russian Federation Government.
2. The Russian Federation Government is to approve the Statute on the Procedure for Control Over Export

From the Russian Federation of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose, But Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons.

3. Establish that the foreign economic activity commodity classification codes indicated in the List appended to this Directive may be updated if necessary by the GTK [State Tariff Committee] of Russia by agreement with Eksportkontrol [not further expanded] of Russia.
4. Recognize Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 508-rp of 16 September 1994 as having become invalid.
5. This directive enters into force from the moment it is signed.

Russian Federation President

B. YELTSIN

7 December 1994 No 621-rp

List of Items Needing Export Licenses

95WC0017B Moscow DELOVOY MIR SUPPLEMENT
PRAVO I EKONOMIKA in Russian No 38, 28 Dec 94
pp 4-5

[List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose, but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses, Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994]

[FBIS Translated Text]

List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses

Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994

Item Number	Description	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code
Section I. Chemicals		
I.1.	Compounds having one P-methyl, P-ethyl, P-propyl (normal or iso-) bond	293100200; 293100300; 293100900
I.2.	N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride	29211
I.3.	N,N-diisopropylaminoethylmercaptan-2	293090800
I.4.	N,N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-ol	292219000
I.5.	Diethyl-N,N-dimethylamidophosphate	292119900
I.6.	Pinacolyl alcohol	290519900
I.7.	3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine	293339900
I.8.	Quinuclidine-3-ol	293339900
I.9.	Thiodiglycol	292090800
I.10.	Arsenic trichloride	281210900
I.11.	Cyanogen chloride	285100900
I.12.	Acid dichloranhydride (phosgene)	281210900
I.13.	Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)	290490900
I.14.	Dimethylphosphite	292090200

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses (Continued)

Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994

Item Number	Description	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code
Section I. Chemicals (continued)		
I.15.	Trimethylphosphite	292090300
I.16.	Diethylphosphite	292090800
I.17.	Triethylphosphite	292090800
I.18.	Phosphorus trichloride	281210150
I.19.	Phosphorus pentachloride	281210190
I.20.	Phosphorus oxychloride	281210110
I.21.	Hydrogen fluoride	281111000
I.22.	Hydrogen fluoride salts	282611000; 282619000
I.23.	Phenylacetic (benzylic) acid	291633000
I.24.	3-quinuclidone	293339900
I.25.	Dimethylamine	292111110; 292111190
I.26.	Thionyl chloride	281210900
I.27.	Methylbenzylate	291819900
I.28.	2-chloroethanol	290550100
I.29.	Pinacolone	291419000
I.30.	Potassium cyanide	283719000
I.31.	Sulfur monochloride	281210900
I.32.	Sulfur dichloride	281210900
I.33.	Dimethylaminohydrochloride	292111900
I.34.	Sodium cyanide	283711000
I.35.	Triethanolamine	292213000
I.36.	Phosphorus pentasulfide	281390100
I.37.	Diisopropylamine	292119900
I.38.	Diethylaminoethanol	292219000
I.39.	Sodium sulfide	283010000
I.40.	Triethanolaminohydrochloride	292213000
I.41.	N,N-diisopropyl-2-amino-ethylchloride hydrochloride	292119900

Section II. Equipment

II.1.	Production units and equipment	
II.1.1.	Reaction vessels, reactors and mixers	
II.1.1.1.	Reaction vessels or reactors with or without mixers, having an overall internal volume over 0.1 m ³ (100 l) and less than 20 m ³ (20,000 l), and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below: <i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	84798200; 841940000; 731010000

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses (Continued)**Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994**

Item Number	Description	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code
Section II. Equipment (continued)		
II.1.1.1. (continued)	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i>	
	<i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i>	
	<i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i>	
	<i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i>	
	<i>fluoropolymers;</i>	
	<i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i>	
	<i>silver or silver-plated materials</i>	
II.1.1.2.	Mixers specially designed (intended) for use in reaction vessels or reactors indicated in paragraph II.1.1.1. and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:	847990920; 847982000; 847990980
	<i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	
	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i>	
	<i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i>	
	<i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i>	
	<i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i>	
	<i>fluoropolymers;</i>	
	<i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i>	
	<i>silver or silver-plated materials</i>	
II.1.2.	Storage tanks, containers or accumulators having an overall internal volume over 0.1 m ³ (100 l) and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:	730900300; 731010000; 731100; 860900900
	<i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	
	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i>	
	<i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i>	
	<i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i>	
	<i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i>	
	<i>fluoropolymers;</i>	
	<i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i>	
	<i>silver or silver-plated materials</i>	

List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses (Continued)

Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994

Item Number	Description	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code
Section II. Equipment (continued)		
II.1.3.	Heat exchangers or condensers having a heat exchange surface area of less than 20 m ² and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:	841950
	<i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	
	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i>	
	<i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i>	
	<i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i>	
	<i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i>	
	<i>fluoropolymers;</i>	
	<i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i>	
	<i>graphite;</i>	
II.1.4.	Distillation or absorption columns having an internal diameter of more than 0.1 m and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:	841940000
	<i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	
	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i>	
	<i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i>	
	<i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i>	
	<i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i>	
	<i>fluoropolymers;</i>	
	<i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i>	
	<i>graphite;</i>	
II.1.5.	Loading (filling) equipment having remote control and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:	848180790 848180870; 848180990
	<i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	
	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight</i>	

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses (Continued)**Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994**

Item Number	Description	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code
Section II. Equipment (continued)		
II.1.6.	<p>Multiple-seal valves [ventil mnogokratnogo uplotneniya] with opening for leak detection, valves with bellows seal, check (stop) valves or diaphragm valves for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p> <p><i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>fluoropolymers;</i></p> <p><i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating)</i></p>	
II.1.7.	<p>Multipurpose supply lines (double-wall and multiwall pipes) of "pipe in pipe" type having an opening for leak detection and for which all surfaces of the inner pipe in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p> <p><i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>fluoropolymers;</i></p> <p><i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i></p> <p><i>graphite;</i></p> <p><i>silver or silver-plated materials</i></p>	841990900
II.1.8.	<p>Leak-free pumps with multiple seal, with magnetic drive, bellows or diaphragm; pumps with maximum delivery over 0.6 m³/hr or vacuum pumps with maximum delivery over 5 m³/hr (at a temperature of 0°C and pressure of 101.30 kPa), for which all surfaces of the inner pipe in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p> <p><i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i></p>	841381900; 841410300; 841410500; 841410900

List of Chemicals, Equipment and Technologies Which Have a Peaceful Purpose but Can Be Used in Creating Chemical Weapons Whose Export Is Controlled and Accomplished Under Licenses (Continued)

Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 621-rp of 7 December 1994

Item Number	Description	Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code
Section II. Equipment (continued)		
II.1.8. (continued)	<i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i>	
	<i>fluoropolymers;</i>	
	<i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i>	
	<i>graphite;</i>	
	<i>ceramics;</i>	
	<i>ferrosilicone</i>	
II.1.9.	Incineration furnaces intended for destruction of toxic chemical agents, controlled chemicals or chemical gear, equipped with specially designed waste feed systems and special loading-unloading mechanisms, with a mean combustion chamber temperature of over 1000°C, in which all surfaces in the waste feed system coming in contact with waste products are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:	841780900; 851420900; 851430900
	<i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i>	
	<i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i>	
	<i>ceramics</i>	
II.2.	Systems and sensors monitoring toxic gases	
II.2.1.	Systems for monitoring toxic gases, including sensors designed for continuous functioning and suitable for detecting chemical weapon agents and chemicals indicated in Section I of this List, or organic compounds containing phosphorus, sulfur, fluorine or chlorine with concentrations of 0.3 mg/m ³ or less	902710100; 902710900; 902790900
II.2.2.	Systems for monitoring toxic gases, including sensors designed for detecting organophosphorus compounds with the help of preparations of the cholinesterase group	902710100; 902710900; 902790900

Notes:

1. Export control does not extend to equipment specially intended for use for civilian purposes (manufacturing food products, processing cellulose pulp and producing paper, and purifying water) and being unsuitable in its design features for storing, processing, producing or passing a flow of toxic chemical agents or any controlled chemicals indicated in Section I of this List.

2. Export (transfer, exchange) of any uncontrolled equipment containing one or more of the controlled components indicated in Section II of this List, where the controlled component or components are part of this equipment and can be practically removed or used for other purposes, is subject to export control under the procedure established for equipment which is such a component.

3. Export (transfer, exchange) of an enterprise which may be used for the production of chemical weapons or chemicals indicated in Section I of this List is subject to export control.

Item Number	Description
Section III. Technologies	
Definitions	
1.	"Technology" is the specific information necessary for development, production or use of a product. This information may be in the form of "technical data" or "technical assistance"
2.	"Development" includes all stages of work preceding production, such as: designing; design studies; analysis of design options; development of design concepts; assembly and test of prototypes (simulation); diagrams of pilot production; technical documentation; process of transfer of technical documentation to production
3.	"Production" includes all stages of production such as: developing the production process; manufacturing; configuration; assembly (mounting); control and check of production; tests; quality assurance measures
4.	"Technical assistance" may assume such forms as: briefing; skill improvement; cadre training; transfer of practical experience; consulting services. Technical assistance may include a transfer of technical data
5.	"Technical data" are information in the form of designs, plans, diagrams, models, formulas, tables, detail designs (rascheniye [transliterated, possible typo with several words omitted], but may be used in the creation of chemical weapons whose export is controlled and accomplished under licenses) and specifications, aids and instructions placed on various data carriers, including those such as magnetic disks, tapes and permanent memory
6.	"Use" includes operation, installation (including on-site mounting), servicing, routine repair (check), repair, major overhaul or restoration
III.1.	Technologies of producing chemicals
III.1.1.	Technology of producing compounds containing a P-methyl, P-ethyl or P-propyl (normal or iso-) bond:
III.1.1.1.	dimethylmethylphosphonate;
III.1.1.2.	methylphosphonyl difluoride (methylphosphonic acid difluoride);
III.1.1.3.	methylphosphonyl dichloride (methylphosphonic acid dichloride);
III.1.1.4.	diethylethylphosphonate;
III.1.1.5.	ethyldichlorophosphine;
III.1.1.6.	ethylphosphonyl dichloride (ethylphosphonic acid dichloride);
III.1.1.7.	ethylphosphonyl difluoride (ethylphosphonic acid difluoride);
III.1.1.8.	methyldichlorophosphine;
III.1.1.9.	O-ethyl-2-diisopropylaminoethylmethylphosphonite;
III.1.1.10.	diethylmethylphosphonite;

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Item Number	Description
Section III. Technologies (Continued)	
<i>Definitions</i>	
III.1.1.11.	dimethylethylphosphonate;
III.1.1.12.	ethyldifluorophosphine;
III.1.1.13.	methyldifluorophosphine;
III.1.1.14.	phosphacrylate;
III.1.1.15.	phosdiol-A;
III.1.1.16.	estephane-383;
III.1.1.17.	hexarane;
III.1.1.18.	phospolyol II;
III.1.1.19.	phostetrole I
III.1.2.	Technology of producing N,N-diisopropylaminoethyl-2-chloride
III.1.3.	Technology of producing N,N-diisopropylaminoethylmercaptan-2
III.1.4.	Technology of producing N,N-diisopropylaminoethane-2-ol
III.1.5.	Technology of producing diethyl-N,N dimethylamidophosphate
III.1.6.	Technology of producing pinacolyl alcohol
III.1.7.	Technology of producing 3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine
III.1.8.	Technology of producing quinuclidine-3-ol
III.1.9.	Technology of producing thiodiglycol
III.1.10.	Technology of producing cyanogen chloride
III.1.11.	Technology of producing arsenic trichloride
III.1.12.	Technology of producing dimethylphosphite
III.1.13.	Technology of producing trimethylphosphite
III.1.14.	Technology of producing diethylphosphite
III.1.15.	Technology of producing triethylphosphite
III.1.16.	Technology of producing phosphorus trichloride
III.1.17.	Technology of producing phosphorus pentachloride
III.1.18.	Technology of producing phosphorus oxychloride
III.1.19.	Technology of producing hydrogen fluoride
III.1.20.	Technology of producing hydrogen fluoride salts:
III.1.21.1.	Technology of producing potassium bifluoride;
III.1.21.2.	Technology of producing ammonium bifluoride;
III.1.21.3.	Technology of producing sodium bifluoride;
III.1.21.4.	Technology of producing sodium fluoride;
III.1.21.5.	Technology of producing potassium fluoride;
III.1.22.	Technology of producing phenylacetic (benzylic) acid
III.1.23.	Technology of producing 3-quinolidone
III.1.24.	Technology of producing dimethylamine
III.1.25.	Technology of producing thionyl chloride
III.1.26.	Technology of producing methylbenzylate
III.1.27.	Technology of producing 2-chloroethanol
III.1.28.	Technology of producing pinacolone
III.1.29.	Technology of producing potassium cyanide
III.1.30.	Technology of producing sulfur monochloride

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Item Number	Description
Section III. Technologies (Continued)	
<i>Definitions</i>	
III.1.31.	Technology of producing sulfur dichloride
III.1.32.	Technology of producing dimethylaminohydrochloride
	(Line III.1.33 was omitted)
III.1.34.	Technology of producing triethanolamine
III.1.35.	Technology of producing phosphorus pentasulfide
III.1.36.	Technology of producing diisopropylamine
III.1.37.	Technology of producing diethylaminoethanol
III.1.38.	Technology of producing sodium sulfide
III.1.39.	Technology of producing triethanolaminohydrochloride
III.1.40.	Technology of producing N,N-diisopropyl-2-amino-ethylchloride hydrochloride
III.2.	Technology of producing equipment
III.2.1.	Design and technology of producing reaction vessels, reactors and mixers
III.2.1.1.	Design and technology of producing reaction vessels or reactors with or without mixers, having an overall internal volume over 0.1 m ³ (100 l) and less than 20 m ³ (20,000 l), and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i> <i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i> <i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i> <i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i> <i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i> <i>fluoropolymers;</i> <i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i> <i>silver or silver-plated materials</i>
III.2.1.2.	Design and technology of mixers specially designed (intended) for use in reaction vessels or reactors indicated in paragraph II.1.1 and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i> <i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i> <i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i> <i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i> <i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i> <i>fluoropolymers;</i> <i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i> <i>silver or silver-plated materials</i>
III.2.2.	Design and technology of producing storage tanks, containers or accumulators having an overall internal volume over 0.1 m ³ (100 l) and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i> <i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i> <i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i> <i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i> <i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i> <i>fluoropolymers;</i> <i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i> <i>silver or silver-plated materials</i>

Item Number	Description
Section III. Technologies (Continued)	
Definitions	
III.2.3.	<p>Design and technology of producing heat exchangers or condensers having a heat exchange surface area of less than 20 m² and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p> <p><i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>fluoropolymers;</i></p> <p><i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i></p> <p><i>graphite;</i></p> <p><i>silver or silver-plated materials</i></p>
III.2.4.	<p>Design and technology of producing distillation or absorption columns having an internal diameter of more than 0.1 m and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p> <p><i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>fluoropolymers;</i></p> <p><i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</i></p> <p><i>graphite;</i></p> <p><i>silver or silver-plated materials</i></p>
III.2.5.	<p>Design and technology of producing loading (filling) equipment having remote control and for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p>
III.2.6.	<p>Design and technology of producing multiple-seal valves with opening for leak detection, valves with bellows seal, check (stop) valves or diaphragm valves, for which all surfaces in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>(nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight; [Translator note: this line may have been omitted along with line III.1.33 in preceding column of original])</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p> <p><i>titanium or titanium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</i></p> <p><i>fluoropolymers;</i></p> <p><i>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating)</i></p>
III.2.7	<p>Design and technology of producing multipurpose supply lines (double-wall and multiwall pipes) of "pipe in pipe" type having an opening for leak detection and for which all surfaces of the inner pipe in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p><i>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</i></p> <p><i>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</i></p>

Item Number	Description
Section III. Technologies (Continued)	
Definitions	
III.2.7 (continued)	<p>titanium or titanium alloys;</p> <p>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</p> <p>fluoropolymers;</p> <p>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</p> <p>graphite;</p> <p>silver or silver-plated materials</p>
III.2.8.	<p>Design and technology of producing leak-free pumps with multiple seal, with magnetic drive, bellows or diaphragm; pumps with maximum delivery over 0.6 m³/hr or vacuum pumps with maximum delivery over 5 m³/hr (at a temperature of 0°C and pressure of 101.30 kPa), for which all surfaces of the inner pipe in contact with chemicals are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</p> <p>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</p> <p>tantalum or tantalum alloys;</p> <p>titanium or titanium alloys;</p> <p>zirconium or zirconium alloys;</p> <p>fluoropolymers;</p> <p>glass or glass lining (including glass-like or enamel coating);</p> <p>graphite;</p> <p>ceramics;</p> <p>ferrosilicone</p>
III.2.9.	<p>Design and technology of producing incineration furnaces intended for destruction of toxic chemical agents, controlled chemicals or chemical gear, equipped with specially designed waste feed systems and special loading-unloading mechanisms, with a mean combustion chamber temperature of over 1000°C, in which all surfaces in the waste feed system coming in contact with waste products are made of one or more of the corrosion-resisting materials indicated below:</p> <p>nickel or alloys with more than a 40-% nickel content by weight;</p> <p>alloys with more than a 25-% nickel content and 20-% chrome content by weight;</p> <p>ceramics</p>
III.3.	Design and technology of producing systems and sensors monitoring toxic gases
III.3.1.	Design and technology of producing systems for monitoring toxic gases, including sensors designed for continuous functioning and suitable for detecting chemical weapon agents and chemicals indicated in Section I of this List, or organic compounds containing phosphorus, sulfur, fluorine or chlorine with concentrations of 0.3 mg/m ³ or less
III.3.2.	Design and technology of producing systems for monitoring toxic gases, including sensors designed for detecting organophosphorus compounds with the help of preparations of the cholinesterase group
Notes:	
1. Export control does not extend to the design and technology of producing equipment specially intended for use for civilian purposes (manufacturing food products, processing cellulose pulp and producing paper, and purifying water) and being unsuitable in its design features for storing, processing, producing or passing a flow of toxic chemical agents or any controlled chemicals indicated in Section I of this List.	
2. Export (transfer, exchange) of the design and technology of producing any uncontrolled equipment containing one or more of the controlled components indicated in Section II of this List, where the controlled component or components are part of this equipment and can be practically removed or used for other purposes, is subject to export control under the procedure established for the design and technology of equipment which is such a component.	
3. Export (transfer, exchange) of the design and technology of producing an enterprise which may be used for the production of chemical weapons or chemicals indicated in Section I of this List is subject to export control.	
4. Approval (permission) for the export of any equipment mentioned in Section II of this List signifies permission for export to that same end user of technology in the minimum amount necessary for installation, functioning, operation or repair of this equipment.	
5. Export control does not extend to transfer of accessible data or basic scientific research published in the open press.	

DEFENSE INDUSTRY & CONVERSION

Effects of Severodvinsk Nuclear Sub Plant Strike Viewed

95UM0230A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 27 Jan 95 p 1

[Interview with Vyacheslav Vasilenko, director of the Ministry of Atomic Energy's Scientific Research and Technological Institute, conducted by Lev Godovannik in Sosnovyy Bor: "We Must Be Able To Stand up for Ourselves"; date of interview not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sosnovyy Bor and St. Petersburg—[Godovannik] Obviously your institute, which for several decades now has been conducting bench tests for nuclear submarines, has some connection with the Severodvinsk plant that manufactures those submarines and that is virtually idle today because of a strike by all of its personnel. Most likely events in Severodvinsk will affect your enterprise as well.

[Vasilenko] We don't just "have some connection" but collaborate closely. After all, our institute gives the final approval to all types of nuclear power units for ships.

And as far as the Severodvinsk plant is concerned, according to my information the question of its financing should be resolved in the next two or three months. Right now this problem is being discussed on the government level, and cooperative arrangements among enterprises capable of recycling old submarines received in Severodvinsk have already been set up. Incidentally, more than 200 such vessels have accumulated at various of the country's naval bases. The draft 1995 budget includes substantial financing for this area.

The production of new submarines, however, will evidently be cut back. And since the Severodvinsk plant is the only manufacturer of warships for our submarine fleet, the problems of Severodvinsk will affect not just our enterprise but the entire Russian fleet.

[Godovannik] In your opinion, does Russia not have enough submarines?

[Vasilenko] A reduction in the number of warships is not the only consequence of poor financing. Don't forget that any ship reactor produces a certain amount of radioactive waste. So far, this waste has been accumulated in special tanks on board the submarines. When a submarine arrived at its base, the waste would be pumped out by pipe into tankers, after which it would be dumped in the ocean.

Remember the scandal involving the TNT-5 and TNT-6 tankers, which dumped such waste directly off the coast of Japan? It happens that an international convention signed by the heads of most major countries now prohibits the discharging of such substances. But Russia never signed that convention, because it did not possess the technology that would enable it to recycle liquid radioactive waste by other means. Now we have such technology, but in order to

begin using it, we must have normal financing for the industry, including the Severodvinsk plant.

But whether the country does or does not have enough nuclear submarines is more of a political question. The economic crisis in Russia, political instability—all that is causing a certain increase in the interest in our country from the standpoint of force, if you will, even an increase in pressure on it. I am referring chiefly to NATO's Armed Forces. In order not to simply be making unsupported claims, let me remind you of the collision between Russian and American submarines in Russian territorial waters that caused such a sensation six months ago.

That is not a threat of war; please understand me correctly. It is a natural and perfectly appropriate reaction to events that have been occurring in Russia. However, any force-based pressure must be answered by methods of force. In the final analysis, other countries must see that we are still capable of standing up for ourselves in at least some respect.

Proposed Ban on Weapons Advertising Decried

95UM0271A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Yegorov, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "To the Deputies of the State Duma: The Ban on Advertising of Weapons Is a 'Mine' Under Russian 'Defense'"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Experts often explain the disorder of our life as the absence of the necessary laws. Precisely the necessary ones. This is because the striving of the legislative organs of power to increase the productivity of their work at any price often gives rise to documents that begin to work, not to the advantage, but to the detriment of matters. Here is an example: The law "On Advertising," approved by the Duma at the first reading.

Many publications have remarked that it is "raw." But, strange as it may seem, no one has yet called attention to the fact that, if the law is adopted in present form, it will become, among other things, a sort of mine laid under Russia's defense system. The question is Article 15, Paragraph 3, which in unambiguous form forbids the advertising of weapons "other than civilian ones (including those for hunting)."

Let us recall that, according to the Law "On Weapons," "civilian" weapons means those for self-defense: gas, spray, etc. Consequently, the ban extends to the advertising of combat weapons and official ones (those intended for special subunits). There simply are not any others. That is, it is also a ban against weapons that are used for "defense." And defense (as is the government as a whole) is concerned with selling them.

Work on this material has convinced one that the article in its present form came about because of the incompetence of those who developed the bill - the Government

of the RF [Russian Federation]. (There simply can be no other reason, because it is the government itself that is becoming the "main" victim of the innovation.) The lack of competence could be compensated for by consulting with experts. For some reason, though, the bill did not go to a single department that has anything to do with the development, production, and sale of weapons. Our information about its existence was news for those working in the Ministry of Defense, the RF State Committee for the Defense Industry, and the state company "Rosvooruzheniye."

And here is what makes one grab his head. Because the ones that have a real chance to be outside the law now are not just the periodic press publications that specialize in advertising and publicizing the country's high technology (read: defense) production, but also the organizers of such Russian expositions as "Arms, Military Equipment, and Conversion" in Nizhniy Novgorod, "Golden Gate" in Vladimir, the International Aerospace Salon in Zhukovskiy, as well as the marketing and advertising services of firms attempting to gain entry into the world market. They will be forbidden even to print catalogs of their products or advertising booklets. This is not to speak of the serious advertising activity that is, as we know, the moving force of trade.

It is not difficult to calculate the direct economic damage from a ban on advertising of weapons. Even the dilettante knows well that one cannot count on success in the arms business without organizing a proper advertising campaign. For this reason the best way out of the situation that has taken shape, in the view of those in defense, is to remove the proposition on banning the advertising of weapons from the bill, and that is that. But the train has already pulled out. As they had said in the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy (which has been assigned the subsequent work on the bill), all talk on removing the article is meaningless, because the law has already been adopted at the first reading. Moreover, the working group of the committee is at present completing their consideration of the amendments that have been received and will soon offer the bill for the second reading. As paradoxical as this may be, there were no amendments to Article 15, Paragraph 3.

We cannot understand why things are going this way. Why is nothing heard from the Subcommittee on the VPK [Military Industrial Commission] of the Committee on Industry, Transportation, and Energy? Why is there such a passive reaction from our country's Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for the Defense Industry, and Rosvooruzheniye? The stormy discussion about it in the State Committee for the Defense Industry took the form of weak wording of a proposed amendment that did not hold up under criticism. We cannot understand any of this, because, if the law is passed in this form, questions regarding the activity of these departments will definitely come up. After all, a significant portion of it is just what is included in an advertisement on weapons for the purpose of selling them.

It is quite clear that the paragraph on banning the advertising of weapons appeared in the bill with just one purpose: to protect citizens from the probable aggressiveness of merchants of "STRELYALKI," who like Lenya Golubkhov would so persistently teach one from the television screen to admire the beauty of hitting a target with a bullet. But what they got was something else: They brought into the article a matter of national importance, the export of arms and military equipment.

[Box]

From the RF bill "On Advertising":

Article 15. Special features of the advertising of certain types of goods (jobs, services)

3. It is forbidden to advertise weapons other than civilians ones that are permitted (including hunting weapons).

The placing of permitted advertising of civilian weapons is allowed only in printed mass information media that specialize in the area of disseminating advertising, and also in areas connected with the permitted use of hunting (sporting) weapons.

The placing of permitted advertising of civilian weapons on electronic mass information media is allowed only after 2200.

We propose to express the article in the following wording:

"The advertising of weapons is forbidden if it directly or indirectly reveals the technology of production, the methods of combat and special employment of VVT [arms and military hardware] models on the list of products (jobs, services) for military use in the territory of the Russian Federation, the export and import of which is carried out under license."

[End box]

Aleksandr Yegorov
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA

Problems, Success Stories in Defense Conversion

95UM0253A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
No 4, 1-7 Feb 95 [Signed to press 31 Jan 95] p 4

[Article by Maksim Bashin: "Expert Opinion: Conversion Zigzag"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Conversion has caused serious difficulties for enterprises of the powerful military-industrial complex. While producing more than 70 percent of Russia's industrial output, including a sizable portion of consumer goods, it has simultaneously had to conduct a serious reorganization. Conversion in 1992-1993 was of a wholesale character and able to "bare its teeth." The sharp cut in budget financing took its toll. In 1992 defense orders declined by 67 percent in comparison with the year before. The wholesale character of conversion continued to gain momentum. Numerous branch research institutes and design bureaus with their vast

scientific and technological potential found themselves in a difficult situation. They were confronted with the task of developing new types of equipment and arranging for their widespread introduction. This always takes three to four years, a period of time considered normal in the developed countries. But Russia has its own unique difficulties. Conversion is taking place amid an incomplete transition to a market economy. In the developed countries, when they shift to a peacetime economy, military production is reduced by six to seven percent. Any acceleration of these rates leads to serious economic upheaval. For Russia, given the enormous macrostructure of this field, such rates of shifting to the production of civilian output are ruled out. Conversion could drag on for 12 to 15 years. In our opinion, seven-percent rates have to be tripled.

It is a paradox: The center tries solve the problem of putting new output into production and designates a facility to produce some product, but there is essentially no enterprise. Its personnel have left, and only the fence and entrance remain; its equipment was sold off on the cheap or pilfered. Such "enterprises" obviously have to be liquidated.

In 1994, the Defense Ministry's orders for its traditional products fell by a factor of 4.3, including by a factor of 4.1 for military aircraft and missiles, 5.4 for artillery of all calibers, and 3.1 for all other types of arms. The ministry's depots are filled with reserve military equipment much of which is physically obsolete and, most importantly, no match for modern types of weaponry. No other country has seen such a wholesale reduction in orders by military departments.

The capital is the nation's calling card. One-third of the State Defense Industry Committee's scientific and technological potential is concentrated in Moscow. On the whole, the results of conversion in the capital are contradictory. Many producers have had to change horses in midstream. There are also positive instances. The Soyuz [Union] Scientific Production Association was able to put sophisticated road-building equipment into production for our neglected municipal service sector in a short period of time. We have stopped importing such equipment, and the treasury reduced its expenditures by \$310 million. The Kompozit [Composite] Association is producing high-strength materials for many branches. The city government has appropriated 20 billion rubles to aid the conversion program, and banks have provided 250 billion rubles in loans.

In the neighboring city of Zhukovskiy, a major aviation industry center, the V. Myasishchev Association, which has had long-standing reciprocal deliveries with enterprises in the capital, has been declared the first candidate for bankruptcy. Its production volume has plummeted, and its employees have not been paid for months.

Other former secret "post office boxes" in the oblast have left the wing of the Defense Ministry, become privatized, and begun producing civilian output.

The Saratov Aircraft Plant, now converted into a closed-type joint-stock company, has begun producing new aircraft for Aeroflot, and some of these planes are being exported.

The production of consumer goods has been increased, and many of them are being exported to the People's Republic of China. The Saratov Electrical Equipment Association has left the military-industrial complex and become an enterprise with a collective form of ownership; it has substantially increased the production of civilian output and reduced its defense-related production to 12 percent. With the help of the Zenit company of Germany, it has set up the production of heavy-duty refrigerators and freezers for the trade network. Under a long-term contract with General Motors, the Saratov association has completed efforts that will make possible the production of components for environmentally clean automobile engines.

The Kursk Electrical Equipment Joint-Stock Company has also gained experience in conversion. In the past, its products were intended solely for the Defense Ministry. It supplied mobile power stations to troop units. They have now been modernized for branches of the national economy, and production remains constant.

Experimental Design Bureau-52, a closed facility, has also completed a successful maneuver. The bureau was once headed by general designer and academician V. Chelomey, a leading rocket designer. The scientist's talent also manifested itself in that Chelomey, foreseeing the onset of conversion, prepared part of the firm's capacity in advance for the production of civilian output. In conjunction with U.S. firms, conversion programs selected on a competitive basis are being carried out. In conjunction with DBA-System, a space complex for remote earth sensing, known as Almaz-IV, is being developed. In conjunction with the German concern SKEPT, the production of hard-to-find equipment for the food industry has been set up.

Beating swords into plowshares has entailed many difficulties and will remain a headache for management structures for several years to come. There are many examples, such as the celebrated Kirov Plant, associated with tank production for 65 years. The plant, now converted into the St. Petersburg Joint-Stock Company, has fallen on hard times. Modern tractors have been placed in production. There are few customers and most of them are deep in debt, and private farmers have no money either because the banks won't make loans to them. Last year the Kirov plant cut the production of defense-related output to 34 percent. Nevertheless, it too is having trouble making ends meet.

Mistakes made in the course of conversion have resulted in a sharp increase in stocks of unsold output. Current assets are being frozen, and normal capital circulation is being distorted. Only rarely is production being diversified, as enterprises prefer to keep their eggs in one basket. Such instances are revealed by audits. Only then is it possible to plan steps to eliminate them. Unexpected negative factors with explosive consequences are having a serious effect. A sensation was created by news of the bankruptcy of the legendary Magnitka, an industrial leader of the early five-year plans. The metallurgical giant is closely tied to defense enterprises, supplying them with a wide range of rolled metal and scarce sheet steel. Many production lines are in

danger of shutting down. Another blow was struck in November. The flagship of our country's electronics industry, the Svetlana Plant in St. Petersburg, was declared bankrupt.

Such are the latest zigzags of conversion, which is complicated by the fact that we have been seriously displaced on the world arms market in recent years.

Experts are unanimous. It is urgently necessary to reorganize management of the defense complex. It is important to create a new infrastructure to support enterprises' current operations, and to form distributor networks and holding and leasing firms.

The government is considering terms for floating a state loan to provide financial support for conversion. It will be welcomed by entrepreneurs. Experience suggests that it would make sense to adopt additional legislative acts to guarantee a procedure for financing state orders and transferring high technology to civilian industries. State orders for the defense complex are currently regulated by an obsolete law passed in 1992. The State Duma has drafted a law defining the status of state orders financed from the budget and off-budget sources.

Let us sketch the outlook for the next two to three years. The establishment of joint ventures with foreign firms will be accelerated; a privatization process more reasonable than it has been up till now will be completed; and a sizable number of complexes will be converted into joint-stock companies.

Enormous untapped economic potential for conversion lies in the use of "dual-use" technologies, which can be used in the production of defense-related output and civilian products simultaneously. Such technologies are widely used in the developed countries.

Many enterprise executives are proposing that price controls be introduced for defense-related output, and, most importantly, that loads on their production capacity be clarified for several years in advance. No one can hide behind the state any longer. There are no easy paths in conversion, although there is now hope that they will not become an exhaustive slalom course.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. Loss to China in War Game

95UM0252A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev, under "Notes on an Occasion" rubric: "America Happily Loses War of 2010, Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I have already had the occasion to talk on the pages of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA about the war game conducted in the U.S., during which a hypothetical battle is waged between the Chinese and American armies in the sample year 2020. The Americans conducted this war

against new generation Chinese weapons using arms systems from the period of Operation Desert Storm, and lost it fair and square.

Its organizers needed the game most of all to demonstrate the undisputed superiority of the newest types of weapons, created based on the latest military-technical advances, especially in the field of information science. But here is an announcement that came again just days ago from the United States. It turns out that in the next computer games, played by order of William Perry, defense secretary, the Chinese Army again routed the American Army completely, or more exactly—the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which was supposed to prevent Mainland Chinese forces from invading Taiwan. "Our aircraft carriers were just unable to get close enough to attack,"—wrote a DEFENSE NEWS journalist in describing this "war" in the year 2010. "The Chinese winged missiles sank our surface ships, and kept the American aircraft carriers at a distance."

Information on the latest defeat of the U.S. Armed Forces cannot help but lead to serious deliberations. Here, the matter lies, obviously, not only in the fact that the Pentagon leaders, loyal to the idea of conducting a new revolution in the military as soon as possible, have decided to use this to emphasize yet again the effectiveness of the newest types of weaponry. One gets the impression that the U.S. war department at times purposely strives to minimize the war readiness of the American Armed Forces in the eyes of the public. Lately, announcements have followed, one after the other, that almost half of the armed formations, including the elite units, are experiencing a serious drop in war readiness. While Floyd Spence, U.S. Congress House of Representatives Armed Forces Committee chairman, even confirms that the level of war readiness in all types of American Armed Forces is even lower than the administration and the Pentagon admit.

I don't know if there are any grounds for statements like this. However, it is instructive that the Americans are consciously over-emphasizing facts of this kind. Most of all, in order to gain the support of a public that cannot fail to be concerned with the fate of its army, in order to flush out new appropriations for military goals.

So there is weeping across the ocean for defeats that the U.S. Armed Forces might suffer in the hypothetical battles of 2020 or 2010.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops Face Financial, Other Problems

95UM0256A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Plotnikov: "Border Troops Replenish the State Treasury"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the breakup of the unified border troops, there remain only a few sectors of the so-called "old border" which are well equipped and have

an efficient service. These are the borders with Norway, Finland, China and Mongolia. But in the other sectors of the state border of the Russian Federation, matters are worse. The illegal movement of weapons, ammunition, and drugs, and export of oil products, nonferrous metals, and lumber from Russia are a consequence of this. An especially difficult situation has developed on the border with Latvia and Estonia, as well as on the Caucasian borders. However to a large degree the border troops are managing to cope with their difficulties, despite everything.

The border with the Baltic states is being equipped. In the last two years, contracts have been signed with a number of republics for joint protection of the external borders of the Commonwealth at the former borders. Teams of Russian border troops are serving together with national border structures in Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. An agreement is being developed to create a joint command of the border services of Russia and Kazakhstan.

According to data of the Russian Federation Federal Border Service [FPS] Information Agency, in 1994 the profit from the operations "Zaslon," "Putina," and "Rubezh" and from stopping contraband cargoes at the border exceeded the maintenance costs of the Russian Border Service itself by 1.6 trillion rubles. Jointly with customs organs, last year they found and stopped 1,572 weapons, more than 80 thousand various munitions, 4,680 kg of explosives, and 1.5 tonnes of drugs, and prevented the export of 36 tonnes of nonferrous metals and 740 tonnes of diesel fuel alone. At the crossing points they managed to catch 3,981 persons trying to cross the border with documents that were counterfeit or belonged to someone else. In connection with the violations of state border procedures, 38 criminal cases were brought against 72 people.

This year too the border troops will be able to protect the borders at the same level. But judging from the problems described to journalists at a press conference by leaders of the FPS RF, it will be quite difficult for the border troops to accomplish their assigned missions.

At present more than 40 percent of the automotive transport in a formation of units of border troops has been operated for 6 or more years. Thirty-six percent of armored equipment has been in commission for 10 years or more. Forty percent of the signalling systems and complexes covering more than 2.5 thousand km of border have served out their established operating lives and require replacement. Roughly the same percentage of communications equipment has concluded its operating life. The aircraft used by the border troops have also seen better days. These subunits are equipped at just the 86-percent level. But because of the lack of finances for the purchase of spare parts and wages for repairs, even with the existing inventory, 15 percent of the planes and helicopters are laid up. In the naval forces of the border troops, 93 ships and 200 patrol boats require replacement.

Because of the lack of icebreaker-class ships, the border and economic zones of the country in the Arctic go virtually unprotected. To all this must be added also the continuous shortage of fuels and lubricants.

The list of problems which the border troops have encountered could be extended even further. In conformity with the missions assigned by the country's leadership, a plan for the construction and development of the RF FPS was drawn up. At the end of July of last year, a draft estimate of expenditures of the border service for 1995, in the amount of 5.5 trillion rubles, was presented to the RF Ministry of Finance. After coordination, this sum was cut first to 3.5 trillion, and then to 2.1 trillion rubles. But in the words of Deputy Director of the RF FPS, Lt-Gen Aleksey Shcherbakov, this amount scarcely suffices to finance even the priority expenditures. With this apportionment, practically nothing remains for the purchase of new weapons and equipment, repair and scheduled tasks, development of the infrastructure and technical border-protection systems, or social programs.

Continued Problems on Tajik Border

95UM0268B Moscow GRANITSA ROSSII in Russian
No 3 (29), Jan 95 p 2

[Article based upon Russian Border Service information: "Tajikistan: Who Is Provoking Whom?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of the Moscow Round of the Inter-Tajik Talks that were postponed from January 15 to the end of the month, opposition leaders stepped up attempts to accuse the Russian border guards of breaking down the process of a peaceful settlement. At the same time the military leadership of the DIVT [Movement of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan], within the framework of the "holy war" declared by Russia, is undertaking steps to further complicate the situation on the border.

During the course of the last week, the underground of the Movement of the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan on the territory of the republic and opposition guerrilla groups on the Afghan border continued to prepare shuttle border crossings and acts of diversion and terrorism.

The leadership of DIVT's "Kulyab Front" has undertaken the replacement of personnel of Tajik guerrilla groups. A group of Mujaheddin who underwent training in Pakistan has arrived at the Afghan city of Chah-e Ab.

The active movements of DIVT teams continued against the Moskovskiy Border Detachment's 12th Border Outpost sector. The DIVT teams delivered ammunition and materiel to Afghan border towns.

"Tajik Mujaheddin Commanding General" R. Sadirov issued an order to field commanders of guerrilla groups that are operating on the Kalai-Khumb and Khorog axes to oppose Tajikistan government troops and Russian border troops subunits in Gornyy Badakhshan and to carry out a series of acts of diversion and terrorism during the period

of January 15-20. According to Sadirov's order, a terrorist group consisting of 40 guerrillas who underwent special training in Pakistan is preparing to cross the river onto the territory of Tajikistan. It is assumed that they will operate in the central areas of Tajikistan and in Dushanbe with small teams of 3-4 men.

It has not been excluded that DIVT guerrillas, who are attempting to prevent the advance of government forces on the Vanch, Yaegulem and Porshnev axes, will undertake an attempt to mine the Kalai-Khumb-Khorog highway. In the near future, they plan to deliver remote-control mine detonation control panels from Afghan territory to a team of Junaydullo guerrillas. As before, the threat remains of the capture of Russian border guards by the guerrillas for their subsequent exchange for Ya. Mirzoyev—one of the commanders of the Islamic front who was previously arrested by 353 Tajikistan law enforcement authorities.

In this situation, it is easy to guess who is provoking whom for a breakdown of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan. Russian border guards have simply been compelled to carry out preemptive operations to disrupt enemy plans. Six river crossings by guerrilla groups were thwarted last week. As a result of combat clashes, Mujaheddin losses totaled more than 100 men killed and approximately 70 wounded. Furthermore, the following were destroyed: a guerrilla base in the village of Makhinau, three warehouses, an intermediate communications hub in the village of Shakhrahan, a Junaydullo headquarters in the village of Zakhrag, and three firing positions with crews.

RF Border Troops News Briefs

95UM0268A Moscow *GRANITSA ROSSII* in Russian
No 3 (29), Jan 95 p 2

[Articles based upon Russian Border Service information: "Exclusive"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

NORWAY. Norway plans to conduct the traditional "Voron" exercises with the participation of a border company of the "Ser-Varanger" Independent Infantry Battalion on the territory of Northern Norway during the period of March 14-23.

FINLAND. The Finnish Border Guard continues to improve the guarding of the border at entry points. Since the beginning of this year, streams of foreigners crossing

the border have been divided into citizens of the European Community countries and citizens of other countries. Customs and passport control has been simplified for representatives of the EC countries.

GERMANY. A team of German parliament deputies who advocate the development of relations with the Baltic countries has called upon Latvia and Estonia to recognize the current border with Russia. The motive for the deputies' appeal was the events in Chechnya and the need, in light of them, to deprive Russia of the opportunity to use the border issue as grounds to "implement an imperial policy".

BELORUSSIA. The Republic has leased two facilities on its territory to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. They are a missile attack warning site that is being put into operation and a Russian Nuclear Submarine Fleet Command and Control Center. The facilities are being leased for a 25-year period.

GEORGIA. A session of the Republic of Georgia Government, at which all of the force ministers were present, took place in Tbilisi. The situation that is developing in the Chechen sector of the Georgian-Russian border was discussed. The head of the Republic of Georgia expressed the opinion that Georgia needs to strengthen protection of the border by creating a second guard line and use ministry of defense and state security service forces to do that.

AJARIYA. Since the beginning of the year restrictions have been imposed on entry into Ajaria based upon an order of the chairman of the republic security service. Russian Army servicemen and border troops, who are not serving in the republic, have the right to enter Ajaria only based upon travel documents.

AZERBAIJAN. The President of Azerbaijan has relieved T. Aliyev, chairman of the country's customs committee, of his duties. The president's decree stresses that "cases of financial violations have occurred and corruption has spread" recently in the work of the customs service.

Geydar Aziyev tasked the government to develop steps to improve customs operations.

CHINA. We are noting a step up of measures directed at identifying and detaining criminal elements that are involved in drug dealing and the possession of firearms. These measures are being implemented in accordance with the orders of the Chinese leadership on the adoption of decisive measures to put things in order on the border with the Russian Federation that exclude any incidents in the PRC border areas.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

- Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.
- Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.
- Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

8 Mar 95